*1 No. 30730. Feb. [L.A. 1979.] MABEL the Person and the Estate ROULET.
Conservatorship HEAP, etc., Conservator, MAY MORRISON
Petitioner and Respondent, ROULET,
MABEL Objector Appellant.
Counsel Mowrer, Jr.,
Glen Defender, Public Gilbert W. Lentz and Richard Defenders, Public Savidge, Deputy Objector Appellant. Halvonik,
Paul State Defender, Public Sevilla, Charles M. Chief Assistant Defender, State Public Quin Denvir, Richard E. and Paul D. Shapiro Defenders, Portman, State Public Sheldon Estella W. Fogel, Deputy Samuel L. Williams and Richard J. Kamins Amici Curiae on Dooley, behalf of Objector Appellant. P. Counsel, Levine, and Marvin
George Kading, County Deputy County Counsel, for Petitioner and Respondent. Sorenson,
Keith C. District (San Mateo), H. Attorney Joseph III, District as Amici Curiae on behalf of Clasgens Deputy Attorney, Petitioner and Respondent.
Opinion
BIRD, case, C. J.In this the court must decide if proof beyond reasonable doubt a unanimous verdict are the standards proper before a can conservator under the Lanterman- apply appointed Petris-Short Act’s with the (LPS Act) grave disability provisions,1 power commit a conservatee ato state mental institution for involuntarily up to a year. Welfare section 5350 et Unless otherwise 1See and Institutions Code all seq. specified, references herein to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
statutory
I In the Public December Guardian of the respondent, County Barbara, named Santa was conservator of and estate of Mabel Roulet. was to confine appellant, Respondent given power instructions, in a mental institution. Pursuant appellant respondent’s in Camarillo State was November placed Hospital. appellant under sections 5350 and 5361 to reestablish the respondent petitioned over for an additional because of conservatorship appellant year appel- lant’s due to a mental disorder. alleged continuing grave disability
At the time of the recommitment was 59 proceeding, appellant years *4 old. to the reevaluation form filled out According conservatorship at Camarillo State not could physicians Hospital, appellant provide confused, her basic needs because is so that she is disorganized “[s]he unable to make If she has some funds she will waste daily plans. living on The form indicated that was cigarettes drinking.” appellant [sic] to treatment because “. . . she feels she is not unwilling accept voluntarily ill.” mentally
Pursuant to subdivision of section (d) demanded a appellant jury trial on the of whether issue she was disabled. At trial gravely appellant the be instructed that a conservator could be requested jury for her if the appointed only jury unanimously agreed, beyond doubt, reasonable was disabled as the result of appellant gravely mental disorder. The trial refused this instruction. Instead he judge need of the instructed jury they only apply preponderance and that 9 of the 12 must in order evidence standard only jurors agree found reach a verdict. to be a jury Subsequently appellant disabled person.2
The trial court entered an order reestablishing conservatorship numerous to institutional- powers including granted respondent power ize to continue her and to her to commitment), (i.e., appellant require receive treatment related her specifically remedying “grave disability.” The court further ordered that (§ 5358.) lose the appellant privilege license driver’s and the to enter into contracts without possessing the consent and of the conservator. (§ 5357.) approval 2How the voted is not clear from the record. The clerk’s contains entirely transcript jury the verdict returned but that form does not indicate the number of jury, jurors The minute does not show that the concurring. entry was hearing polled. order from indicates that the verdict was unanimous. appealed This The Court followed. reversed the order appeal Appeal that the reason- holding unanimously conservatorship, reestablishing Thereafter, court this able doubt standard must granted applied. conservator’s petition hearing.
II
trials,
In criminal
a reasonable doubt
is an
guilt beyond
obstacle the state
in its own
in order to lessen the
places
way,
possibility
an innocent
This
constraint is
convicting
person.
procedural
eloquent
stakes involved—a defendant’s
freedom and
testimony
high
on the verdict. In
v. Burnick
reputation
hinge
319-322
imagine committed experienced by competent person falsely disturbed order that freedom appreciate openly trial at a civil commitment Therefore, the Burnick court proceeding. ruled that a reasonable doubt proof beyond disor- applies mentally *5 sex dered offender proceedings.
The of Burnick is here. The logic equally applicable appointment of a conservator for and her confinement in a appellant subsequent mental will her of freedom its in most hospital against deprived appellant basic a on her aspects placed stigma lasting reputation. Deprivation Liberty
A. extent to which is at stake be can ascertained liberty by reviewing what awaits an individual exactly subjected grave disability When the establishment of a is recommend- proceeding. conservatorship ed, court a conservator who has the may appoint temporary power the individual in a treatment to six months keep facility up pending the outcome of a trial on the issue 5352.1, If (§§ 5353.) grave disability. disabled,” the individual is found be the court then “gravely appoints conservator which the conservator will specifies powers possess. One of the (§§ 5358.) which the court principal powers may grant conservator is the in a conservatee an institution. Unlike a place who is found to be to others and can be person imminently dangerous confined for a of 90 maximum before a new court order must issue days can be to be who is found
(§§ 5300-5306),3
his or her
in mental
confined
by
hospital
up
year
involuntarily
extensions.
conservator,
of additional
with the
year-long
possibility
is
included
not
5361.)
(§§
temporary conservatorship
period
to reestablish
If the conservator
(§ 5361.)
in the
petitions
one-year period.
the conservatee
the court
order
may
conservatorship,
expiring
are com
until renewal
date
the termination
confined
past
cases an
effect,
assure
In
these statutes
many
pleted.
