Lead Opinion
These cases raise issues under G. L. c. 258, § 10 (b) and (/), immunity provisions of the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act. The defendants in Brum v. Dartmouth,
I
King vs. Commonwealth.
In November, 1993, a judge released Dalton O. Simpson, who had been in custody on various criminal charges, on personal recognizance in response to an agreement between Simpson and the district attorney’s office. Almost three months later, in February, 1994, Simpson shot and killed Boston police officer Berisford Wayne Anderson. Frances B. King, administra-trix of Anderson’s estate, filed suit against the Commonwealth and the district attorney’s office,
Brum vs. Dartmouth.
Jason Robinson, son of the plaintiff Elaine Brum, was stabbed to death at Dartmouth high school in April, 1993, by three armed individuals, at least one of whom was not a student at the school. Earlier that morning, the three assailants had been involved in a violent interaction at the school with two of Rob
II
Interlocutory rulings, such as the Superior Court’s order denying the motion to dismiss in King, generally are not appealable until the ultimate disposition of the case because they are not “final orders.” See Kargman v. Superior Court,
The Commonwealth’s motion to dismiss in King was based on a claim of immunity under G. L. c. 258, § 10, which sets out several exceptions to the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act. An order denying such a motion is a “final order” meeting the criteria described above, and is immediately appealable. Section 10 of the Act confers immunity from suit, see Spring v. Geriatric Auth. of Holyoke,
in
King claims that the Commonwealth and the Middlesex district attorney’s office are liable under the Massachusetts Tort
King asserts that the defendants “allowed” Simpson to be released from custody on personal recognizance. A prosecutor, however, does not have the authority to allоw or disallow the release of a prisoner. Although the prosecutor may make a recommendation concerning bail, only a judge, clerk, bail commissioner, or master in chancery has the authority to set bail or release an individual on personal recognizance. See G. L. c. 276, §§ 57, 58. Even assuming that the prosecutor had recommended that Simpson be released on personal recognizance, and even if a judicial officer may be more likely to release a prisoner on personal recognizance where the prosecutor recommends this course of action, the fact remains that the power to release the individual is ultimately in the hands of the judicial officer, not the prosecutor. At most, King may have been able to show that, but for the prosecutor’s recommendation, the judge would not have released Simpson on his own recognizance and that Simpson would have been unable to meet any bail requirements placed on him and so would have remained in custody. Such a chain of causation is too long and contains toо many speculative links to connect the assistant district attorney’s action to the violence that ultimately befell Anderson.
IV
The defendants in both of these cases argue that the plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the immunities set out in G. L. c. 258, § 10 (b) and 10 (/). Because we have concluded in King vs. Commonwealth that, as a matter of law, the defendants’ actions were not a proximate cause of Simpson’s release, and, thus, that
A
In Brum vs. Dartmouth, the defendant town of Dartmouth invokes § 10 (b), asserting that deciding what security measures to implement at a public school is an act involving discretion on a matter of policy or planning. The essence of Brum’s claim, however, is not that the school officials abused their discretion by implementing faulty security measures, but that the school had no security measures at all, in violation of G. L. c. 71, § 37H, which requires each school district to implement and publish school policies including “standards and procedures to assure school building security and safety of students and school personnel.”
B
Defendants in both Brum vs. Dartmouth and King vs. Commonwealth argue that the plaintiffs’ claims against them are barred by the so-called statutory public duty rule of G. L. c. 258, § 10 (/), which exempts from the Tort Claims Act “any claim based on an act or failure to act to prevent or diminish the harmful consequences of a condition or situation, including the violent or tortious conduct of a third person, which is not originally caused by the public employer or any other person acting on behalf of the public employer.”
