This is а case of judicial review of administrative rules. Petitioner below (respondent on review) Kellas 1 challenges the lawfulness of two administrative rules under ORS 183.400, which provides, in part, that “[t]he validity of any rule may be determined upon a petition by any person to the Court of Appeals!.]” (Emphasis added.) The Court of Appeals declined to reach the merits of petitioner’s arguments because it concluded that petitioner lacked standing to challenge the rules in question. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. We reverse.
We take the pertinent facts from the record and the opinion of the Court of Appeals. Petitioner is the father of an adult son, Brian Kellas. Police arrested and charged Brian with robbery and burglary, among other charges. Subsequently, Brian executed and the court approved a security release agreement in which Brian agreed that he would be on “house arrest” during the pendency of his case. That term of the agreement compelled Brian to remain at his parents’ home; it permitted him to leave the home only if a parent accompaniеd him or if he left to attend to his job, his classes, or to visit his health club. Brian’s house arrest lasted for 311 days.
Brian pleaded guilty to robbery and burglary charges. The court sentenced him, among other conditions, to prison for 36 months on each offense, with 12 months of the burglary sentence to run concurrently with the robbery sentence and the remaining 24 months to run consecutively to the robbery sentence, for a total of 60 months. The court committed Brian to the custody of the Department of Corrections (DOC). The DOC calculated Brian’s prison term, but did not give Brian credit against his prison term for the 311 days that he spent on house arrest in compliance with his pretrial security release agreement.
*474 In refusing to grant time served credit to Brian for the time he spent on house arrest, DOC relied on its interpretation of two administrative rules: OAR 213-005-0012(2)(d) and OAR 291-100-0080. The first is a rule that the Criminal Justice Commission (CJC) has promulgated. In a series of administrative rules, the CJC has specified the length of a term of incarceration that will result from a sentence imposed in a judgment of conviction. In general, the CJC rules distinguish between a sentence of imprisonment and a probationary sentence. The rules also specify the number of “sanction units” that a person sentenced to a term of incarceration must serve. A day spent in various kinds of custodial supervision, incarceration, treatment or release programs may qualify as a “sanction unit.” The CJC rules authorize sentencing judges, under specific conditions, to impose sanction units as a part of a probationary sentence. OAR 213-005-0011(3). OAR 213-005-0012(2)(d) provides that, if a court imposes sanction units as part of a probationary sentence, then the offender must rеceive credit for each day of satisfactory compliance with house arrest. OAR 213-005-0012(2) provides, in part:
“When sanction units are imposed as part of a probationary sentence, the offender shall receive credit for having served those sanction units as follows:
“(d) HOUSE ARREST: Each day of satisfactory compliance with the requirements of house arrest equals one (1) sanction unit if the offender satisfactorily completes the house arrest.”
However, the DOC asserted that OAR 213-005-0012(2)(d) was inapplicable to the sentence in Brian’s casе because the court sentenced Brian to imprisonment, not a probationary sentence, and, according to DOC, that rule applies only to probation.
The second rule is one of several rules that DOC has adopted to aid that agency in determining the length of time that it should incarcerate an inmate sentenced to its custody. OAR 291-100-0080 provides, in part, that the DOC must *475 grant credit to an inmate for time spent in custody before sentencing, such as in a county jail. However, OAR 291-100-0080(7) provides: “An inmate will not receive time served credit for time spent on hоuse arrest or electronic monitoring.” DOC declined to grant time served credit to Brian under that rule.
Petitioner filed this challenge under ORS 183.400 to assert that the refusal of DOC to grant time served credit to Brian for the period of his pretrial house arrest, pursuant to the administrative rules discussed above, was unlawful under ORS 137.370(2). That statute provides, in part:
“Except as provided in subsections (3) and (4) of this section, when a person is sentenced to imprisonment in the custody of the Department of Corrections, for the purpose of computing the amount of sentencе served the term of confinement includes only:
“(a) The time that the person is confined by any authority after the arrest for the crime for which sentence is imposed [.]”
