Cordero v. State
296 Ga. 703
Ga.2015Background
- Marco Cordero was convicted by a Fulton County jury of felony murder (predicated on cruelty to children) and first-degree cruelty to children for separate incidents spanning Sept–Dec 2007 and Jan 16–18, 2008; four-year-old Mark Mendez died on Jan 18, 2008.
- Mother Sabina Mendez pleaded guilty to first-degree child cruelty and testified that Cordero repeatedly beat the child with objects, hung him upside down, rubbed chili on him, and otherwise abused him; medical evidence showed over 60 injuries and death from generalized blunt force trauma.
- Appellant admitted some discipline but denied many of the severe acts; forensic and medical testimony concluded injuries were not self-inflicted and the cumulative injuries caused death.
- Jury acquitted on some counts (malice murder, felony murder predicated on aggravated assault) and convicted on felony murder (predicated on cruelty) and separate cruelty counts for two time periods; court merged January cruelty with felony murder but sentenced separately on the Sept–Dec cruelty count.
- Appellant appealed alleging (1) ineffective assistance of counsel based on jury recharges given during deliberations and (2) erroneous sentencing because the Sept–Dec cruelty conviction should have merged with felony murder.
Issues
| Issue | Cordero's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Ineffective assistance for trial counsel’s proposed answers to jury questions about causation and felony murder | Counsel’s answers could have confused jury into convicting felony murder based solely on underlying felony, without proximate-cause analysis or considering intervening acts by wife | Charge as given (when read with full instructions) adequately required finding of underlying felony plus cause of death; no reasonable probability of different outcome | Denied: no prejudice under Strickland — conviction affirmed |
| 2. Whether jury needed a Jackson proximate-cause charge | Cordero: court should have charged Jackson proximate-causation principles to address intervening causation and foreseeability | State: jury was adequately instructed overall; evidence showed injuries were not self-inflicted and January acts proximate to death | Denied: no reasonable probability different result even if additional Jackson charge given |
| 3. Whether Sept–Dec 2007 cruelty conviction merged with felony murder / Jan 2008 cruelty for sentencing | Cordero: expert testimony that cumulative injuries caused death means earlier assaults merged into single course of conduct culminating in murder | State: Sept–Dec assaults were completed earlier and separated by a deliberate interval; Jan assaults materially accelerated death so earlier crime was independent | Held: convictions do not merge — Sept–Dec cruelty is an independent offense; separate sentence permitted |
| 4. Sufficiency of the evidence to support convictions | Cordero: (implicit) challenges weight/attribution of injuries to him vs. wife | State: multiple witnesses, forensic evidence, admissions, and expert testimony support convictions | Held: Evidence sufficient under Jackson v. Virginia; credibility issues for jury to resolve |
Key Cases Cited
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (establishes sufficiency-of-evidence standard for criminal convictions)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (two-prong ineffective-assistance standard)
- Drinkard v. Walker, 281 Ga. 211 (adopts required-evidence/Blockburger test for merger)
- Coleman v. State, 286 Ga. 291 (discusses merger where no deliberate interval exists)
- State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646 (defines proximate causation in felony-murder context)
- Castro v. State, 295 Ga. 105 (holds act that materially accelerates death can be proximate cause despite pre-existing injuries)
- Jones v. State, 290 Ga. 670 (separate completed crimes do not merge when one is completed before the other)
- Bradley v. State, 292 Ga. 607 (jury resolves credibility and conflicts in evidence)
- Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (required-evidence test for multiple offenses)
- Fair v. State, 288 Ga. 244 (states offender takes victim as found; eggshell-skull principle)
- Bryant v. State, 270 Ga. 266 (pre-existing conditions do not preclude proximate causation when assault materially accelerates death)
- Durden v. State, 250 Ga. 325 (proximate causation where defendant’s act materially accelerated death)