As indicated above, we need not consider this claim as it applies in King vs. Commonwealth. The plaintiff in Brum vs. Dartmouth argues that § 10 (/) does not bar her claim because the condition that led to her son’s death was the lack of security on the school premises, which was originally caused by the defendants’ failure to adopt security policies as they were required to do by G. L. c. 71, § 37H. The Appeals Court agreed, reasoning that, by failing to implement a security policy at the school, the defendants created the “initial injury-causing condition of physical insecurity,” and subsequently, by failing to apprehend the perpetrators on the day of the murder, they “еxacerbated the hazardous condition” they had created, “thereby materially contributing to the circumstances that directly led to the tortious injury. Those scenarios constitute risk-creating conduct on the part of public employees that is sufficient to overcome the bar of § 10 (/').” Brum v. Dartmouth,
Thus, the plaintiffs argue that § 10 (j) does not confer immunity on the defendants because the defendants “originally caused” the dangerous “condition or situation” that resulted in the killings by the “violent. . . conduct of a third person.” But
To say that § 10 (/) presents an interpretive quаgmire would be an understatement. The language is convoluted and ambiguous, as evidenced by the difficulty Superior Court judges have had in applying it and the inconsistency of outcomes. The particular issue in question in these cases, the meaning of the “originally caused” clause in § 10 (/), has not to date been directly addressed by this court.
The principal purpose of the provision, as we have said, must be taken to be announced in its opening clause: to exclude liability for “an act or failure to act to prevent or diminish” certain “harmful consequences.” Which harmful consequences? All those “including the violent or tortious conduct of a third person.” The “including” clause must modify the noun “consequences,” rather than the nearer nouns “condition” or “situation,” because conduct cannot grammatically or logically constitute “a condition or situation.” Thus, there is immunity in respect to all consequences except where “the condition or situation” was “originally caused by the public employer.” We take the “originally caused” clause to modify “condition or situation,” although it might also be read to qualify only the nearer term “conduct of a third person.” If the latter interpretation were adopted, the exception to the exclusion would apply only if the public employer had caused the third party’s wrongful act and not in the broader circumstance, if it caused the “condition or situation” leading to “harmful consequences” generally.
The plaintiff’s contention is that the neglect of duty by the school officials in Brum w. Dartmouth “originally caused” the “condition[s] or situation[s]” of which either the killers’ acts or the death of their victim were “the harmful consequences.” But if a neglect of duty can be taken to “originally cause[]” such a “situation,” then the opening words of § 10 (/'), immunizing “act[s] or failure[s] to act to prevent,” which we take to an
We acknowledge that, if the principal clause is not qualified out of existence in the way that the Appeals Court and the plaintiff’s interpretation would do, we are hard put to discover what the range of application of the subordinate exception to the exclusion — “originally caused” “harmful consequences” — might be. What is needed is an example of a condition leading to a harmful consequence, where that condition was originally caused by the public employer but not brought about by the public employer’s failure to prevent it. Many frequently recurring situations are the subject of specific provisions elsewhere in § 10. See, e.g., §10 if) (claim based on failure to inspect); § 10 (i) (claim based on release of prisoner); § 10 (j) (3) (claim based on negligent maintenance of public property). Some of these specific provisions require exclusion of liability, some withdraw the exclusion, and some — § 10 (i), for example — do both. As they point in all directions, it is best not to look to these specific provisions to elucidate the obscure and convoluted meaning of § 10 (j), but rather to allow them to stand on their own bottoms, applying them directly where appropriate.
The history of the provision and subsequent decisions of this court provide some confirmation of our conclusion to apply § 10 (j) to exclude liability here. Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Cyran v. Ware,
The circumstances surrounding the enactment of § 10 (j) also provide some insight into the meaning of the section.
The construction of the statute adopted here is consistent with the few opinions of this court that have decided cases under § 10 (j), although none of those cases has defined original causation. In Bonnie W. v. Commonwealth,
In sum, the principal purpose of § 10 (j) is to preclude liability for failures to prevent or diminish harm, including harm brought about by the wrongful act of a third party. And to interpret, as the Appeals Court did, the subordinate clause referring to “originally caused” conditions, to include conditions that are, in effect, failures to prevent harm, would undermine that principal purpose. Accordingly, we conclude that, in Brum ví. Dartmouth, § 10 (j) excludes the defendants’ liability for their failure to prevent the killing. King vj. Commonwealth presents an easier case because the killing in that case was so far removed from the prosecutor’s misfeasance, if misfeasance it was, that it cannot even be taken to be a proximate cause or “failure to prevent” it at all. Because the defendants’ liability in that case is excluded on other grounds, we need not resolve the issue of the application of § 10 (j) to them.