Petitioner argued that the trial court had confined Brian to his parents’ home prior to trial for 311 days and that ORS 137.370(2)(a) required DOC to grant time served credit for that period of confinement. Petitioner contended that OAR 213-005-0012(2)(d) and OAR 291-100-0080(7) were not valid because, among other grounds, they conflicted with ORS 137.370(2)(a) and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In connection with the equal protection claim, petitioner asserted that he had a fundamental liberty interest in associating with his son and that the DOC infringed on that interest by maintaining its custody over Brian for 311 days longer than the law would permit.
DOC and CJC (collectively, the state) took no position on whether petitioner had standing to challenge the two administrative rules. Instead, the state confined its dispute with petitioner’s rule challenge to the merits. The Court of Appeals raised the issue of petitioner’s standing
sua sponte.
That court acknowledged that ORS 183.400 is broadly phrased and appears to confer standing “without regard to whether a petitioner has a personal stake in the validity of a
*476
particular administrative rule.”
Kellas v. Dept. of Corrections,
“a petitioner seeking to challenge a rule under ORS 183.400 must demonstrate that he or she has a legally recognized interest at stake and that the relief sought — validation or invalidation of an administrative rule — would have a рractical effect on that interest.”
Id. The court concluded that petitioner had failed to demonstrate that invalidation of the challenged rules would have a practical effect on petitioner or on his interest in associating with his son. Id. at 336. Consequently, the court held that petitioner had no standing to challenge the administrative rules in question. Id. at 337.
The Court of Appeals reached that conclusion by relying on its opinion in
Utsey v. Coos County,
The state now petitions this сourt for review of the Court of Appeals decision. The state argues that the legislature lawfully may authorize any person to seek judicial review to challenge the validity of a governmental action, such as an administrative rule, without a showing that the governmental action or the court’s decision will have a practical effect on that person’s individual rights or interests. We granted review and, for the reasons expressed below, conclude that, at least within the context of the present controversy, the state’s argument is corrеct.
“Standing” is a legal term that identifies whether a party to a legal proceeding possesses a status or qualification
*477
necessary for the assertion, enforcement, or adjudication of legal rights or duties.
3
See Eckles v. State of Oregon,
As noted, ORS 183.400(1) provides that “[t]he validity of any rule may be determined upon a petition by any person to the Court of Appeals!.]” (Emphasis added.) The statute imposes no additional qualification for standing in this context.
The legislature’s policy choice regarding standing in ORS 183.400(1) is unambiguous. The legislature intends by the statute to authorize any person to invoke the judicial power of the court to test the validity of every administrative rule under existing statutory and constitutional law and, thus, to advance the objective that all agency rulemaking shall remain within applicable procedural and substantive legal bounds. So understood, рetitioner satisfies the standing requirement that ORS 183.400(1) identifies. The remaining question is whether some other source of law — in this case, the Oregon Constitution — imposes any additional requirement or limitation regarding a party’s standing to challenge an administrative rule. To address that question, we examine first the scope of the constitutional authority of the legislature to enact ORS 183.400(1) and, second, the authority of an Oregon court, consistent with the conception of the *478 judicial power that we find in the Oregon Constitution, to entertain a challenge to administrative rulеs under ORS 183.400(1).
The lawmaking authority of Oregon’s legislature under the Oregon Constitution is plenary, subject only to limits that arise either from the Oregon Constitution or from a source of supreme federal law. We are aware of no qualification on the legislature’s authority in the Oregon Constitution that would restrict the legislature from authorizing any member of the public to initiate litigation concerning the validity of administrative rules under a statute such as ORS 183.400(1).
The plenary lawmaking authority of the Oregon legislature stands in marked contrast to the limitations that pertain to lawmaking by the United States Congress. For example, in authorizing litigation in the courts of the United States, Congress must respect the limitation in Article III, section 2, of the United States Constitution, which provides that the judicial power of the United States extends to the resolution of “cases” or “controversies.” That clause has given rise to an extensive body of federal law regarding the justicia-bility of disputes in federal court. See Lea Brilmayer, “The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the ‘Case or Controversy’ Requirement’’ 93 Harv L Rev 297 (1979) (reviewing federal jurisprudence of justiciability); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., “Article Ill’s CаselControversy Distinction and the Dual Functions of Federal Courts,” 69 Notre Dame L Rev 447 (1994) (same).