“The
confinement.
of state-sanctioned
indefinite
unbroken and
period
is
as successive
of detention
maximum
petitions
theoretical
period
life
296, 300
5 Cal.3d
re
W. (1971)
filed . . . .” (In
Cal.Rptr.
[96
Gary
added.)
486 P.2d
italics
1201],
mental
inmates of state
court has
This
recognized
previously
In In re
S.
on their freedom.
face serious restrictions
Roger
hospitals
the court
1286],
569 P.2d
Cal.Rptr.
form of
restraint.
is a direct
confinement
noted
physical
involuntary
that a
liberty
And
is
personal
principal ingredient
dispute
beyond
“[i]t
. . .” (Id.,
restraint’
‘freedom from
p.
bodily
[citation].
court of
a federal
14 Cal.3d
appeals
People
“
fact
that civil
‘the
cited to
was
emphasize
indisputable
opinion
in the constitu
commitment
“massive curtailment
entails a
liberty”
individual’s
of an
The destruction
personal
tional sense. [Citation.]
total than that
less
civil commitment
effected
scarcely
freedoms
”
in a
confinement
effected
penitentiaiy.’
236, 244-245
Cal.Rptr.
v. Olivas (1976)
Again,
in institutions
confined
stated, “While wards
this court
375],
551 P.2d
within the
freedom
often
Youth
greater
*6
experience
Authority
or mental
in state
confined
hospitals
individuals
prisons
institution
will, a most
their
incarcerated
are nevertheless
against
[citation], they
added.)
(Italics
form of
basic
deprivation.”
liberty
personal
this court.
decisions of
these
fails to distinguish
previous
Respondent
in the fact
false comfort
Instead,
takes
appellant’s
respondent
remedial
for
a “civil” confinement
purposes.
commitment
only
device is
that the conservatorship
data
of many
gatherers
3“The definite impression
from recalcitrant patients.
consent to treatment
necessity
obtaining
to avoid
used
into
who are coerced
accepting
on the number of people
One can only speculate
if the individual is
threat to initiate the conservatorship process
treatment
‘voluntary’
by
Disabled”:
(Morris,
the “Gravely
Conservatorship
treatment.”
accept
unwilling
for
L.Rev. 225
(1978) 15 San Diego
Nondeclaration
Nonindependence
California’s
(hereafter
Disabled).)
Conservatorship
Gravely
cited
225
However,
these are mere labels.
in Camarillo State
Appellant’s stay
was not
less
because
state called her
Hospital
any
involuntaiy
incarceration
one name rather than
As
another.
the United States
written,
Court has
is a
“commitment
Supreme
authoritatively
deprivation
It is
will,
incarceration
one’s
whether
it is called
liberty.
against
”
1,
‘criminal’
re
or ‘civil.’
Gault
(In
(1967) 387 U.S.
50
L.Ed.2d
[18
558, 87 S.Ct.
In a
1428].)
Court
subsequent opinion,
Supreme
reiterated that “civil labels and
intentions do not themselves obviate
good
the need for criminal due
. . . .”
re
(In
(1970)
safeguards
process
Winship
368, 376,
397 U.S.
365-366
L.Ed.2d
226 in need of the state’s care. If a is in fact appellant person incapable life, for the necessities of this should not providing daily prove
insurmountable burden for the petitioner cany. relies on the concurring dissenting opinion today argument
that confinement of an is “. . . never in allegedly gravely or an institutional environment for the jail, prison, designed punish and dis. convicted of crimes.” 238.) ment of (Conc. opn., post, at p. persons However, recent statistics from the California of Health Department State for the Disordered (Ann. (1975-1976) Rep., Mentally Hospitals for Health table hereafter cited as 1977) Center Statistics (Apr. p. Ann. indicate that conservatees under the LPS Act are Rep.) frequently 30, 1976, and Patton State As of June at Atascadero Hospitals. placed and 40 these institutions contained percent, approximately percent crimes and determined to be of those convicted of persons respectively, Hence, sexual offenders 6300 et disordered (see § seq.). conservatees do often find themselves confined in the same as those place 1975-1976, of crimes. out of convicted fiscal During year example, 1,325 conservatees admitted to state under sections hospitals 5353, 23 were admitted to Atascadero and 140 to Patton. (Ann. Rep., 1,956 table Of the total conservatees p. inpatient state June were at Atascadero and 126 were at hospitals Patton. table The 102 conservatees at Atascadero (Id., p. almost of the total of that institution comprised percent population and the 126 at Patton more than 15 (1,045), total comprised percent of that (823). (Ibid.) population hospital
In this court the resemblance in soberly recognized reality State between Atascadero and a conventional “Let us Hospital prison. Gault, deceive not ourselves as nature of that institution. In re (Cf. 387 U.S. L.Ed.2d It was described 545-546].) frankly of the medical ‘In as follows its distinguished body profession. like a this is much more hospital. physical appearance, prison architectural it the modern its planning, disregards psychiatric concept corridors, bars, There are bare iron community. gates, therapeutic rather than treatment. rows of cells—all the stigmata punishment are locked out of them Patients who individual rooms during occupy to withdraw for Patients wards and have no privacy. day opportunity area reasonable amount of from one have a hospital mobility another, are in evidence . . . security precautions everywhere. although has a attractive appearance. Externally, plant misleadingly [If] *8 attributes, its it is well-maintained and Internally, despite dehumanizing and characterized as Other well-equipped might sanitary dungeon.’ observers have confirmed this (Fns. omitted.) description.” (People 319-320.)
