Commonwealth v. Ware, 27 N.E.3d 1204

Background

Sonja Farak, a chemist at the Amherst State Laboratory Institute, pleaded guilty to multiple charges in January 2014 for tampering with evidence and stealing cocaine from the lab after State police discovered missing/compromised drug samples in January 2013. A limited State police inquiry identified several tampered samples and items indicating possible earlier misconduct.
The Amherst lab served western Massachusetts; access to evidence was available to four employees. Inventories revealed four missing samples in Jan. 2013; retesting in a small number of other cases later showed substitution of cocaine with counterfeit substances.
Bryant Ware was indicted in 2007, 2009, and 2010 on various drug and related charges; he pleaded guilty to the 2009 and 2010 charges in 2011. Ware later sought postconviction discovery and funds to retest Springfield police drug evidence from July 2004–Jan. 18, 2013, because Farak had signed a drug certificate relevant to his 2009 distribution indictment.
Ware moved under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30(c)(4) for broad visual inspection and retesting (about 1,700 samples) to establish the timeframe and scope of Farak’s misconduct; the Commonwealth opposed.
The Superior Court denied Ware’s motion, finding no prima facie showing that such sweeping discovery was likely to uncover evidence warranting a new trial and noting plea advantages and no direct evidence Farak’s misconduct affected Ware’s decisions.
The SJC, exercising superintendence due to the exceptional public‑interest implications of Farak’s conduct and the Commonwealth’s limited investigation, affirmed the denial in part but remanded to allow Ware to seek targeted postconviction discovery and retesting limited to the 2009 charge (the only charge for which Farak had signed the drug certificate).

Issues

Issue	Ware's Argument	Commonwealth's Argument	Held
Whether Ware made a prima facie showing under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30(c)(4) to permit broad postconviction discovery and retesting of thousands of samples	Broad inspection and retesting are reasonably likely to uncover evidence (timing/scope of Farak's misconduct) that could warrant a new trial	No specific evidence links Farak's misconduct to Ware's cases; request is an impermissible fishing expedition and overly broad	Denied as to the broad, statewide discovery request — judge did not abuse discretion in refusing expansive testing
Whether special appellate review (superintendence) was warranted despite interlocutory posture	Immediate review needed because Farak’s misconduct raises exceptional, systemic concerns affecting many convictions	Ordinary route is appeal from final denial of new‑trial motion; superintendence not usually used to bypass normal appellate process	SJC exercised superintendence given exceptional circumstances and public interest
Whether Commonwealth conducted adequate investigation and had disclosure obligations re: Farak misconduct	Commonwealth failed to investigate scope/timing; retesting likely necessary to identify exculpatory evidence	Commonwealth conducted limited State police inquiry; no proof misconduct extended to earlier years or Ware’s cases	Commonwealth had duty to investigate and disclose; limited inquiry was insufficient, so targeted discovery for Ware’s 2009 charge is warranted
Scope of permissible postconviction discovery for Ware	All samples from 2004–2013 and large random retesting sample	Overbroad; not shown reasonably likely to produce material evidence	Permissible: targeted visual inspection and retesting limited to the 2009 charge (where Farak signed the drug certificate); broad statewide request denied

Key Cases Cited

Cronin v. Strayer, 392 Mass. 525 (discovery orders generally interlocutory and not appealable)
Brum v. Dartmouth, 428 Mass. 684 (interlocutory rulings not appealable absent statute/rule)
Donald v. Commonwealth, 437 Mass. 1007 (route for appellate review of postconviction discovery typically via new trial appeal)
Commonwealth v. Charles, 466 Mass. 63 (court used superintendence in lab‑misconduct context involving Hinton lab)
Commonwealth v. Daniels, 445 Mass. 392 (standard: discovery allowed where affidavit shows discovery reasonably likely to uncover evidence that might warrant new trial)
Commonwealth v. Morgan, 453 Mass. 54 (postconviction discovery prima facie standard)
Commonwealth v. Martinez, 437 Mass. 84 (judge’s broad discretion on postconviction discovery)
Commonwealth v. Beal, 429 Mass. 530 (prosecution duty to learn of and disclose exculpatory evidence held by prosecution team agents)
Commonwealth v. Scott, 467 Mass. 336 (lab analysts are agents whose information may be exculpatory and must be disclosed)
Commonwealth v. Lykus, 451 Mass. 310 (disclosure obligations of prosecution)
Commonwealth v. Martin, 427 Mass. 816 (prosecutor’s duty to inquire about lab tests and produce exculpatory evidence)
Commonwealth v. Tucceri, 412 Mass. 401 (nondisclosure of obviously exculpatory evidence can require new trial)
Commonwealth v. Lynch, 439 Mass. 532 (trial judge’s discretion in postconviction discovery)