Commonwealth v. St. Hilaire, 470 Mass. 338

Victim, an 86-year-old nursing-home resident, executed a quitclaim deed conveying her home to neighbor David St. Hilaire while hospitalized/rehabilitating after hip surgery; she later fell into a coma and died. The deed was signed in the presence of a notary but the victim later said she did not know what she had signed.
Medical records and staff observations showed the victim had mild cognitive deficits on admission and later periods of incoherence after medication; her health-care proxy (Lisa Miele) and attorney were not told about the deed.
The defendant recorded one mortgage, paid no money, changed the locks immediately, and claimed an earlier oral sale agreement and that the victim looked competent when signing.
Police interviewed the defendant; he produced unsigned documents (mortgages, a life estate) and the signed quitclaim deed.
At a bench (jury-waived) trial the judge convicted the defendant of larceny from a person 60+ (G. L. c. 266, § 30 (5)) and acquitted him of obtaining a signature by false pretenses. The judge allowed evidence of the victim’s mental incapacity to prove an "unlawful taking."
The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the conviction and remanded for a new trial because the judge’s instruction on the specific-intent element permitted a conviction based on a showing that the defendant “should have known” of incapacity rather than actual knowledge.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether victim's mental incapacity may be used to prove an "unlawful taking" element of larceny	Commonwealth: Victim's incapacity vitiated consent; evidence of incapacity is admissible to show the taking was unlawful	St. Hilaire: Victim's mental state is not an element of larceny and cannot substitute for lack of other larceny proof	Court: Mental incapacity is admissible and probative of lack of consent and thus the unlawful-taking element
Whether specific intent to steal can be proved by showing defendant "knew or should have known" of victim's incapacity	Commonwealth: Proving defendant knew or should have known suffices to show intent to steal	St. Hilaire: Commonwealth must prove actual knowledge; reasonable-person standard insufficient	Court: Requiring only that defendant "should have known" was error; Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant actually knew victim lacked capacity when claim-of-right defense is raised
Whether granting a life estate defeats the intent-to-permanently-deprive element	Defendant: Existence of life estate means no permanent deprivation; insufficient evidence of intent to permanently deprive	Commonwealth: Documents creating life estate were unsigned/unrecorded; conduct (locks changed, no payment) supports intent to deprive permanently	Court: Life-estate argument fails on facts; evidence could support intent to permanently deprive, so claim rejected on the record

Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671 (Mass. 1979) (standard for reviewing sufficiency of evidence)
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (U.S. 1979) (reasonable-doubt sufficiency standard)
Commonwealth v. Mills, 436 Mass. 387 (Mass. 2002) (elements of larceny; merger of larceny forms)
Commonwealth v. Blache, 450 Mass. 583 (Mass. 2008) (victim's lack of capacity can vitiate consent in sexual-assault context)
Commonwealth v. Reske, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 522 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997) (victim's mental capacity probative in larceny-by-false-pretenses case)
State v. Calonico, 256 Conn. 135 (Conn. 2001) (victim incapacity may be considered on issue of consent under similar larceny statute)
People v. Camiola, 225 A.D.2d 380 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (victim's inability to consent properly considered in larceny context)
Commonwealth v. White, 123 Mass. 430 (Mass. 1877) (historical formulation: larceny requires taking without owner consent)
Commonwealth v. Stebbins, 8 Gray 492 (Mass. 1857) (early recognition that honest belief may negate felonious intent)