456 F.Supp.3d 152
D.D.C.2020Background
- Title V of the CARES Act set aside $8 billion for "Tribal governments," defined as "the recognized governing body of an Indian tribe," and cross‑references ISDEAA’s definition of "Indian tribe."
- ISDEAA’s definition expressly includes "any Alaska Native village or regional or village corporation as defined in or established pursuant to the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA)," but also contains an eligibility clause: entities must be "recognized as eligible for the special programs and services provided by the United States to Indians because of their status as Indians."
- Alaska Native regional and village corporations (ANCs) are state‑chartered, for‑profit corporations created by ANCSA; Treasury announced ANCs are eligible for Title V payments and posted a data "Certification" form that solicited ANC‑style metrics (e.g., shareholders, ANCSA land), suggesting ANCs would be counted.
- Several federally recognized tribes filed consolidated APA suits seeking a TRO/PI to prevent Treasury from disbursing Title V funds to ANCs and to require distribution to tribes; Treasury announced it would disburse funds on April 28, 2020.
- The court held Plaintiffs likely would suffer irreparable harm, are likely to succeed on the merits, and that the equities/public interest favor relief; it granted a preliminary injunction narrowly enjoining Treasury from disbursing Title V funds to any ANC, but declined to order immediate distribution of the full $8 billion to plaintiffs.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Judicial reviewability of Treasury’s allocation decisions | Treasury’s allocation of Title V funds must comply with statutory definitions and is reviewable under the APA. | Allocation from a lump‑sum appropriation is committed to agency discretion and not reviewable; emergency context strengthens nonreviewability. | Treasury’s discretion over amounts is limited by statutory eligibility definitions; decisions whom to pay are reviewable. |
| Whether ANCs are “Indian tribe” under the ISDEAA definition (eligibility clause) | The ISDEAA eligibility clause ("recognized as eligible…") applies to all listed entities including ANCs; no ANC satisfies that clause, so ANCs are not "Indian tribes." | ISDEAA’s inclusion of "regional or village corporation" shows Congress intended ANCs to be covered; administrative practice and Cook Inlet support ANC inclusion. | The eligibility clause applies to ANCs; no ANC shown to meet the "recognized as eligible" requirement, so ANCs do not qualify as "Indian tribes" for Title V. |
| Whether an ANC board can be the "recognized governing body" of an Indian tribe (i.e., a "Tribal government") | "Recognized" is a term of art meaning formal federal recognition; ANC boards are not federally recognized governing bodies. | "Recognized" need not mean formal federal recognition here; ANC governance can qualify. | "Recognized" is a legal term of art in this context; ANC boards are not recognized governing bodies and thus are not "Tribal governments." |
| Preliminary injunction factors (irreparable harm, likelihood of success, equities/public interest) | Plaintiffs: improper payments to ANCs would irreparably deplete the fixed $8B, funds would be unrecoverable, and Plaintiffs likely to succeed on the merits. | Treasury: alleged harm speculative/economic; agency needs discretion to allocate funds quickly; Inspector General recoupment and other CARES Act funds mitigate harm. | Plaintiffs showed likely irreparable harm, likelihood of success, and that equities/public interest favor enjoining payments to ANCs. |
Key Cases Cited
- Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182 (allocation of lump‑sum appropriations generally committed to agency discretion but subject to statutory limits)
- Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (agency action to refuse enforcement is presumptively unreviewable in certain contexts)
- Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7 (preliminary injunction standard requires likelihood of success and irreparable harm)
- Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (merger of public interest and balance of equities when federal government is opposing party)
- Milk Train, Inc. v. Veneman, 310 F.3d 747 (statutory limits on agency disbursement provide a judicially manageable standard)
- City of Houston v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 24 F.3d 1421 (once appropriations are obligated/lapsed, courts cannot compel re‑expenditure)
- Ambach v. Bell, 686 F.2d 974 (interim relief appropriate where distributed funds cannot be recouped)
- Cook Inlet Native Ass’n v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1471 (agency and Ninth Circuit treatment of ANCs under ISDEAA)
- Wyandot Nation of Kan. v. United States, 858 F.3d 1392 (post‑List Act cases treating ISDEAA definition in conjunction with the Secretary’s list of federally recognized tribes)
- Slockish v. U.S. Fed. Highway Admin., 682 F. Supp. 2d 1178 (interpreting identical statutory language in the context of the List Act and federal recognition)
- Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 562 U.S. 562 (courts will not defer to longstanding administrative practice that conflicts with statutory text)