Commonwealth v. Sperber
177 A.3d 212
| Pa. Super. Ct. | 2017Background
- Thomas Sperber, Jr., a parolee, attended a routine parole reporting meeting; during a search of his vehicle an LG smartphone was seized. Authorities had received anonymous tips that Sperber had internet-enabled/social-media accounts.
- Sperber moved to suppress, arguing the warrantless seizure/search was unsupported by reasonable suspicion because based on uncorroborated anonymous tips; he also argued subsequent searches/arrest and the phone-warrant were fruits of the unlawful seizure.
- The suppression motion cited Commonwealth v. Colon, Commonwealth v. Kue, and Commonwealth v. Wimbush; Sperber did not assert in his written motion that any consent he gave was involuntary.
- The Superior Court concurrence (Bowes, J.) would affirm on the ground that Sperber consented to the vehicular search that yielded the phone, and would treat any voluntariness challenge as waived for lack of preservation.
- The concurrence also concluded the limited, warrantless search of the phone was lawful because discovery of the phone corroborated the anonymous tips, possession of an internet-capable phone violated parole conditions, and ensuring compliance justified the search.
Issues
| Issue | Commonwealth's Argument | Sperber's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Was the vehicular search lawful? | Search was supported either by corroborated anonymous tips or was consensual; parolee status reduces expectation of privacy. | Anonymous tips alone cannot establish reasonable suspicion for search; seizure/search unsupported. | Concurrence: search upheld as consensual; majority analyzed tips but concurrence would affirm on consent. |
| Was consent voluntary or waived? | Commonwealth treated voluntariness as not contested at hearing; evidence addressed issues raised. | Consent was involuntary due to the supervisory/parole context and thus invalid. | Concurrence: voluntariness challenge waived because not raised in motion/hearing; evidence record insufficient to decide voluntariness. |
| Was the warrantless search of the phone lawful? | Once phone was discovered (corroborating tips) and possession violated parole, a limited search to ensure compliance was justified. | Sperber did not consent to phone search; he only provided the password; claimed unlawful search. | Concurrence: limited warrantless search lawful based on corroboration, parole violation, and supervisory needs. |
| Does Packingham v. North Carolina invalidate parole conditions banning internet/social media? | Packingham’s language suspicious of blanket bans, but it did not address supervisory conditions; states may tailor conditions for supervised release. | Sperber could argue his parole conditions are overbroad in light of Packingham. | Concurrence: Packingham does not alter analysis here; any challenge to parole conditions was not preserved and is better pursued in separate collateral proceedings. |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Colon, 31 A.3d 309 (Pa. Super. 2011) (anonymous-tip/corroboration principles relevant to searches)
- Commonwealth v. Kue, 692 A.2d 1076 (Pa. 1997) (anonymous tip and reasonable-suspicion analysis)
- Commonwealth v. Wimbush, 750 A.2d 807 (Pa. 2000) (anonymous-tip reliability for investigative detentions)
- Commonwealth v. Strickler, 757 A.2d 884 (Pa. 2000) (consent vs. seizure analysis and voluntariness overlap)
- Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (U.S. 2017) (First Amendment limits on blanket internet-access prohibitions for sex offenders)
- Commonwealth v. Dixon, 997 A.2d 368 (Pa. Super. 2010) (preservation and scope of suppression motions)
- Commonwealth v. McDonald, 881 A.2d 858 (Pa. Super. 2005) (notice function of a suppression motion)
- Commonwealth v. Partee, 86 A.3d 245 (Pa. Super. 2014) (limitations on PCRA relief for certain post-conviction challenges)