Commonwealth v. Smith, W., Aplt.
131 A.3d 467
Pa.2015Background
- In 1994 appellant (Smith) murdered Eileen Jones; he was convicted of first-degree murder and originally sentenced to death in 1995. The conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. A PCRA proceeding later resulted in vacatur of the death sentence and remand for a new penalty-phase hearing based on ineffective assistance of counsel.
- At the 2012 penalty-phase retrial the Commonwealth presented (and the jury found) the aggravating circumstance of a prior 1980 voluntary-manslaughter conviction; the jury returned a death sentence after weighing mitigating evidence (emotional distress, abusive childhood).
- Appellant raised multiple challenges on appeal to this Court, including: whether delay between conviction and resentencing barred the death penalty or violated due process/Eighth Amendment; admissibility of facts underlying the prior manslaughter conviction; admission of testimony that appellant read books about murder; a mistrial motion based on a witness mentioning “death row”; instruction to continue deliberations after jurors reported being deadlocked; and preclusion of a proposed voir dire question intended to “life-qualify” jurors given the prior conviction.
- The trial court denied the motion to bar the death penalty, admitted evidence about the prior conviction (including factual development), found the book-reading objection waived, denied a mistrial after giving a curative instruction about the “death row” remark, and ordered the jury to continue deliberations. The court also excluded appellant’s proposed case-specific voir dire question.
- The Pennsylvania Supreme Court (majority) affirmed the sentence: (1) no due-process or Eighth Amendment violation from delay or time on death row absent proof of bad-faith Commonwealth delay or identifiable prejudice; (2) facts underlying a prior conviction are admissible to give the jury meaningful context for a § 9711(d)(12) aggravator; (3) the “death row” remark was cured by instruction, so mistrial was unnecessary; (4) continuing deliberations was within the trial court’s discretion; and (5) the proposed voir dire question was properly excluded as an impermissible case-specific inquiry into how jurors would react to a particular aggravator and was unnecessary because general life-qualification had already occurred.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Smith) | Defendant's Argument (Commonwealth) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Should the death penalty be barred for excessive delay between conviction and resentencing? | 17-year delay caused loss of witnesses/memory and violated due process, speedy trial, and Eighth Amendment protections. | Delay resulted from appeals and PCRA process; no bad-faith Commonwealth delay; transcripts preserved prior testimony; no identifiable prejudice. | Affirmed: No due-process or Eighth Amendment violation; appellant failed to show specific prejudice or bad-faith delay. |
| 2. Was it error to admit factual development of appellant’s 1980 voluntary-manslaughter conviction? | Underlying facts are more prejudicial than the conviction itself and unfair because Commonwealth previously resolved the matter as manslaughter. | Jury must know facts behind prior convictions to assess character and weigh the (d)(12) aggravator properly. | Affirmed: Trial court didn’t abuse discretion; factual development of prior conviction admissible for sentencing determination. |
| 3. Should a mistrial have been granted after a witness mentioned appellant was on "death row"? | The remark improperly signaled prior conviction/sentence and prejudiced the jury. | Remark was inadvertent; immediate objection and curative instruction dispelled prejudice. | Affirmed: Denial of mistrial proper; curative instruction adequate and juries presumed to follow instructions. |
| 4. Was exclusion of appellant’s case‑specific voir dire question (to "life‑qualify" jurors given prior manslaughter) improper? | Appellant needed to ask whether jurors could consider life despite a prior homicide to detect jurors committed to death. | The question sought case‑specific reactions to a particular aggravator; Bomar prohibits hypothetical/case‑specific questions that seek juror precommitments; general life‑qualification already done. | Affirmed: Preclusion proper; proposed question impermissibly probed juror reactions to a specific aggravator and was unnecessary to detect jurors who would always impose death. |
Key Cases Cited
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (U.S. 1966) (establishes Miranda warnings for custodial interrogation)
- Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (U.S. 1972) (sets four-factor balancing test for speedy-trial/due-process claims)
- Azania v. State, 865 N.E.2d 994 (Ind. 2007) (applied Barker test to long delay before penalty-phase resentencing)
- Beasley, 505 Pa. 279, 479 A.2d 460 (Pa. 1984) (prior convictions may be developed by facts and circumstances to inform jury about defendant’s character at sentencing)
- Flor, 606 Pa. 384, 998 A.2d 606 (Pa. 2010) (affirming that jury must know more than mere fact of conviction when considering aggravators)
- Bomar, 573 Pa. 426, 826 A.2d 831 (Pa. 2003) (precludes direct or hypothetical voir dire questions designed to elicit jurors’ likely decisions under specific facts)
- Mattison, 623 Pa. 174, 82 A.3d 386 (Pa. 2013) (upholds preclusion of voir dire that would disclose prior conviction before guilt phase and rejects separate juries to life‑qualify penalty jurors)