C
The plaintiff in King vs. Commonwealth claims that § 10 (i)
This argument is meritless. Section 10 (z) creates no cause of action for gross negligence. Subsection (i), like the other subsections of § 10, creates an immunity from suit; the provision regarding cases of gross negligence is an exception to that immunity. Thus, a claim alleging gross negligence in releasing an individual may be brought invoking the exception to § 10 (z) only if no other immunity under § 10 bars the claim. The immunities provided by § 10 operate in the alternative; even if one immunity contains an exception that would permit a claim to be brought, that claim is barred if any of the other immunities apply. Whether or not King’s claim would be barred by either § 10 (b) or § 10 (j), we need not consider whether the plaintiff’s claim could survive § 10 (z), because we conclude that the prosecutor’s conduct cannot, as a matter of law, be considered a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s harm. Accordingly, we need not address whether the plaintiff adequately stated a claim for gross negligence.
V
A
Brum asserts a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that, by failing to protect her son from harm while in school, the defendants violated his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Not all torts recognized by State law give rise to liability under § 1983. See Daniels v. Williams,
The due process clause, generally, operates as a restriction against “unwarranted government interference” but does not guarantee citizens protection from dangers posed by nongovernmental sources. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Social Servs.,
The facts pleaded in Brum vs. Dartmouth indicate that Robinson’s death was caused by three private individuals who invaded the school uninvited, none of whom can be considered a school official or in any way an agent of the State. Therefore, unless an exception to the reasoning of DeShaney applies to this case, the school owed no duty of protection to Robinson, and Brum’s claim must fail.
Brum asserts that she has stated a valid claim under § 1983 because her case falls within two exceptions to the rule of De-Shaney that the government has no duty to protect individuals from harm at the hands of private actors.
First, Brum argues that her son was in a “special relationship” with the school. When such a relationship exists, the government has an affirmative duty to protect an individual from private hаrm. The DeShaney Court explicitly noted this “special relationship” exception to its ruling, but spoke of it only in terms of custody situations, mentioning, by way of example, incarcerated individuals and those who have been involuntarily committed to state psychiatric facilities. See DeShaney, supra at 200. See also Jones v. Phyfer,
Brum urges us either to hold that a special relationship may exist in noncustodial situations or, alternatively, that a high school student is in school custody. The case law interpreting DeShaney, however, weighs heavily against any such holding. Several courts have considered whether a special relationship might exist in a noncustodial situation. Although some have indicated a willingness to extend the speciаl relationship exception to circumstances other than prisons or State psychiatric institutions, the concept of custody or State restriction of movement remains central to the creation of a special relationship. See, e.g., Walton v. Alexander,
Because the Court’s opinion in DeShaney makes clear that the special relationship exception applies only to individuals in State custody, we must consider whether Robinson was in the custody of the defendants at the time he was murdered. The circuit courts that have considered this question have uniformly decided that a student in Robinson’s position is not in the custody of the school.
