OPINION BY
Rаymond Douglas Partee appeals from the April 25, 2013 order treating his petition seeking enforcement of plea agreement as a PCRA petition and dismissing it as patently under Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. We agree with Appellant that the relief sought is not cognizable under the PCRA and that it was error to treat it as such. However, Appellant is not entitled to specific performance of a negotiated plea bargain that he subsequently breached. Hence, we affirm.
On September 17, 2007, Appellant entered a negotiated nolo contendere plea to indecent assault (person under age of thirteen), corruption of minors, and endangering the welfare of children. Pursuant to the agreement, counts one and two of the information, rape and incest, were withdrawn. Appellant was sentenced to intermediate punishment for six months, followed by a four-year probationary term.
On May 11, 2010, following a hearing, Appellant was fоund to be in violation of his probation
On June 2, 2011, Appellant filed a PCRA petition seeking reinstatement of his aрpellate rights regarding the VOP sentence. Counsel was appointed and filed an amended petition. Appellant’s right to appeal the May 11, 2010 sentence was reinstated, a notice of appeal was filed, and this Court affirmed judgment of sentence on June 19, 2012. Commonwealth v. Par-tee,
Appellant filed a petition for habeas corpus and/or seeking enforcement of a plea agreement on February 19, 2013. The Commonwealth treated the petition as a PCRA petition and filed an answer. The trial court issued Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of intent to dismiss on March 5, 2013, and Appellant filed a response. On April 25, 2013, the trial court dismissed the petition, аnd this appeal ensued. Appellant complied with the court’s order to file a Pa. R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal and the court issued its Rule 1925(a) opinion. Appellant presents the following issues:
I. Did the trial court err in dismissing Mr. Partee’s рetition to enforce his plea agreement?
(A) Did the court err in construing the petition as a PCRA petition, and calling it “patently frivolous?”
(B) Should the terms of Mr. Partee’s plea agreement, including the length of time he will be required to register under the Adam Walsh Act, be strictly enforced?
Apрellant’s brief at 5. The Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SOR-NA”), commonly referred to as the Adam Walsh Act, became effective on December 20, 2012. By its terms, any individual who was then being supervised by the board of probation or parole was subject to its provisions. A convictiоn for indecent assault was designated therein as a Tier II sexual offense, subjecting a defendant to a twenty-five-year registration requirement.
Preliminarily, we examine whether the trial court was correct in treating Appel
In support of his position that his petition should not be treated as a PCRA petition, Appellant directs our attention to two recent decisions where our Supreme Court determined that petitions fell outside the scope of the PCRA. In Commonwealth v. West,
We note that the within petition is not an attack on Appellant’s sentence, nor is he alleging that he is innocent of the offenses of which he was convicted. Appellant is not asserting that his conviction or sentence resulted from a violation of thе Constitution, ineffective assistance of counsel, an unlawfully-induced plea, obstruction by government officials of his right to appeal, newly-discovered evidence, an illegal sentence, or a lack of jurisdiction. 42 Pa. C.S. § 9543(a)(2). In short, we agree with Appellant that his claim doеs not fall within the scope of the PCRA and should not be reviewed under the standard applicable to the dismissal of PCRA petitions. See Commonwealth v. Masker,
Appellant argues that the ten-year registration requirement was an essential term of his plea agreement and that it should be specifically enforcеd. In a post-submission communication, he directs our attention to this Court’s recent en banc decision in Commonwealth v. Hainesworth,
Hainesworth filed a motiоn seeking to terminate supervision effective one week prior to the effective date of SORNA. The trial court denied the petition to terminate supervision, but held that application of SORNA’s registration requirements to Hainesworth violated due process.
On appeal, this Court, sitting en banc, concluded first that Hainesworth correctly framed the issue as one of contract law, and applied the standard of review applicable to whether a plea agreement has been breached: “what the parties to this plea agreement reasonably understood to be the terms of the agreement.” Hainesworth, supra (quoting Commonwealth v. Fruehan,
Our first inquiry herein is whether, looking at the totality of the circumstances, this case falls within Benner or Haines-worth. Appellant negotiated a plea bargain that would only require him to register for a ten-year period, rathеr than for a lifetime. Appellant read, answered, and signed a written colloquy acknowledging that there was a plea bargain in this case and that he was “willing to enter a plea to the offenses specified.” Colloquy, 9/17/07, at 9 # 60. At the nolo contendere plea/sentencing hearing on September 17, 2007, the following exchange took place:
The Court: Mr. Hoffman, I understand that you and Mr. Nightingale have reached a plea agreement in this case? Mr. Hoffman: We have, Your Honor. Commonwealth agrees to drop the counts of rape and incest. There’s going to be a nolо contendere plea entered to the counts of indecent assault, corruption of minors, and endangering welfare.
