Corley v. United States, 11 F.4th 79

Plaintiff Royce Corley, then incarcerated at FCI Danbury, sued prison dental staff for medical malpractice arising from dental treatment in Connecticut. He filed pro se in the Southern District of New York.
The SDNY transferred the case to the District of Connecticut under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) because the events, witnesses, and evidence were located in Connecticut.
The District of Connecticut dismissed Corley’s original complaint without prejudice for failing to name the United States in an FTCA claim; Corley filed an amended complaint naming the United States.
The United States moved to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5) for insufficient service, arguing Corley failed to attach the Connecticut statutory ‘‘good-faith’’ certificate (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-190a) required in state medical-malpractice suits.
Corley argued the Federal Rules govern FTCA suits (so § 52-190a is inapplicable), and alternatively raised an access-to-courts claim and asked for appointment of a health-care provider or an extension to obtain the certificate.
The district court dismissed for failure to file § 52-190a’s certificate; the Second Circuit vacated, holding § 52-190a is procedural and conflicts with the Federal Rules, so it does not apply in FTCA actions, and affirmed the transfer as not an abuse of discretion.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-190a (certificate of good-faith / expert opinion requirement) applies in FTCA suits	Corley: Federal Rules govern procedure in FTCA actions; § 52-190a is procedural and conflicts with FRCP, so it is inapplicable	U.S.: FTCA makes the United States liable "in the same manner and to the same extent" as a private party; § 52-190a is a substantive condition precedent that must apply to preserve the Government’s defenses	The statute is procedural (a pleading/service requirement) and conflicts with the Federal Rules; it does not apply in FTCA suits. The dismissal was vacated.
Whether requiring § 52-190a would impermissibly alter substantive liability under Connecticut law	Corley: Applying § 52-190a is unnecessary to define substantive elements of malpractice and would improperly burden FTCA plaintiffs	U.S.: Applying § 52-190a preserves parity with private defendants and the FTCA waiver of sovereign immunity	Court: § 52-190a does not change Connecticut’s substantive malpractice elements; it regulates pleading/service and thus is procedural.
Whether the Southern District of New York abused its discretion by transferring venue to D. Conn.	Corley: He filed in SDNY because it was convenient; transfer was improper	Transfer court: Operative facts, witnesses, documents, and parties were in Connecticut	Court: Transfer under § 1404(a) was within discretion and not an abuse; transfer affirmed

Hernandez v. United States, 939 F.3d 191 (2d Cir. 2019) (state law is the source of substantive liability under the FTCA)
F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1994) (FTCA’s reference to "law of the place" means state substantive law)
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393 (2010) (analysis for conflicts between federal rules and state law)
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (Rule 8’s notice-pleading standard and plausibility requirement)
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (federal courts in diversity apply state substantive law and federal procedural law)
Hill v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 393 F.3d 1111 (10th Cir. 2004) (Tenth Circuit applied a state certificate-of-review rule in an FTCA action)
Gallivan v. United States, 943 F.3d 291 (6th Cir. 2019) (federal court should apply the Federal Rules where state affidavit-of-merit conflicts with FRCP)
Pappas v. Philip Morris, Inc., 915 F.3d 889 (2d Cir. 2019) (distinguishing procedural and substantive law)