Therefore, the mere fact that found herself confined in a appellant rather does not eliminate the need to her hospital prison protect confinement. against false for has been whom conservatorship faces of of
established the loss other liberties in addition to the loss many her For his or freedom from restraint. the conservator4 physical example, is also to an given powers granted guardian incompetent 7, 8 5357; and 9 of division of the Probate Code. Prob. chapters Code, These 1852.) § include: conservatee’s debts and payment Code, collection or of debts owed the conservatee (Prob. discharge estate, 1501); of the or § conservatee’s sale management including Code, encumbrance of the conservatee’s (Prob. 1530); §§ property commencement, and defense of actions for of the prosecution, partition Code, conservatee’s interests (Prob. 1506-1508); §§ property disposition of the conservatee’s or other for money property court-approved compro- Code, mises or (Prob. 1530a); §§ of the judgments deposit bank, conservatee’s in a institution, and loan or credit money savings Code, (Prob. union 1513); the § to vote shares of the giving proxies conservatee’s Code, stocks and (Prob. 1517); corporate § borrowing when it will Code, benefit the conservatee money (Prob. 1533). § addition, the court the conservator or all of the may grant any powers in Probate Code 1853.5 section (See § specified 4“A on LPS report Santa Clara conservatorships revealed that a County majority conservators,
conservatees had no with contact their and personal in fact did not they Disabled, even know their (Morris, names. Conservatorship [Fn. Gravely omitted.]” 15 San L.Rev. Diego 5These are as follows: “To powers institute and maintain all actions and other for the benefit proceedings to defend all actions and other against the estate; take, conservatee or to collect and hold conservatorship of the property conservatee; to contract for the and to conservatorship perform contracts and outstanding estate; business, bind the thereby to at the conservatorship risk the estate operate any or farm enterprise asset constituting take conservatorship, grant options; sale; servitudes; sell at or to create public private or otherwise easements and by grant thereof; to borrow for the money give real or security repayment purchase alter, raze, or personal improve and rebuild property; repair conservator- replace to let or lease ship property; property any for and purpose including exploration removal of oil and other and natural minerals resources and for gas, any period, including time; a term at a to loan future commencing money adequate security; exchange to sell on credit conservatorship property; provided any unpaid portion selling *9 to
Further an individual found be disabled” suffer “gravely may disabilities, of the numerous loss including possible following statutory :6 law to remain licensed to & Prof (Bus. rights practice profession (e.g., 2416, Code, 6007, Code, & to 2417); subd. medicine Prof. (a)); (Bus. §§ § Code, 1770, offices subd. to (Gov. (b)); continue to hold certain § public Code, to establish 87732); remain as a teacher (Ed. §§ employed Code, children certain (Civ. or maintain custody relationships (e.g., Code, to to 4506); subd. (Civ. §§ (a)(6)); § object marriage refuse certain of medical treatment sterilization to (§ 7254); types to a driver’s license 5358); subds. (c), (d), subd: (§§ possess 8103); or firearms (§§ to own (a)); possess ^remain Code, contracts (§ and to enter into 701); to vote (Elec. § registered subd. (b))). illustrates, that a there can be no review finding
As this question result in serious liberty. personal disability may deprivation grave his or her control of Indeed, a conservatee subjected greater of a crime. life than one convicted Stigma
B. issue which must be resolved is whether second any “stigma” when an individual is found to be disabled due to a attaches gravely toward a mental disorder. attitude argues Respondent public is one of this is not disabled person “sympathy.” Unfortunately, evidence, which this court accurate. There compelling completely ill with still views society acknowledged suspicion. secured; and securities or all shares to vote by proxy shall be adequately
price conservator; in and and stock to exercise stock rights options; participate held trust and any voting any and to consent provisions become subject dissolution, consolidation, or other modification or liquidation merger, reorganization, effect insurance for the necessary affecting conservatorship property; adjustment collect, estate, to arbitrate or otherwise compromise, adjust of the pay, protection proper taxes; claims, those for debts or demands conservatorship, including and all upon any accountants, counsel, and to investment attorneys, valueless employ to abandon property, and to therefor from the conservator- pay expense depositaries employees agents, Code, (Prob. § estate.” ship to refer to impairments resulting different several phrases cited utilize 6The statutes identical to language are not always these terms Although mental disorders. from Act, would disability certainly LPS a finding grave disability provisions the grave of these falls within the ambit whether an individual a determination be relevant statutory provisions. *10 the ill the of “In the ideal would be society, mentally subjects and rather than and aversion. But understanding compassion ignorance view, does not unfortunately, yet enlightened prevail. stigma ill been borne has identified the literature: by mentally frequently ‘a former mental suffer from the social which may patient opprobrium attaches to treatment for mental illness!7! and which have more may do severe disabilities. consequences formally imposed Many have “irrational fear ill.” The former mental people mentally is to be treated with distrust and even he patient likely loathing; ostracized and victimized and educational socially by employment discrimination. the individual’s Finally, hospitalization posthospital ization cause him to lose self-confidence and self-esteem. experience may [11] legal and social consequences of commitment constitute the illness, of mental as could be as stigma stigma socially debilitating that of a criminal conviction.’ (Fns. omitted.) in the (Developments Law—Civil Commitment Ill (1974) Harv.L.Rev. Mentally 1200-1201; accord, Rosenhan, On Sane in Insane Places (1973) Being Santa Clara Law. and authorities cited in fn. 11.)” (People 321.) Cal.3d supra, this court which attaches to an Recently recognized stigma individual who is found to be ill. “Not is there mentally physical restraint an individual is confined in mental but there is [when hospital], interests in an interest [citations], in not injury protected reputation or as ill or disordered.” being improperly unfairly stigmatized mentally S., re (In italics Roger added.) Moreover, threats to grave disability proceedings carry special reputa- A tion. is that a finding grave disability equivalent finding person feed, unable clothe or house himself because aof mental disorder 5008, subd. It that a (h)(1)). labelled state implausible person by as ill about, so could release, after his totally go seeking employment, schools, or old with his applying meeting acquaintances reputation intact. fully
