Conservatorship of T.B., 99 Cal.App.5th 1361

T.B. was found gravely disabled under the Lanterman-Petris-Short (LPS) Act and a conservator was appointed following her incompetency to stand trial after criminal charges.
T.B. demanded a trial on the conservatorship; by statute, trial should commence within 10 days of demand, but several continuances resulted in a 171-day delay.
The continuances were mainly due to prosecution counsel's scheduling conflicts, court unavailability, and pending receipt of records. T.B.'s counsel did not object until after the third continuance.
Effective January 1, 2023, the governing statute was amended to state that failure to commence trial within the statutory timeframe is "grounds for dismissal."
T.B. moved for dismissal under the amended statute and on due process grounds, arguing the delay required dismissal; both motions were denied.
On appeal, the principal legal issues were the correct interpretation of the statutory time limit and whether denial of dismissal constituted abuse of discretion or due process violation.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the statutory 10-day trial limit in section 5350(d)(2) is mandatory or directory	T.B.: The amended statute makes the time limit mandatory—failure to start trial within 10 days (or extended time) requires dismissal.	Public Guardian: The time limit is only directory; the court has discretion whether to dismiss based on delay.	The time limit is directory, not mandatory; dismissal is discretionary, not automatic.
If denial of motions to dismiss for delay was abuse of discretion	The court did not exercise proper discretion and failed to weigh relevant factors before denying dismissal.	The court acted within its discretion and good cause existed for continuances.	The court abused its discretion by not weighing all relevant factors, but reversal is not warranted absent a showing of prejudice.
Requirement to show prejudice for reversal on appeal	Prejudice should be presumed due to the delay and legislative intent for expedited LPS proceedings.	T.B. must affirmatively show prejudice resulting from the delay.	Prejudice is required for reversal; mere delay, without showing prejudice, is insufficient.
Whether the delay violated due process	The delay was so lengthy it violated due process rights to a timely trial.	Only actual prejudice or impaired defense demonstrates a due process violation; delays did not affect fairness of trial.	No due process violation was shown; the Barker factors do not support reversal in these civil proceedings.

Conservatorship of John L., 48 Cal.4th 131 (Cal. 2010) (explaining substantial liberty interests and procedural protections under the LPS Act)
Conservatorship of Ben C., 40 Cal.4th 529 (Cal. 2007) (discussing balancing of public and private interests under LPS Act)
Conservatorship of Roulet, 23 Cal.3d 219 (Cal. 1979) (detailing personal and reputational impacts of LPS conservatorships)
People v. Overstreet, 42 Cal.3d 891 (Cal. 1986) (presumption that legislature is aware of existing law when enacting statutes)
Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. Univ. of S. Cal., 55 Cal.4th 747 (Cal. 2012) (clarifying abuse of discretion standard)
F.P. v. Monier, 3 Cal.5th 1099 (Cal. 2017) (harm and prejudice requirements for reversal on appeal)
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (U.S. 1972) (speedy trial/due process framework—adopted for argument but found inapplicable to this civil context)