Couey v. Atkins
355 P.3d 866
| Or. | 2015Background
- Couey, a paid initiative petition circulator in 2010, sued Oregon Secretary of State challenging ORS 250.048(9), which forbade a registered paid circulator from simultaneously collecting signatures as a volunteer for other petitions.
- At filing Couey was registered and working as a paid circulator and wanted to volunteer for an environmental petition; he alleged chilling of free speech and association under state and federal constitutions.
- While the litigation was pending Couey stopped paid circulation, his registration expired, and no concrete volunteer petition opportunity existed; the Secretary later adopted an administrative rule defining “at the same time.”
- The Secretary moved for summary judgment as moot; trial court granted it, concluding Couey’s affidavit of future intent was speculative and that Couey failed to seek expedited review under the statute authorizing preferential docketing.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed; the Oregon Supreme Court granted review to decide (1) whether Couey’s affidavits avoid mootness, (2) whether ORS 14.175 (statutory exception for matters capable of repetition yet evading review) applies, and (3) whether ORS 14.175 is constitutional.
- The Supreme Court held Couey’s affidavits were insufficient to avoid mootness, but ORS 14.175 applies to this sort of election-law challenge and is constitutional; it reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mootness of the declaratory-judgment claim | Couey’s affidavit of intent to work again and to volunteer creates a continuing concrete interest and avoids mootness | Secretary: Couey’s registration expired and there was no present petition or concrete harm; affidavit is speculative | Affidavit insufficient; the claim is moot because facts are speculative and not present |
| Effect of overbreadth doctrine on justiciability | Overbreadth claim relaxes justiciability; plaintiff may assert third-party chill without continuing personal stake | Secretary: Overbreadth does not relieve a plaintiff of constitutional standing or mootness requirements | Overbreadth does not excuse the need for a continuing personal stake; claim became moot when plaintiff’s interest vanished |
| Application of ORS 14.175 (capable of repetition yet evading review) | Election-related challenges are likely to evade review; statute permits courts to adjudicate otherwise moot public-action cases without a requirement that petitioner seek expedited relief | Secretary: Two-year election cycle allows judicial resolution; plaintiff could have sought expedited relief or mandamus | ORS 14.175 applies; election challenges are the classic evading-review category and petitioners need not first exhaust expedition avenues |
| Constitutionality of ORS 14.175 under Oregon Constitution | Statute is a lawful legislative response to Yancy and codifies a long-recognized exception for public-interest cases | Secretary argued Yancy barred courts from deciding such moot-but-repeating cases and legislature cannot override constitution | The court disavowed Yancy’s constitutional bar as wrongly decided for public-action cases, upheld Kellas view, and found ORS 14.175 constitutional as applied to public-interest challenges |
Key Cases Cited
- Yancy v. Shatzer, 337 Or. 345 (Or. 2004) (addressed mootness and held judicial power did not permit deciding certain moot cases)
- Kellas v. Dept. of Corrections, 341 Or. 471 (Or. 2006) (held legislature may confer standing and cautioned against importing federal justiciability limits)
- Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (U.S. 1988) (applied capable-of-repetition exception to state election petition regulation)
- Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 219 U.S. 498 (U.S. 1911) (early recognition of repetition-evading-review rationale)
- Oregon Cry. Mfgs. Ass’n v. White, 159 Or. 99 (Or. 1938) (discussed limits on advisory opinions and justiciability in declaratory-judgment context)
- Brumnett v. PSRB, 315 Or. 402 (Or. 1993) (explained mootness as part of justiciability inquiry and requirement for present-fact controversy)