A consistent line cases decided the United States Court Supreme this court us to reliance on “civil” require reject respondent’s labels to hold that since grave disability proceedings “seriously put illness, 7In a and mental stigma study was found to result stigmatization from the of a ill rather than categorization from nature of that person’s Mancuso, (Sarbin & behavior. Failure a Moral Attitudes Enterprise: the Public Mental Illness 35 J. & Toward Consul. Clinical Psych. individual, and the name of the both the risk liberty good personal doubt is a reasonable (People required.” beyond safeguard Thomas,
Ill is likewise an nature of The civil grave disability name to lose his insufficient excuse for liberty good allowing person *11 unanimous Under the trial at the hands of less than a ruling, jury. judge’s have been certified as disabled and could gravely appellant theoretically 3 her even of the 12 found committed to a mental jurors though hospital, criminal case in California sane. No defendant in a goes perfectly Yet, a we have seen that after such vote. already split jury prison in its on a freedom. commitment impact person’s equals imprisonment is that the to a unanimous verdict conclusion right juiy inescapable under the LPS Act. other Any applies conservatorship proceedings taken to result would mock the care our has historically legal system the wrong person. guard against incarcerating all the more when The need for unanimous verdicts is apparent jury still considers the uncertainties that surround one diagnoses. psychiatric views . . . that “the of This court has noted recently divergence expert mistake of diagnosis significantly greater [in possibility render[s] S., re illness.” (In mental Roger diagnosis physical illness] 921, this 929.)8 expert fallibility, Against background supra, minimum, law must jurors agree among require, made in a was that a themselves accurately disability diagnosis grave case. particular 338, 509, 535 14 Cal.3d
In v. Cal.Rptr. Feagley People in a disordered sex this court noted that a defendant P.2d 373], verdict for “the to a unanimous was entitled offender jury proceeding the standard of he was entitled to reasons” that beyond same proof Thomas, 19 Cal.3d this v. reasonable doubt. was with civil commitment threatened noted that a court again to those “identical reasons” verdict for to a unanimous entitled jury him narcotics addiction his entitled to have proved beyond which alleged doubt. reasonable 325-326; O’Connor Donaldson 8See also People J.); C. (conc. 95 S.Ct. opn. Burger, L.Ed.2d U.S. 2486] Litwack, in the Coins and the Presumption Expertise: Flipping Ennis & Psychiatry (1974) 62 Cal. L.Rev. 699-708. Courtroom Thus, this court twice has explicitly recognized jury unanimity the standard of reasonable doubt are slices the same proof beyond It would one due be curious indeed grant process pie. appellant Therefore, the other. court concludes without this appellant those entitled to a unanimous verdict reasons identical which jury her standard of a reasonable entitle doubt. beyond Moreover, of section subdivision as not (d) any interpretation a unanimous verdict would render that section unconstitu- requiring jury as a tional violation of clauses of the California and equal protection Section 5303 federal Constitutions.9 extends explicitly protection unanimous verdicts to commitment jury imminently Were com- dangerous persons. persons facing possible mitment not entitled to the same would have cause protection, they just to complain. has
This court characterized unanimous previously *12 verdict as 338, “fundamental.” v. Cal.3d 14 356.)10 (People Feagley, supra, statutes, 9It ais cornerstone of constitutional that courts adjudication interpret (See, wherever so as to their possible, Kash preserve constitutionality. e.g., Enterprises, 294, 53, (1977) Inc. v. 1302].) Los 19 Cal.3d 305 562 P.2d City Angeles Cal.Rptr. [138 10The and on the concurring seeks to dissenting opinion distinguish Feagley grounds that defendant had of a there been with and convicted criminal offense as a charged “[t]he to determine his status as a disordered sex precondition proceedings mentally 241, However, (Cone, added.) offender." dis. italics court opn., p. the post, Feagley disclaimed civil reliance on the fact that the commitment of a explicitly mentally disordered sex offender a “[Tjhe is criminal conviction. criminal offense of triggered by which the defendant have was convicted need no relevance at all to the issues in the subsequently adjudicated disordered sex offender v. mentally proceedings.” (People 338, 356.) Cal.3d 14 that a Feagley, supra, concluded Feagley specifically person alleged be a a disordered sex offender has fundamental mentally unanimous jury verdict in civil (Ibid) commitment proceedings. One would have that the thought concurring opinion’s misreading dissenting would have been significance laid rest these words of Feagley’s Justice by explanation by Mosk, author: Feagley’s “The identified in primary ground invalidity Feagley a was violation of California Constitution due provisions guaranteeing process 7, I, (art. (a)) I, (art. 16). § subd. unanimous verdict We that § recognized actions, its neither terms to applied ‘civil but we recalled our in In re statement W. Gary 1201], 5 Cal.3d 486 P.2d that ‘the California Cal.Rptr. Legislature are has recognized interests involved in civil commitment less no proceedings than those in criminal and that no less is because proceedings liberty precious fundamental forfeited a civil than when taken as a of a proceeding criminal consequence conviction.’ We then that a disordered sex offender has explained mentally proceeding ‘all the of a criminal the worst of the trappings with prosecution, together consequences (14 350) latter’ Cal.3d at . . . p. .” Thomas Cal.3d (People 228], added.) 566 P.2d italics Cal.Rptr. (Cone, court This does not today very at issue.” and dis. thing post, opn., “assum[e] Instead, undertaken close severe p. having analysis consequences individual’s of commitment to mental as a liberty disabled this hospital gravely person, which would the state must show the interest” Accordingly, “compelling between imminently dangerous justify distinguishing rights W., (In re persons. Gary most, interest. At such fails to demonstrate any compelling Respondent between a rational basis for that there is distinguishing argues respondent basis is that in ill the two classes of grave alleged mentally persons. is one of benevolence the state’s interest solely disability proceedings, individual. In toward the imminently dangerous proceedings, hand, the additional interest of has other adversary government concludes there is others from that individual. Respondent protecting abuse in less disability given danger grave governmental Therefore, there less need for the benevolent state motives. is supposedly due heightened process protection.