In cases in which no compulsory education rules apply, courts have decided that the argument against finding a special relationship is even stronger. In Sargi v. Kent City Bd. of Educ.,
In the instant case, Brum’s son, who had passed his sixteenth
This outcome is not changed by Brum’s allegation that the defendants were aware of the danger to Robinson on the day he was killed. The DeShaney Court specifically stated that the source of the special relationship bеtween the government and those in its custody is not a “knowledge of the individual’s predicament.” DeShaney, supra at 200. Other courts have held that where a third party, and not a government actor, injured the plaintiff, the fact that the government defendants were aware of the potential danger did not render them liable. See Graham, supra at 994 (“foreseeability [of the danger] cannot create an affirmative duty to protect when plaintiff remains unable to allege a custodial relationship”); Estate of Gilmore, supra at 722 (rejecting argument that knowledge that “third party poses a special danger to an identified victim will alone support a claim for relief under section 1983”); Arroyo, supra at 61 (“[although the defendants may have known of other shooting incidents or violent acts that had taken place on school premises, the injury here was caused by a third person and not by a school official”); Russell, supra at 1581 (citing DeShaney as deciding “even when state officials know that a person is in imminent harm from a third party,” United States Constitution imposes no duty to protect). Nor does the fact that the defendants may have had a state-law duty under G. L. c. 71, § 37H, to adopt security policies еxpose them to liability under § 1983. “[I]n light of DeShaney, the Court cannot rely on state laws that impose on state agents an affirmative duty of protection as the premise for federal constitutional liability when the injury is caused by a private third person.” Arroyo, supra at 60. Section 1983 does not create a Federal right of action for every act that may be actionable under State law, see Martinez, supra at 285, and acts
The plaintiff in Brum ví. Dartmouth also argues that her case falls within the “state-created danger” exception to the rule of DeShaney. This doctrine is derived from the DeShaney Court’s comment that the State had “played no part in [the dangers’] creation, nor did it do anything to render [the plaintiff] any more vulnerable to them.” DeShaney, supra at 201. It is used by the courts that have adopted it “to find a constitutional tort duty under § 1983 outside of a strictly custodial context,” Middle Bucks Area Vocational Tech. Sch., supra at 1373; see L.W. v. Grubbs, supra at 122, and provides that the government may have a duty to protect an individual from harm by a third party where the State actor was culpable in “affirmatively placing an individual in a position of danger, effectively stripping a person of her ability to defend herself, or cutting off potential sources of private aid,” Johnson v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., supra at 201.
The courts that have adopted this doctrine have uniformly held that, to be liable under it, a government defendant must have committed an affirmative act placing the victim in danger. It must have “used [its] authority to create an opportunity that would not otherwise have existed for the third party’s crime to occur.” Id. See Middle Bucks Area Vocational Tech. Sch., supra at 1374-1375 (liability “predicated upon the states’ affirmative acts which work to plaintiffs’ detriments in terms of exposure to danger . . . [T]he state can fairly be said to have affirmatively acted to create the danger to the victims”); L.W. v. Grubbs, supra at 121; Estate of Gilmore, supra at 721-722 (furloughed prisoner who murdered plaintiff’s decedent “was in no sense an agent of the state. The state played no part in creating the threat that [he] posed to [the decedent], [his] murderous design was independently сonceived and executed, and the state neither condoned nor encouraged his behavior”). As the United States Court of Appeals for the First and Eighth Circuits have written, merely increasing an already existing risk of harm from a private source is insufficient to create governmental liability under this doctrine. See Monahan, supra at 993 (rendering plaintiff “more
Courts have rejected application of this doctrine in circumstances very similar to those in the instant case. For example, in Graham v. Independent School Dist. No. 1-89, supra at 995, a student was killed by another student who, to school officials’ knowledge, had previously threatened the victim and was on school grounds with a gun, and school officials failed to protect the victim from this known threat. Yet the court held that the school was not liable under the State-created danger doctrine because plaintiffs could not “point to any affirmative actions by the defendants that created or increased the danger to the victim[].” Id. See Johnson v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., supra at 202 (rejecting liability under State-created danger doctrine because “[n]o state actor placed [the student] in a ‘unique, confrontational encounter’ with a violent criminal.... No official in the performance of her duties abandoned him in a crack house or released a known criminal in front of his locker. . . . [T]he facts here pleaded suggest only that [the student] was the tragic victim of random criminal conduct rather than of school officials’ deliberate, callous decisions to interpose him in the midst of a criminally dangerous environment”); Sargi, supra at 913 (“no evidence that the Board took any affirmative action that exposed decedent to any danger to which she was not already exposed”).
