Commonwealth v. Penn
472 Mass. 610
| Mass. | 2015Background
- On April 1, 2004, after a confrontation outside an apartment in Lawrence, MA, Benjamin Serrano produced a gun, handed it to Luis Penn (the defendant), and a scuffle ensued; the victim, Aneury Guzman, was later shot in the head and died.
- The only eyewitness to the shooting, Jose Estrella, observed from across the street at a distance and described the shooter’s clothing and relative height; he did not give a positive, in-court identification of Penn as the shooter but described physical traits consistent with Penn’s height and attire.
- Physical evidence at the scene included a .22 shell casing, a Virgin Mary medallion belonging to Serrano, the victim’s medallion and jacket, and a knife with the victim’s DNA; DNA excluded the defendant as source of blood on the knife.
- Penn made inconsistent pretrial statements: an initial alibi implicating being shot at elsewhere, later telling an officer he had been present and “had the gun,” and admitting to a girlfriend non‑specific involvement when asked what happened.
- At trial a jury convicted Penn of first‑degree murder (deliberate premeditation) and illegal firearm possession; he was sentenced to life without parole (mandatory at the time) and appealed on multiple grounds.
Issues
| Issue | Commonwealth's Argument | Penn's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence to prove Penn was the shooter and premeditated murder | Evidence (Estrella’s description, height difference, clothing/hood, Penn’s possession of gun during fight, flight and admissions) permits reasonable inference Penn shot Guzman and acted with deliberation | Evidence was insufficient; Serrano had stronger motive and Serrano’s medallion at scene favors Serrano as shooter | Conviction affirmed: evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find Penn guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; weight of evidence also supports verdict |
| Closure of courtroom during voir dire (public‑trial right) | Closure was procedural, consistent with local practice; defense waived by counsel’s acquiescence; no prejudice shown | Closure violated Sixth Amendment; counsel ineffective for not objecting; warrants new trial | Claim was procedurally waived; counsel‑ineffectiveness claim fails for lack of prejudice — no new trial warranted |
| Failure to instruct jury on honest but mistaken eyewitness identification | Existing modified instruction about assessing Estrella’s descriptive testimony was sufficient | Trial judge erred by not giving requested amplification explicitly addressing ‘‘good faith error’’ risk | Error was unpreserved; no substantial likelihood of miscarriage of justice because defense tested mistake theory in cross‑exam and argument; no new trial |
| Prosecutor’s alleged vouching in closing argument | Argument framed as inferences from evidence; prosecutor permissibly urged jury to draw conclusions | Prosecutor improperly vouched for witness and expressed personal belief in guilt, requiring new trial | Comments were improper but did not create substantial likelihood of miscarriage of justice; no new trial |
| Juvenile sentencing (Eighth Amendment / art. 26) | Prior mandatory LWOP for juveniles has been superseded by Miller and Diatchenko; Commonwealth concedes resentencing required | Penn (age 17 at offense) entitled to resentencing to life with parole possibility | Remand for resentencing consistent with Diatchenko (life with possibility of parole) |
Key Cases Cited
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (establishes appellate sufficiency‑of‑the‑evidence standard)
- Latimore v. Commonwealth, 378 Mass. 671 (1979) (Massachusetts statement of sufficiency standard)
- Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass. 655 (2013) (Massachusetts rule that mandatory LWOP for offenders under 18 violates art. 26)
- Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (mandatory LWOP for juveniles violates Eighth Amendment)
- Franklin v. Commonwealth, 465 Mass. 895 (2013) (modified eyewitness instruction guidance and G. L. c. 278, § 33E weight‑of‑evidence discussion)
- Rodriguez v. Commonwealth, 378 Mass. 296 (1979) (template eyewitness‑identification jury instruction)
- Pressley v. Commonwealth, 390 Mass. 617 (1983) (trial judge must instruct on honest but mistaken identification when facts permit and defendant requests)
- Sanders v. Commonwealth, 451 Mass. 290 (2008) (standards for evaluating improper prosecutorial vouching in closing)
- Ciampa v. Commonwealth, 406 Mass. 257 (1989) (prosecutorial vouching impermissible because it suggests special knowledge)
- Ruddock v. Commonwealth, 428 Mass. 288 (1998) (harmless‑error analysis where omitted instruction was unlikely to affect verdict)
- LaChance v. Commonwealth, 469 Mass. 854 (2014) (waiver of public‑trial claim and standards for ineffective assistance where objection not preserved)
- Morganti v. Commonwealth, 467 Mass. 96 (2014) (discusses preservation and waiver of public‑trial claims)
- Jackson v. Commonwealth, 471 Mass. 262 (2015) (ineffective assistance standard and prejudice showing for public‑trial closure claims)
- Ray v. Commonwealth, 467 Mass. 115 (2014) (remanding for resentencing consistent with Diatchenko)
- Russell v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 464 (2015) (discusses proof beyond a reasonable doubt vs. absolute certainty)