Commonwealth v. Turner
622 Pa. 318
| Pa. | 2013

Background

  • Emma Turner was convicted (non-jury) of conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance in 2007 and sentenced to two years’ reporting probation on January 14, 2008; she did not file a direct appeal.
  • Turner filed a pro se PCRA petition on January 12, 2009 (within one year of finality), later amended to raise multiple ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims; she completed her sentence on February 19, 2010 while PCRA proceedings were pending.
  • The Commonwealth moved to dismiss under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(1)(i) (PCRA eligibility requires petitioner be serving a sentence at time relief is granted); the PCRA court held the statute unconstitutional as applied and granted an evidentiary hearing and ultimately a new trial based on counsel’s failure to call a character witness.
  • The Commonwealth appealed directly to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court asserting (1) no due process right to non-custodial collateral review, (2) Turner could have pursued direct-appeal review via Bomar, and (3) Turner delayed and could have expedited PCRA review while still serving her sentence.
  • The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reviewed whether due process required the Commonwealth to provide collateral review to a petitioner no longer serving a sentence and whether Turner was denied an opportunity to be heard.

Issues

Issue Plaintiff's Argument Defendant's Argument Held
Whether due process requires collateral PCRA review for someone no longer serving a sentence Turner: due process (opportunity to be heard) and the constitutional right to effective counsel require a hearing on her ineffectiveness claims despite sentence completion Commonwealth: no protected liberty interest once sentence ends; PCRA eligibility lawfully limits relief to those in custody Held: No. No due-process right to collateral PCRA review after sentence completion; §9543(a)(1)(i) constitutional as applied
Whether Turner was required to raise ineffectiveness claims on direct appeal (Bomar exception) Turner: Grant typically defers ineffectiveness claims to PCRA; Bomar was unreliable/uncertain and not a workable requirement Commonwealth: Bomar provided a possible route; Turner could have sought Bomar/direct-appeal review instead of waiting Held: Court noted Bomar was available at the time and Turner had opportunities to seek review; failure to pursue direct appeal or expedited PCRA undercuts due-process claim
Whether federal/state habeas or other writs (coram nobis) were available alternatives Turner: PCRA relief unavailable now, so habeas or coram nobis should permit relief Commonwealth: PCRA subsumes habeas and coram nobis; those extraordinary writs are unavailable when a PCRA remedy exists Held: Habeas and coram nobis unavailable because Turner’s claims were cognizable under the PCRA during her sentence; PCRA is the exclusive remedy
Whether the Remedies Clause requires the specific relief Turner received (hearing and new trial) Turner: Remedies Clause guarantees a remedy for constitutional violations (thus supporting PCRA court’s relief) Commonwealth: Remedies Clause does not override statutory eligibility; Turner had statutory PCRA remedy while serving sentence but failed to timely pursue it Held: Remedies Clause does not require the specific relief where statutory scheme provided an opportunity during the eligible period and petitioner failed to avail herself

Key Cases Cited

  • Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (U.S. 1986) (noting fundamental requisites of due process include opportunity to be heard)
  • Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (standard for ineffective assistance of counsel)
  • Finley v. Pennsylvania, 481 U.S. 551 (U.S. 1987) (states that provide post-conviction procedures need only meet fundamental fairness; procedure form is not dictated by federal Constitution)
  • Osborne v. District Attorney's Office for the Third Judicial Dist., 557 U.S. 52 (U.S. 2009) (states may design postconviction procedures; burden to show state procedures inadequate rests on defendant)
  • Daniels v. United States, 532 U.S. 374 (U.S. 2001) (procedural limits like statutes of limitation and exhaustion restrict access to constitutional review)
  • Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (U.S. 1973) (habeas corpus traditional function addresses release from custody)
  • Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (U.S. 2012) (equitable rule in federal habeas allowing cause to excuse default when ineffective assistance on state collateral review prevented earlier federal review)
  • Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.2d 726 (Pa. 2002) (prefer deferral of ineffectiveness claims to PCRA review)
  • Commonwealth v. Bomar, 826 A.2d 831 (Pa. 2003) (limited exception permitting direct-appeal consideration of ineffectiveness when trial court considered claims)
  • Commonwealth v. Ahlborn, 699 A.2d 718 (Pa. 1997) (interpreting §9543(a)(1)(i) to require petitioner be serving a sentence during pleading and proof)
  • Commonwealth v. O’Berg, 880 A.2d 597 (Pa. 2005) (rejected a broad short-sentence exception to Grant; recognized that Grant + §9543 may leave short-sentence defendants without collateral review)
  • Commonwealth v. Holmes, 79 A.3d 562 (Pa. 2013) (reaffirmed Grant; limited Bomar to its pre-Grant facts and described narrow exceptions)
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