The defendants in the instant case did not create the danger that resulted in Robinson’s death. They neither created the three assailants’ murderous intent nor invited them onto school property. “The most that can bе said of the state functionaries in this case is that they stood by and did nothing when suspicious circumstances dictated a more active role for them.” De-Shaney, supra at 203. This inaction does not make the defendants liable under § 1983. See id.-, Graham, supra at 995 (“Inaction by the state in the face of a known danger is not enough to trigger the obligation [to protect]; according to De-
Because the plaintiff in Brum vs. Dartmouth has failed to allege a violation of any constitutional right, she has not made out a valid claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We need not, therefore, address the parties’ arguments regarding thе availability to defendants of a qualified immunity defense. See Estate of Gilmore, supra at 723; Russell v. Fannin County Sch. Dist.,
B
The plaintiff in Brum vs. Dartmouth claims that she is entitled to recover under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, G. L. c. 12, § 111, because the defendants interfered with Robinson’s constitutional right to fife. In order to make out a claim under § 111,
VI
In Brum vs. Dartmouth, the judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed.
In King vs. Commonwealth, the Superior Court’s order denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss is reversed.
So ordered.
Notes
King also sued Simpson, making separate allegations against him. Simpson is not a party to the motion or appeal.
The individual who stabbed Robinson was subsequently convicted of murder in the second degree. See Commonwealth v. Reed,
We note that at the time Simpson was releasеd, future dangerousness, the very consideration King urges here, could not permissibly be taken into account in determining whether and under what conditions Simpson should be released. See Aime v. Commonwealth,
Counsel for the town stated at oral argument that he recently had discovered that the relevant language in G. L. c. 71, § 37H — mandating adoption of security measures by school committees — was added to the statute in an amendment taking effect in June, 1993 (St. 1993, c. 71, § 36), and, therefore, was not in effect at the time of Robinson’s death in April, 1993. Were that true, the discretionary function would clearly apply, and the plaintiff’s claim would be disposed of easily.
As Brum’s counsel pointed out in a postargument letter to this court, however, the language of § 37H has, since 1987, stated that: “[e]ach school committee’s rules or regulations pertaining to the conduct of students shall include the following: . . . procedures to assure school building security and safety of students and school personnel . . . .” The use of the word “shall” makes adoption of security measures mandatory, and the 1993 amendments, which in no way changed this provision, are irrelevant to this issue.
Counsel for the town quoted, as support for its argument, G. L. c. 71, § 37, which is entirely separate from § 37H, and which, before June, 1993, contained the word “may” with reference to school committees’ adoption of policies regarding the length of the school week and year. It was rewritten in 1993 to use the word “shall.” St. 1993, c. 71, § 35. It is not apparent how that provision is in any way relevant to whether schools are compelled to adopt security policies. Therefore, the fact that its language was changed from “may” to “shall” is irrelevant.
The plaintiffs as well as the Appeals Court and several decisions by Superior Court judges have cited Glannon, Liability for “Public Duties” Under the Tort Claims Act: The Legislature Reconsiders the Public Duty Rule, 79 Mass. L. Rev. 17 (1994), as a source of clarification of the meaning of § 10 (j). See, e.g., Enterprise Rent A Car of Boston, Inc. vs. Imbrogna, No. Civ. A. 94-2000 (Norfolk Superior Court July 2, 1996); McConnell vs. Dooling, No. Civ. A. 94-1503 (Norfolk Superior Court June 7, 1995); Hardy vs. Somerville, No. Civ. A. 94-2979 (Middlesex Superior Court Dec. 15, 1994). That article, of course, is not part of the legislative history of the statute — not even part of what is sometimes oxymoronically called subsequent legislative history — and should not be treated as such, notwithstanding the fact that Professor Glannon “participated in the committee discussions which led to” § 10 (/'). Glannon, supra at 17 n.*. In fact, the article, although its description of the statute is useful in a number of respects, perpetuates some of the confusion caused by the statute. It argues, for example, that § 10 (j) would not bar a suit brought by the parents of a child injured on the schoolyard by another child where the injury occurred under the negligent supervision of a government-employed teacher, but fails to provide any adequate explanation of how such a situation differs from other scenarios — such as one he mentions in which a child is bitten by a rabid raccoon after the public health director had been notified of the raccoon’s presence and negligently delayed in responding until after the child had been bitten — which, Glannon argues, may not be the basis of a Tort Claims Act suit due to § 10 (/'). It will not do (and Glannon does not suggest that it should) to account for the difference by noting that the child’s act but not the raccoon’s bite is “the violent . . . conduct of a third person,” because by its terms such an act of a third person is included in the circumstances giving rise to immunity.