The Oregon Constitution contains no “cases” or “controversies” provision. Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has determined that “the constraints of Article III do not apply to state courts * * *.”
Asarco Inc. v. Radish,
“In sum, rejecting premature or advisory litigation is good policy, but rigid tests of ‘justiciability’ breed evasions *479 and legal fictions. It is prudent to keep judicial intervention within statutory or established equitable and common law remedies. It is not prudent to link a decision declining adjudication to non-textual, self-created constitutional barriers, and thereby to foreclose lawmakers from facilitating impartial, reasoned resolutions of legal disputes that affect people’s public, rather than self-seeking, interests. Requirements that rest only on statutory interpretations can be altered to meet desired ends, but change becomes harder once interpretations are elevated into supposedly essential doctrines of‘justiciability.’ * * *”
Hans A. Linde, “The State and the Federal Courts in Governance: Vive La Difference\,” 46 Wm & Mary L Rev 1273, 1287-88 (2005). See also Helen Hershkoff, “State Courts and the ‘Passive Virtues’: Rethinking the Judicial Function,” 114 Harv L Rev 1833, 1905 (2001) (concluding that “the concerns that motivate federal justiciability doctrine are not wholly applicable to the theory or practice of state governance.”).
We turn next to a consideration whether the Oregon Constitution limits the authority of Oregon’s courts to consider a challеnge to administrative rules under ORS 183.400(1). As noted, the Court of Appeals concluded in
Utsey
that Oregon courts lack the power to decide any case unless the party invoking the judicial power asserts a personal right or claims a personal injury that a judicial decision will affect in a practical way. We note that this court’s discussions of that question have not always been consistent.
Article VII (Amended), section 1, of the Oregon Constitution provides, in part:
“The judicial power of the state shall be vested in one supreme court and in such other courts as may from time to time be created by law.”
This court recognized in
Yancy v. Shatzer,
The premise for the Utsey court’s holding on that issue is that the absence of personal stake in the rule challenge on the part of petitioner prevents the court from exercising the judicial рower — whatever its scope may be — to address the matter, thus elevating the practical effects criterion to a jurisdictional component. However, from the early days of statehood to the present day, our cases undermine that view of the judicial power.
In
State v. Ware,
“ ‘the decided weight of authority supports the proposition that, where the relief is merely for the protection of private rights, the relator must show some рersonal or special interest in the subject-matter, since he is regarded as the real party in interest, and his right must clearly appear. On the other hand, where the question is one of public right, and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party; and the relator, at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted, need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen, and as such is interested in the exeсution of the law.’ ”
*481
Ware,
State ex rel. Durkheimer v. Grace,
“[A]s the question at bar is one of public right, and the object of the mandamus is to enforce the performance of a public duty, the people being regarded as the real parties in interest, it is not necessary that the relators should show any special interest or particular right to be affected by the result.”
In
Marbet v. Portland Gen. Elect,
“(1) Any person adversely affected or aggrieved by any order or any party to an agency proceeding is entitled to judicial review of a final order, * *
(Emphasis added.)
This сourt observed that the legislature, in conferring standing on “any party” admitted as such by the agency to its proceeding, entitled the petitioner to judicial review without a further showing of interest.
Marbet,
“(2) The council may, by proper order, permit any person to become a-party complainant or defendant by intervention who appears to have an interest in the results of the *482 hearing or who represents a public interest in such results * ^ * »
This court stated that ORS 469.380
“thus gives no greater procedural weight to an intervenor’s personal self-interest than to an interest that he shares with other members of the public. It expresses the legislature’s judgment that the important decisions of public policy entrusted to the Energy Facility Siting Council are not to be treated as a dispute between opposing private interests.”