This is haunted cries of argument spurious. History accusing those locked “for their own It would be small solace to a away good.” road that his to commit- person wrongly judged incompetent ment was with intentions. paved good
Moreover, this court has whether the previously questioned reality commitment conforms to its benign (People purpose. cases the treatment has served 319-320.) many “promise what an illusion of benevolence to bring essentially *13 for social misfits.” v. Harris (Cross (D.C.Cir. 1969)
warehousing operation reasons, rational 418 F.2d For -these basis respondent’s must be argument rejected. that, alone dictates if
Common sense anything, grave disability than be hemmed in more should safeguards by procedural This is because those imminently dangerous proceedings. surrounding disabled the LPS Act makes it easier to commit gravely persons the trier In disability proceedings, imminently dangerous persons. grave with a that the individual of fact need general showing presented due to a mental cannot for his or her basic needs provide personal However, a much more exact disorder. subd. (§ (h)(1).) showing which must be made imminently dangerous proceedings, require threatened, inflicted demonstration of a or actually physical attempted, and Thomas in as fundamental court follows characterizing today Feagley under the LPS Act. in civil commitment proceedings unanimous verdict jury threat of substantial another well as an imminent harm on as person, 5304.)11 of a mental disorder. harm to others reason physical commitment, The easier to the more becomes the likely path of mistake. decision As reaching possibility possibility wrong increases, to number of votes commit a juror person required should not To allow a be certified decrease. to as certainly person 9 of while jurors, requiring agree unanimously can before a be found would be to stand imminently dangerous, the doctrine of on its head. equal protection 14 Cal.3d this court reached a Feagley, supra, conclusion the unanimous verdict
parallel regarding juiy rights disordered sex offenders. The court noted it was easier to mentally commit disordered sex offenders than those accused of being concluded, others. The court we do dangerous today, the easier to commitment with less safe surrounding path procedural was is down, nonsensical. “This common sense turned guards upside discrimination without semblance rational basis—let alone a compel interest, state and a wholesale denial of ling laws equal protection under the California and federal both Constitutions.” (Fn. omitted.) (People Feagley, supra,
IV is an There additional consideration involved in case before this court. Since a function standards of is to ensure the major proof correctness of the eventual verdict12 an examination of the extent LPS which Act to factual distor- conservatorship procedures subject tions is standard of helpful why showing high necessary offset the effect of those distortions.
A conservatee’s his mental proposed only opportunity prove trial on the issue of In the case competency disability. grave typical *14 11Itis also more difficult for an individual found to be disabled to secure his or gravely A her conservatee be confined for to a the release. to may up year, compared 90-day Moreover, for a maximum one additional person imminently dangerous. only adjudged of ordered the court for treatment be 90-day imminently period may dangerous threatened, even then has or attempted, and if inflicted only .person actually 5304; (§ harm on another the initial 90-day physical during period. Feagley, 14.) hand, other fn. on be Conservatorship, may times, for an indefinite number of reestablished additional as the periods long one-year 5361.) (§ of found to continue. grave condition is disability 12See, Underwood, on Burdens Persuasion in e.g., The Thumb the Scales Justice: of of (1977) Criminal Cases 86 Yale L.J. 1306-1307. conservatee is at an initial bar), the case (including potential placed is to be confined because or she likely prior disadvantage he. (§ or 5353) trial—either conservatorship pursuant temporary which is constraints 5358). to be reestablished These (§ conservatorship counsel, wit- limit the to communicate with individual’s freely ability nesses, in for trial. and others preparation
Moreover, behavior confinement can individual’s during pretrial and is introduced at the to grave disability hearing help justify normally will to be the individual is and continue disabled. predictions However, reactions an individual’s frantic or desperate involuntary not, themselves, mental do that he is commitment in a in prove hospital One Over the Nest Flew Cuckoo’s (See, ill. e.g., Kesey, illness” to be a and “Mental is (1962).)13 acknowledged vague generally unclear, mental uncertain of diseases Categories notoriously concept. often often and themselves change.14 experts overlap, frequently is an (See ante.) on what p. diagnosis. appropriate disagree addition, counsel, literature that some reveals appointed regardless be, tend to a than an how rather experienced they play paternalistic in A recent role commitment advocacy empirical proceedings.15 study LPS under the Act confirms this observation.16 practice 13A the LPS recent Act out that about an individual’s failure study points testimony in However, setting relied on to adjust hospital frequently