There’s going to be a period of six months’ house arrest and, in addition to that, probation to be set by the Court, Your Honor.
Mr. Nightingale: And it’s further our understanding the sentence will be at indecent assault only. We understand the Megan’s Law reporting requirement. We had a brief discussion about whether or not my client would be released pending being hooked up on house arrest.... N.T. Nolo Contendere Plea/Sentencing, 9/17/07, at 2-3.
The Court commenced its colloquy of Appellant:
The Court: Do you understand Counts 1 and 2 have been withdrawn. Count 3 charges you with indecent assault....
Do you understand the charges against you?
*249 The Defendant: Yes, Ma’am.
The Court: Mr. Hoffman, would you incorporate into the plea agreement the testimony of the trial this morning?
Mr. Hoffman: I would, Your Honor.
Id. at 4-5.
The Court: Okay. Mr. Partee, you also filled out the explanation of Megan’s rights, and you understand that you will have to register for ten yeаrs? There, of course, will be no assessment to determine whether Mr. Partee is an SVP; is that correct?
Mr. Hoffman: That is correct, Your Honor.
Id. at 6-7.
The explanation of Megan’s Law rights form to which the court referred provided in pertinent part:
2. Do you understand the charges to which you are pleading guilty/nolo con-tendere require you to register as a “sexual offender” for a period of 10 years (assistant district Attorney to check appropriate line) _X_Ten years X Yes _No
Megan’s Law Explanation of Rights Form, 9/13/07, at 1.
Herein, Appellant was subject to a ten-year reporting requirement under the terms of the plea agreement аnd there is no indication that he bargained for non-registration as a part of his plea. However, the ten-year Megan’s Law registration period was discussed at the plea proceeding. While it was not an explicit term of the negotiated plea, it is apparent that Appellant’s negotiated plea agreement was structured so that he would only be subject to a ten-year rather than a lifetime reporting requirement, distinguishing the facts herein from those in Benner. The two charges carrying a lifetime registration requirement were withdrawn by the Commonwealth аs part of the negotiations, leaving Appellant subject to the less onerous ten-year reporting requirement then imposed on indecent assault. Under our reasoning in Hainesworth, Appellant arguably would be entitled to the benefit of that bargain.
The Commonwealth argues, however, that tо the extent that Appellant’s original sentence, including the Megan’s Law registration requirement, are seen as a product of the 2007 plea agreement, Appellant’s subsequent violation of his probation constituted a breach of that agreement. Thus, the Commonwealth mаintains that Appellant cannot seek specific performance of the underlying plea agreement as there is no longer a plea bargain to enforce. It cites Commonwealth v. Parsons,
As our Supreme Court held in Commonwealth v. Wallace,
The rationale for giving the trial court such discretion upon resentencing is grounded in the nature of a negotiated guilty plea, which is a two-sided agreement that imposes obligations on both the defendant and the Commonwealth.*250 On the one hand, the Commonwealth agrees not to prosecute the defendant to the full extent of the law and to recommend a circumscribed punishment. The defendant, on the other hand, accepts this benefit with the implicit promise that he will abide by the terms of the agreement and behave in accordance with the legal punishment imposed by the court. See Commonwealth v. Coles,365 Pa.Super. 562 ,530 A.2d 453 (Pa.Super.1987) (holding that the benefit of the bargain principle commonly applied to the prosecution is also equally applicable to the defendant and imparts upon him the obligation to abide by the negotiated terms of his sentence).
Id. at 843 n. 6. See also Commonwealth v. Tann,
Appellant does not address the Commonwealth’s argument or the legal effect of his probation violation upon the original plea agreement. We agree with the Commonwealth that, having failed to abide by the terms of the plea bargain, that agreement is no longer in effect, and hence, Appellant is not entitled to spеcific performance. Hainesworth is not controlling.
Order affirmed.
Notes
. Initially, Appellant was found to be in technical violation of his probation for alcohol and drug related violations and failure to report. However, on May 10, 2010, he was convicted of failure to comply with sexual offender registration and was sentenced to one year of probation.