Marbet,
In holding that the petitioner was entitled to judicial review of the council’s final order under ORS 183.480, despite his lack of an individualized self-interest in the outcome, this court implicitly recognized that the Oregon Constitution does not limit the legislature’s power to deputize its citizens to challenge government action in the public interest. In fact, in Marbet, this court held the case to be justiciable even though its decision would have a practical effect only on the respondent, PGE, and not on the petitioner, Marbet, who had invoked the judicial power in the first place.
More recently, in
Brian v. Oregon Government Ethics Commission,
Outside the APA, this court has reaffirmed its view in non-APA cases that statutory standing conferred in pursuit of any permissible legislative interest is sufficient to meet any constitutional requirement that might exist. For example,
Deras v. Keisling,
Finally, in
Oregon Newspaper Publishers v. Dept. of Corrections,
This court’s cases from Ware to Oregon Newspaper Publishers consistently have held that the legislature can recognize the right of аny citizen to initiate a judicial action to enforce matters of public interest. That statutory recognition satisfied whatever constitutional requirement may inhere in Article VII (Amended), section 1. The correct question accordingly is not whether Article VII, section 1, requires a personal stake in the proceeding. Rather, the question is whether the legislature has empowered citizens to initiate a judicial proceeding to vindicate the public’s interest in requiring the government to respect the limits of its authority under law.
In reaching its contrary conclusion in
Utsey,
the Court of Appeals еrroneously relied on decisions in which this court discussed a practical effects requirement in the context of distinguishable statutory standing requirements, such as those in the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act,
6
ORS 28.010 to 28.160.
See Oregon Cry. Mfgs. Ass’n v. White,
We acknowledge that three recent decisions from this court may have caused some confusion in the application of statutes conferring standing on persons who do not assert a personal interest in the outcome. In
People for Ethical Treatment v. Inst. Animal Care,
In the third case,
McIntire v. Forbes,
*486 “There are two aspects to the analysis of justiciability in this case. The first relates to the standing inquiry: will a decision have a practical effect on the rights of the parties? The secоnd relates to ripeness: is this case brought prematurely?”
McIntire,
“This court recently has reiterated the standard for a justi-ciable controversy under Oregon law:
“ ‘Under Oregon law, a justiciable controversy exists when “the interests of the parties to the action are adverse” and “the court’s decision in the matter will have some practical effect on the rights of the parties to the controversy.” Brumnett v. PSRB,315 Or 402 , 405-06,848 P2d 1194 (1993).’ Barcik v. Kubiaczyk,321 Or 174 , 182,895 P2d 765 (1995).”
McIntire,
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that the standing component in ORS 183.400(1) does not violate any limitation imposed by the Oregon Constitution. Petitioner satisfied that requirement. The Court of Appeals erred in concluding otherwise and dismissing the petition. On remand, the Court of Appeals must address the merits of the petition.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remаnded to that court for further proceedings.
Notes
In this opinion, we refer to Scott Thomas Kellas by his designation in the proceeding below, “petitioner.”
This court allowed review in
Utsey
but later dismissed the petitions for review when the underlying controversy became moot.
See Utsey v. Coos County,
Unlike the concepts of ripeness and mootness, which inquire about whether litigation has occurred too soon or too late (i.e., they ask the question “when?”), standing asks the question “who?” Elaborating on that point, Justice Antonin Scalia has commented: “In more pedestriаn terms, [standing] is an answer to the very first question that is sometimes rudely asked when one person complains of another’s actions: “What’s it to you?’ ” Antonin Scalia, “The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers’’ 17 Suffolk U L Rev 881, 882 (1983).
For an application in the land use context of the requirement that a petitioner be “adversely affected” or “aggrieved” to petition for agency review, see
Jefferson Landfill Comm. v. Marion Co.,
ORS 251.235 (1993) provided, in part, that “[a]ny person dissatisfied with an explanatory statement for which suggestions were offered at the Secretary of State’s hearing * * * may petition the Supreme Court seeking a different statement and stating the reasons the statement filed with the court is insufficient or unclear.”
ORS 28.110 provides, in part:
“When declaratory relief is sought, all persons shall be made parties who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the declaration * *
(Emphasis added.)