Commonwealth v. Okoro
471 Mass. 51
| Mass. | 2015Background
- Defendant Emmanuel Okoro, age 15 at the time of the killing (Jan. 1, 2008), was convicted of second‑degree murder for stabbing Markeen Starks and sentenced to life with parole eligibility after 15 years under statutes then in effect.
- Defendant had IQ ~75–76 (borderline), a history of emotional dysregulation, substance use that night, exposure to chronic domestic violence, foster‑care placement, and other adverse childhood experiences; a forensic psychologist testified about these factors and adolescent brain development.
- Trial allowed expert testimony about adolescent brain development and the defendant’s individual capacity (impulse control, decisionmaking) but excluded any expert opinion that being fifteen per se made formation of malice impossible.
- Defendant sought (posttrial) resentencing/individualized sentencing based on Miller v. Alabama and related authority; trial court denied motions and request for reconsideration; appeal taken to the Supreme Judicial Court.
- Defendant also argued trial error: exclusion of expert opinion that youth precluded malice, and failure to instruct jury on defense of another (in defense of sister). The court rejected those claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Okoro) | Defendant's Argument (Commonwealth) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Constitutionality of mandatory life with parole (juvenile homicide, 2d° murder) | Miller requires individualized judicial sentencing for juvenile homicide offenders; mandatory life (even with parole) is cruel and unusual | Miller’s individualized‑sentencing rule applies only to life without parole; mandatory life with parole is constitutional; parole procedures can address youth differences | Court held mandatory life with parole after 15 years for juvenile 2d‑degree murder does not violate the Eighth Amendment or art. 26 (for now) |
| Parole due process / separation of powers | Parole board lacks protections and may not consider youth attributes; judicial individualized sentencing required to protect due process and separation of powers | Parole is an executive function; court sentencing need not be individualized where statute permits parole; procedural protections can be provided at parole | Court ordered that certain due process protections applied at parole hearings for juvenile 2d‑degree murder (following Diatchenko II), but rejected separation‑of‑powers claim because individualized judicial sentencing is not constitutionally required |
| Admissibility of expert testimony on adolescent brain and intent | Expert should be allowed to testify that adolescent brain development can negate capacity for malice generally (youth itself as a mitigating factor) | Legislature has determined juveniles ≥14 can form intent for murder; experts may testify about individual capacity but not say age alone negates legal capacity | Court affirmed: expert may explain adolescent brain science and this defendant’s capacities, but not opine that being fifteen categorically prevents formation of malice; no exclusionary error |
| Jury instruction on defense of another | Evidence supported instruction that Okoro acted to defend his sister and could reduce culpability to manslaughter | Evidence did not show an immediate unlawful attack on the sister or a reasonable belief requiring deadly force | Court held no reversible error: facts viewed most favorably did not warrant instruction on defense of another |
Key Cases Cited
- Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (Eighth Amendment forbids mandatory life without parole for juvenile offenders; youth must be considered)
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (juveniles must have a meaningful opportunity for release; nonhomicide life without parole unconstitutional)
- Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass. 655 (2013) (Mass. SJC construing Miller; juvenile life without parole unconstitutional; juvenile life with parole permissible with parole review)
- Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 471 Mass. 12 (2015) (procedural due process protections at parole hearings for juvenile homicide offenders)
- Commonwealth v. Ogden O., 448 Mass. 798 (2007) (juveniles may form specific intent; courts should respect legislative determinations about juvenile criminal capacity)