“Section 10 (j) provides that its exception to liability “shall not apply to: (1) any claim based upon explicit and specific assurances of safety or assistance, beyond general representations that investigation or assistance will be or has been undertaken, made to the direct victim or a member of his fam
Brum provides at least two other arguments why she has stated a valid cause of action despite the rule of DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Social Servs.,
Second, the plaintiff argues that municipal policymakers may be held liable, regardless of the presence of a “special relationship,” see infra, under the ruling in Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist.,
None of the cases on which Brum relies alters this conclusion. The only Federal circuit opinion cited by Brum on this topic is Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist.,
The only other cases cited by Brum for the proposition that schools owe some duty of protection to their students depend on facts involving a situation more analogous to custody than the facts in the instant case. Two district court ■ cases that found that a student is owed some duty of care by the school specifically cited compulsory education laws as a basis for their holdings. See Lichtler v. County of Orange,
Because Brum has not stated a viable cause of action under the due process clause and § 1983, this court need not address her claim that the defendants acted with “deliberate indifference” to the threat of hаrm to Robinson. Even if the alleged indifference violated some duty under state tort law, because the defendants’ “misconduct violated no constitutional duty . . . [the plaintiff’s] remedies ... lie in the arena of tort, not constitutional law.” Monahan v. Dorchester Counseling Ctr., Inc.,
General Laws c. 12, § 111, provides: “Any person whose exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by the constitution or laws of the United States, or of rights secured by the constitution or laws of the commonwealth, has been interfered with, or attempted to be interfered with, as described in section 11H, may institute and prosecute in his own name and on his own behalf a civil action for injunctive and other appropriate equitable relief . . . including the award of compensatory money damages.”
General Laws c. 12, § 11H, referred to by § 111, states: “Whenever any person or persons, whether or not acting under color of law, interfere by threats, intimidation or coercion, or attempt to interfere by threats, intimidation or coercion, with the exercise or enjoyment by any other person or persons of rights secured by the constitution or laws ... of the commonwealth, the attorney gеneral may bring a civil action for injunctive or other appropriate equitable relief.”
The plaintiff’s argument on appeal that the defendants’ failure to provide a safe environment constituted a “non-physical threat to students’ well-being” is purely semantic and borders on the frivolous. Although the word “threat” may be used to connote “danger,” as it does in Brum’s argument, that mean: ing of the word is obviously not the one intended in § 11H.
We are in complete sympathy with the concurrence’s observations that it is unfortunate that school officials should .escape all legal accountability for their failure to protect the children under their supervision. As the concurrence appears to acknowledge, it would, however, distort the general regime of § 10 (/') to interpret its provision, which speaks to tort liability in a wide range of circumstances, to achieve a satisfactory result in this special category of case. This is a task for the Legislature.
Concurrence Opinion
(concurring, with whom Abrams and Marshall, JJ., join). I agree that G. L. c. 258, § 10 (j), as it has been written, and DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Social Servs.,
In the present case, the school principal was told that the assailants had threatened to return to the school and retaliate against the students who were involved in a prior altercation. Apparently, the school took no action in response to that warning. Several school officials then witnessed three armed individuals enter the school, but again they took no action. Those armed individuals then stabbed Robinson to death in front of his classmates as he sat in a classroom. At the time that he was stabbed, the school’s security “standards and procedures” — if one could refer to them as such.— consisted of a “no-trespassing” sign and a sign asking visitors to report to the school office. See ante at 691. On such facts, parents should be able to submit to a jury the claim that the school breached a duty owed to them.
While G. L. c. 71, § 37H, G. L. c. 258, § 10 (j), and De-Shanery, supra, may compel the outcome we reach today, I believe that parents should be entitled to believe that the school officials to whom they entrust their children will not be deliberately indifferent and simply stand by and do nothing when made aware of an imminent threat to the safety of their
This entire matter is within the control of the Legislature, which, I hope, will act to impose an obligation on school districts, and to ensure that the restrictions in the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act do not apply to these cases.