Cooke v. Colorado City, Town of
3:10-cv-08105
D. Ariz.Nov 25, 2014Background
- Plaintiffs Ron and Jinjer Cooke sued the Town of Colorado City, City of Hildale, Hildale-Colorado City Utilities, Twin City Water Authority, and Twin City Power for religious discrimination and retaliation under the federal Fair Housing Act (FFHA) and Arizona Fair Housing Act (AFHA). A jury awarded substantial damages on discrimination and retaliation claims.
- The State of Arizona intervened, asserting three theories: (1) discrimination in services/facilities; (2) retaliation/interference with enjoyment of dwelling; and (3) a pattern-or-practice of resistance to AFHA rights under A.R.S. § 41-1491.35. The jury returned advisory findings on the pattern-or-practice theory.
- When entering the final Judgment and Permanent Injunction, the district court initially concluded § 41-1491.35 did not create an independent cause of action but rather conferred standing and expanded remedies for the Attorney General. The court therefore declined to enter judgment on the pattern-or-practice claim.
- The State moved under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) to amend the Judgment, arguing the court erred and that § 41-1491.35 supplies a substantive pattern-or-practice cause of action.
- After reconsideration, the court concluded Balistrieri and related FHA jurisprudence showed the statute, when read with other AFHA provisions, supports a pattern-or-practice cause of action that requires: statutory standing, proof of underlying AFHA violations, and a demand for relief under § 41-1491.35(B). The court therefore amended the Judgment to add § 41-1491.35 as a basis for judgment for the State.
- The court also granted specific injunctive relief for certain nonparties (John Cook and Patrick Barlow) ordering defendants to provide nondiscriminatory access to municipal utilities and required relevant municipal officers to certify they have read the amended injunction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does A.R.S. § 41-1491.35 create an independent cause of action (pattern-or-practice) or only confer standing/remedies? | § 41-1491.35 supplies a statutory cause of action permitting the State to pursue a pattern-or-practice claim and relief. | The statute is a method-of-proof/standing provision only; it does not create a freestanding cause of action. | Court: § 41-1491.35, read with AFHA, supports a pattern-or-practice claim requiring standing, proof of underlying AFHA violations, and a § 41-1491.35 remedy. |
| Whether jury’s advisory finding of a pattern-or-practice satisfies the requirement that the AG had "reasonable cause" to sue under the statute | Jury finding established the Attorney General had reasonable cause to believe a pattern existed. | N/A (defendants argued no separate claim exists) | Court: Jury’s finding satisfies the intertwined standing/merits showing required under the statute. |
| Whether additional specific injunctive relief for nonparties (water connections) is warranted | State sought orders requiring nondiscriminatory utility service for identified nonparties based on trial evidence of ongoing discrimination. | Defendants argued remediation steps underway and some relief is moot for one nonparty. | Court: Granted targeted injunctive relief for Cook and Barlow; emphasized compliance and warned of contempt. |
| Whether Rule 59(e) relief was appropriate to correct the court’s prior legal error | State: amendment required to correct manifest legal error and prevent injustice. | Defendants: prior order correct; pattern-or-practice is not a freestanding claim. | Court: Exercised discretion to amend judgment, concluding prior narrow terminology was error and amendment appropriate. |
Key Cases Cited
- Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (discusses distinction among standing, cause of action, and relief)
- United States v. Balistrieri, 981 F.2d 916 (7th Cir.) (treats FHA § 3614 pattern-or-practice framework as requiring both standing and proof of underlying statutory violations)
- Parisi v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 710 F.3d 483 (2d Cir.) (Title VII jurisprudence: pattern-or-practice characterized as method of proof)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (standing elements must be proved like other elements of a claim)
- Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (government may show employer’s regular practice of discrimination in pattern-or-practice actions)