support finding grave little, such have if on disability. the basic testimony may any, bearing question is, to the finder of fact—that whether or not the conservatee “as a result posed proposed disorder, food, mental unable of a for his needs basic for provide personal clothing, Warren, (h)(1)). (See or shelter” subd. Mental Commitment Involuntary for (1977) Act 11 Law & Disorder: The Lanterman-Petris-Short Application of California’s Rev. Society Both tend to defer to that is and behavior judges juries psychiatric judgments regarding (For of a disorder. recent indicative mental purportedly empirical study noting factfinder in deference of the civil commitment opinion testimony psychiatric Arizona, Scoville, see Justice: Wexler & Administration Psychiatric 1, 60.) in Arizona 13 Ariz. Practice L.Rev. Theory .Code, title “mental is defined as 14In California Administrative section disorder” in the Manual of of the mental disorders as set forth Statistical Diagnostic “any Ed.) (Current American This definition Mental Association.” Disorders Psychiatric confusion, the lack American serves of standards as the potential highlight what a mental alters its definitions of constitutes Association Psychiatric frequently Jackson, (See, Manual disorder. The Revised Statistical e.g., Diagnostic (1970) 127:1 American Association Am.J.Psych. Psychiatric 15See, Litwack, The Role Counsel Civil Commitment e.g., Proceedings: Emerging therein; 827-831 and cited Andalman & 62 Cal.L.Rev. authorities Problems Polemic, Chambers, A Counsel Persons Civil Commitment: Facing Survey, Effective (1974) 45 Miss.L.J. 43. and a Proposal (Warren, 16The counsel. complacency part appointed study suggests *15 633.) “[ijnformal & Rev. at A in North Carolina noted that Law p. study Society mental of these factors—the effect defining combined difficulty and the illness, deference to the factfinder’s testimony, psychiatric counsel17—lends attitude of some strong support appointed paternalistic and a reasonable doubt that the conclusion jury to proof beyond to standards assure mandated are necessary constitutionally unanimity established. LPS are that Act accurately conservatorships V The due clause of the California Constitution that process requires a reasonable doubt and unanimous verdict be beyond under the LPS Act. This court’s applied conservatorship proceedings decisions in and have Thomas held as much in Feagley already to other civil commitment There is no reason regard proceedings. logical from in To that this case. turn back toward diverge path repudiated criterion of the civil-criminal serves label form exalt over only law, constitutional substance. and as well as for the value of Logic regard court to this follow those decisions liberty, compel today.18 is reversed. from The order appealed J., Mosk, J., Newman, and
Tobriner, J., concurred. conversations with and defer to judges attorneys suggest they psychiatric opinion because feel lack want they they requisite to obtain for those expertise help in the need.” Commitment An (Hiday, Procedures: Empirical Courtroom Study Reformed 11 Law & Rev. Society The Wisconsin Court has mandated recently minimum standards Supreme for in civil commitment Those attorneys standards call for appearing proceedings. “adversary counsel” who (State must client within the bounds of the law.” represent “zealously ex rel. 577].) Memmel Wis.2d 322 N.W.2d Mundy 17One recent article law review outlined the “The present system: did not lawyers in an in which consider themselves advocates was to be adversary process conservatorship observed avoided. For court sixty-three hearings example, during study period, less, nine nine lasted three minutes or lasted thirty-six only hearings minutes or were of a shorter duration .longer. conservatorship average Ironically, hearings 4.7 minute commitment criticism leveled at the pre-LPS average hearings. LPS commitment to the ‘One can equally conservatorship hearings: hearings applicable 13,000 to more than wonder what the court meant experience Californians are so committed last If the doctors year. purposes system confusing judges, it, come the citizens who before the court three or who four lawyers practice must believe must be bewildered. Many they minutes completely being (Morris, for terrible Conservatorship incarcerated Disabled, Gravely deeds.’-[Fns. omitted.]” 15 San L.Rev. Diego 18The irf this case shall be holding cases not as of the applied only final date on yet which this decision final. In becomes of Welfare and light Institutions Code sections 5361 this court is that final over establishing conservatorships satisfied judgments disturbed, new need not since the rules announced in this be gravely case persons will, rate, any available all conservatees. shortly *16 of The thesis the and
CLARK, J., majority Dissenting. Concurring failed in for that the state has be because caring to appears opinion disabilities, with mental the suffering only persons gravest persons disabilities—those who unanimous reasonable by opinion beyond any the doubt disabled—should be to degradations exposed as ill. If what the the chamber- adjudication mentally majority say of-horrors at our mental institutions of which (none atmosphere appears true, the does case) record this is it follow that those needing the be a defective should such greatest help subjected program?
