465 F.Supp.3d 56
D. Conn.2020Background
- Connecticut law requires applicants for handgun permits or eligibility certificates to have fingerprints collected by local police or the Division of State Police (DESPP) for criminal background checks; statute bars employees from refusing to collect fingerprints.
- In response to COVID-19, Governor Lamont issued Executive Order No. 7E (Mar. 17, 2020) suspending the statutory requirement and leaving fingerprinting to police/DESPP discretion; DESPP and many local agencies then halted fingerprinting.
- CCDL (Connecticut Citizens Defense League) and individual members sued Governor Lamont and DESPP Commissioner Rovella, alleging the suspension violates the Second Amendment and other constitutional provisions and seeking a preliminary injunction to resume fingerprinting or provide alternatives.
- Four municipal police chiefs agreed to resume fingerprinting; plaintiffs withdrew claims against them; the motion for preliminary injunctive relief proceeded only against the Governor and Commissioner.
- The district court held a hearing and, finding Eleventh Amendment did not bar relief, that plaintiffs had standing and the case was not moot, granted a preliminary injunction ordering modification of Executive Order 7E and resumption of DESPP fingerprinting by June 15, 2020.
- On the merits the court found irreparable harm and a clear/substantial likelihood of success on plaintiffs’ Second Amendment claim because an indefinite, categorical suspension of fingerprinting was not substantially related to the public-health interest in light of available safety measures.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Eleventh Amendment / prospective relief | Ex parte Young permits prospective injunctive relief against state officers for ongoing constitutional violations. | Defendants argued Eleventh Amendment bars suit. | Court: Ex parte Young exception applies; Eleventh Amendment does not bar the preliminary-injunction request. |
| Standing | Individual plaintiffs were prevented from initiating permit process (fingerprints denied); CCDL diverted resources to assist members—injuries traceable and redressable. | Defendants contended no concrete injury and delays are temporary. | Court: Plaintiffs had Article III standing at filing; organizational standing established for CCDL. |
| Mootness / voluntary cessation | Plaintiffs argued suspensions continued in many localities and commitments to resume were insufficiently reliable. | Defendants relied on resumed permit processing and representations that fingerprinting would resume June 15 to render the dispute moot. | Court: Voluntary cessation doctrine; defendants failed to show it was "absolutely clear" violation won't recur; case not moot. |
| Preliminary injunction / Second Amendment merits | Indefinite suspension of fingerprinting functionally forecloses acquisition of new handguns and burdens core Second Amendment rights; less restrictive safety measures are available. | Defendants argued public-health and safety interests justify suspension during pandemic. | Court: Plaintiffs showed irreparable harm and a clear likelihood of success; suspension fails intermediate-scrutiny fit because alternatives exist; injunction granted to resume fingerprinting by June 15, 2020. |
Key Cases Cited
- Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (prospective injunctions against state officers permit federal relief from ongoing constitutional violations)
- Virginia Office for Protection & Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247 (2011) (discussing Ex parte Young exception to Eleventh Amendment)
- Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) (standing requires concrete injury-in-fact)
- Davis v. Federal Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724 (2008) (standing focuses on plaintiff’s stake when suit was filed)
- City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283 (1982) (voluntary cessation does not automatically moot a case)
- Mhany Management, Inc. v. County of Nassau, 819 F.3d 581 (2d Cir. 2016) (defendant bears heavy burden to show voluntary cessation moots case)
- District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (Second Amendment protects handgun possession for self-defense in the home)
- McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (Second Amendment incorporated against the states)
- Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011) (intermediate scrutiny and close "fit" requirement where core Second Amendment rights implicated)
- New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242 (2d Cir. 2015) (framework for evaluating Second Amendment burdens)
- United States v. Jimenez, 895 F.3d 228 (2d Cir. 2018) (two-step Second Amendment inquiry and scrutiny selection)
- Otoe‑Missouria Tribe of Indians v. New York State Dep’t of Financial Services, 769 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2014) (preliminary injunction standard in Second Circuit)
- Faiveley Transport Malmo AB v. Wabtec Corp., 559 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2009) (irreparable harm is a critical preliminary injunction factor)