The is the result of majority misguided gratuitously applying opinion misconduct criminal adjudicating totally concepts developed for mental see different adjudicating disability. procedure majority same, the and thus the same the issues to standard essentially require an unanimous But reasonable the doubt—by jury. proof—beyond A different in at least one essential criminal’s issues are ingredient. the environment is deemed a from also removal punishment general removal not for the is the serves to general public. purpose protect defendant, it is direct benefits some although hoped affording hand, will be served. On other rehabilitative mentally purpose not removed reasons. The disabled punitive primaiy person such removal to benefit protect person. purpose action it more difficult take decision will make majority Today’s added Who benefits from this action is indicated. need for when the in need not Certainly difficulty? or need. his her intervention but too disabled appreciate professional on It further based considerations appears legal analysis statutory law, case that both the doubt and beyond-a-reasonable applicable I should be consider first the standard unanimity rejected. concepts legal of proof. However, does
The Act not standard of it does specify proof.1 reference Probate Code by incorporate conservatorship provisions. Probate Code civil trial state that provisions Although proce- do dures are not standard applicable, provisions specify particular Evidence Code section states the burden of proof. general proof rule, law, in relevant otherwise part: ‘‘‘‘Except providing provided of the evidence.” burden proof by proof requires preponderance law” added.) The burden of “otherwise (Italics provided (Welf. 1All herein to the Act are to references Lanterman-Petris-Short Act & Inst. Code, 5350 et and unless otherwise all other references are seq.) specified statutory § Code. sections of Welfare Institutions designated *17 Code, 160; includes decisional v. 14 (Evid. (1975) law. Burnick § People 306, 488, 535 Under Cal.3d 313-314 P.2d these 352].) Cal.Rptr. [121 circumstances, court to determine the it is incumbent this upon appro in the substantive burden of of the priate light policies underlying Burnick, 314, v. fn. 5.) law. (People supra, atp. evidence three traditional standards of (1)
The proof, beyond doubt, evidence, clear and and (3) reasonable (2) convincing preponder evidence, “an instruct the fact finder concern represent attempt ating our of confidence thinks he should have in the degree society ing correctness factual conclusions for a particular type adjudication.” 358, 368, 379, re 397 U.S. 370 L.Ed.2d 90 (In (1970) S.Ct. Winship [25 J., (Harlan, As the seriousness of the concurring).) consequences 1068] increase, from an erroneous a stricter standard is resulting judgment Burnick, of error. v. mitigate against possibility required (People 306, 14 Cal.3d 310.) case, the context of the supra, present standard should be determined of the nature and applicable light and the purpose proceedings, potential deprivation liberty, incurred. at (Id., stigma pp. Whether a civil criminal, denominated or its nature proceeding
1
must be ascertained
its true character.
purpose
re
by examining
(In
358,
397 U.S.
368,
365-366
L.Ed.2d
Winship, supra,
375-377]; In re
[25
1,
527,
387
49-50
(1967)
558-559,
Gault
U.S.
L.Ed.2d
confined, either in the residence of relative confinement occurs private it home. must nearest the conservatee’s or Accordingly, hospital are remedial to the Act concluded pursuant purpose or In re (See criminal civil no element of either liability. only, containing 486 P.2d 1201].) 302-303 W. Cal.Rptr. Gary *18 of for a of the not liberty We are unmindful deprivation potential be confined in Such conservatee. may hospital disabled person gravely However, is controlled confinement 5361.) (§ to one potential year. up does not Confinement necessarily extensive safeguards. statutory all, If it occurs at 5358.) (§ follow establishment conservatorship. environment an institutional or is never in confinement jail, prison, of crimes. (§ 5358.)2 of convicted for the persons designed punishment entitled two Further, conservatee is hearings during one-year The 5364.) determination. (§ to initial in addition judicial period if the conservator be released within one also conservatee year gives may of the conservatee has a At the end one 6000.) notice. (§ year, requisite 5361.) release. (§ to immediate attach to a Some determined to stigma may judicially degree person However, is different in have been disabled. both gravely stigma kind from that criminal conviction or following involuntary degree as a disordered sex offender. Criminal convictions commitment mentally based on fear and distrust. A carry society’s approbrium to be viewed with instead is far more by society compassion likely person A criminal conviction fear. continuing prior impose legal hand, Act, the other even The presumption prohibits impairment. incompetence. on In re 397
The reliance U.S. 358 and majority’s Winship, Unlike the situation v. misplaced. case, cases in the instant those involved criminal proceedings. presented both cases the adverse decision In consequence subjected confinement in a individual institution. possibility penal asserted interest was Both cases state’s primarily protection society. , much is here at In concerned issue. greater deprivation liberty the defendant was confined for an Burnick indeterminate period. the defendant was for six confinement subject potential years. Winship 2The that because convicted of crimes who are argue majority appear persons be a determined to disordered often confined state mentally hospitals—as may not convicted of a crime—confinement in a state disordered mentally hospital (Ante, of such p. logic to confinement prison. argument tantamount me. escapes Further, reviewed in carried the greater stigma Winship and in Burnick the additional burden of a criminal conviction sex offender. disordered the benefit and of the Act adverse conse-
Balancing purpose against to the individual standard is clear quences clearly suggests proper (See, Service 385 U.S. (1966) convincing proof. Immigration Woodby L.Ed.2d 87 S.Ct. Chaunt v. United 483]; States [17 U.S. 350 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. Nishikawa Dulles 147]; 659, 78 U.S. 129 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. 612].)
The less standard of evidence would be demanding preponderating While this would allow full and efficient standard implementa- improper. *19 the it would fail to tion of the statutory purpose, adequately safeguard of a individual’s The determination rights. consequences grave in result confinement one This disability may year. potential a dictates standard of be used to higher deprivation liberty proof minimize risk of error. the stricter standard of a reason-
Conversely, requiring beyond able doubt While the individual from the inappropriate. insulating decision, of erroneous this standard also possibility individ- may prevent uals from needed aid. It be must remembered that receiving sorely while the of an erroneous a consequences judgment finding person substantial, disabled are the gravely erroneous consequences not well be more judgment finding case, In severe. the latter an individual be left to may quite literally in the streets. of the criminal standard would languish Application threaten the beneficial while the statutory purpose increasing stigma. in
The also err can be found concluding grave disability majority the Act unanimous verdict. While guarantees jury potential trial, the it is silent as to whether conservatees right jury jury’s 5350, noted, however, verdict must subd. As be unanimous. (§ (d).) Probate Code Act reference for conservator- incorporates by procedures The Probate Code for factual (§ 5350.) determinations ships. provides Code, three-fourths when factfinder is a (Prob. majority jury. Code, 1233; Thus, see Prob. §§ has § Legislature for less than unanimous verdicts in provided cases. jury grave disability issue whether the direction is constitu- Accordingly, Legislature’s tional.
240 in criminal
While the mandates unanimous verdicts Constitution it verdict in other cases. (Cal. a three-fourths permits jury proceedings, 352; Const., I, 338, 14 v. 16; v. Cal.3d art. § People Feagley, 929, 327, 434 67 Cal.2d Court (Thomas) (1967) Cal.Rptr. Superior [64 Act P.2d under the civil Grave 623].) being disability proceedings nature, not basic constitutional decision does violate the the legislative concerning right jury. provision contrast, Act for unanimous verdicts in imminently provides jury to hold there to be majority appear
dangerous proceedings. and federal Constitu- clauses of the state a violation protection equal tions right denying subject grave disability persons such a verdict while to unanimous subject granting persons to imminently dangerous proceedings. Const., XIV; Const., Cal. S. Amend. (U. clauses protection equal situated receive like I, 7, subd. (b))
art.
§
persons similarly
require
404 U.S.
75-76
law.
Reed Reed (1971)
under the
treatment
(E.g.,
[30
229-230,
Brown v. Merlo
251];
S.Ct.
L.Ed.2d
505];
506 P.2d
66 A.L.R.3d
&
Purdy
Cal.Rptr.
State
Cal.Rptr.
Fitzpatrick
of California
*20
must be reasonable
456 P.2d
38 A.L.R.3d
Classifications
1194].)
v.
384
the
to be served.
Rinaldi
in
purpose
(E.g.,
Yeager
light
577, 579-580, 86
S.Ct.
v.
1497];
308-309
L.Ed.2d
Brown
U.S.
Merlo,
861;
v.
223
Court
Cal.3d
p.
Hayes
Superior
449,
The verdict imminent between an and proceeding disparity danger is because the disability subject proceeding justified persons grave are Unlike a disabled different not situated. gravely similarly procedures of harm to others. threat an imminently dangerous person poses person, interest, the rise This analogous gives governmental danger When the interest in criminal government’s proceedings. governmental individual, the benevolence towards are motivated not actions only by behavior, from the individual’s an interest in others also but protecting as a be misused substitute exists. The for abuse may potential the additional criminal safeguard prosecution, justifying the of error. (See the risk individual People against protect unanimity This et additional governmental seq.) Feagley, supra, be of those found to the fact that commitment reflected interest Because this interest is not is mandatory. imminently dangerous in and grave disability proceedings, imminently dangerous present disabled not situated.3 are persons similarly the Act’s grave disability provisions provide purpose clothe, feed, to those unable to term treatment and care short prompt, classification in themselves. shelter Legislature’s light Obviously, is reasonable. of this purpose conclude, based on materials not of the part majority gratuitously herein, illness, that of “the
record because mental difficulty defining deference to factfinder’s psychiatric testimony, paternalistic of some counsel” (ante, 235), attitude appointed p. proof beyond doubt and reasonable mandated.” jury unanimity “constitutionally no of the nebulous There is factors showing any played any part factual determination that the conservatee is instant a gravely act, within the these factors are now yet meaning' held to mandate the conclusions. constitutionally majority’s
While seek out reasons the strictest test for majority supporting far from the do record to grave determining disability—even straying or no little heed reasons their conclusions. In so—they pay rejecting the standard of we are determining jury requirement concerned with the of error In the possibility judicial proceedings. event of such error there is the that some not persons possibility confined, ill but there is also the who—due risk persons mental illness—are unable to take care of themselves will not receive care The latter are faced with release without treatment. persons to survive. Consideration of to freedom who by persons ability (ante, pp. 3The majority Feagley, improperly rely *21 is involved—the right a interest 229-233) for the that because fundamental theory verdict—the must demonstrate a interest” “compelling justifying unanimous state jury The and imminent danger proceedings. majority the distinction between grave disability “court at state this has very They previously err first in issue. assuming thing ” ‘fundamental,’ a verdict characterized the unanimous as citing Feagley. right jury issue, course, (Ante, 231-232.) whether a verdict in jury grave pp. with disordered sex is “fundamental.” dealt mentally disability proceedings Feagley Code, in (Welf. & Inst. 6300 et Thus seq.) proceedings § offender proceedings. there had been charged were of an different character. defendant entirely Feagley determine his convicted a criminal offense as a precondition proceedings with and such He was in exposed a disordered sex offender. status as mentally inas a state a state prison—not hospital in institutional unit within commitment an of confinement more severe circumstances This court noted in instant case. Feagley to the argument contrary in state hospital, such unit when to confinement compared in this case. (People Feagley, the majority urged elsewhere by as fail to demonstrate the they thus 346-347.) rely Feagley improperly The majority issue here. fundamental right similar same or be committed standard of may erroneously requires rejection evidence; a mere humanitarian considerations preponderance who released of persons erroneously require rejection criminal a reasonable doubt—and the unani- standard—proof beyond verdict I mous am satisfied that such requirement. humanitarian consid- for the ill erations us to favor of a clear and require opt test and the three-fourths verdict. The convincing proof jury Legislature’s decision to for less than unanimous verdict to provide jury support is consistent with constitutional finding grave disability requirements. I concur that the reversed, must be but for the reason judgment that the was instructed to find on the question grave disability by of the evidence rather clear and preponderance convincing evidence. all other I dissent from the respects majority opinion. Richardson, J., Manuel, J., concurred. for a was denied
Respondent’s March petition rehearing was modified to read Clark, J., above. opinion printed Richardson, J., were of the that the should be opinion petition granted.