Commonwealth v. Neiman
624 Pa. 53
| Pa. | 2013Background
- Act 152 of 2004 (enacted Nov. 24, 2004) began as a narrow Senate bill amending deficiency-judgment procedures in Title 42 but was expanded during the legislative process to include: asbestos statutes of limitation, county park police jurisdiction, and extensive amendments to Pennsylvania’s Megan’s Law (sex-offender registration, notification, database, enforcement).
- The Act was applied to the appellant (criminal defendant) at sentencing; appellant appealed raising, among other claims, that Act 152 violated Article III, § 3 (the Pennsylvania "single subject" rule).
- The Superior Court, sitting en banc, held Act 152 violated the single-subject rule but severed and preserved the Megan’s Law provisions, invalidating other parts.
- The Commonwealth and the General Assembly defended the Act, arguing a unifying subject of "refining civil remedies" or "judicial remedies and sanctions;" appellant argued the Act contained unrelated subjects and was therefore unconstitutional in whole.
- The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court: it held Act 152 violated Article III, § 3 because its provisions were not germane to a single unifying subject, and declined to sever any portions — striking the entire Act but staying the judgment for 90 days to allow for legislative remedial measures.
Issues
| Issue | Appellant's Argument | Commonwealth/General Assembly's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Act 152 violated Article III, § 3 (single-subject rule) | Act 152’s disparate provisions (Megan’s Law, deficiency-judgment rules, asbestos limitations, police jurisdiction) lack a unifying subject and thus violate the single-subject rule | All provisions relate to a single subject (e.g., "refining civil remedies" or "judicial remedies and sanctions") and are therefore germane | Held: Act 152 violates Article III, § 3 — provisions are not germane to a single, reasonably narrow subject; statute unconstitutional in whole |
| Appropriate scope of permissible unifying topic under Article III, § 3 | Proposed narrow focuses (e.g., initial deficiency-judgment purpose) show no nexus with later additions | Proposed broader unifying subjects (judicial/civil remedies) are proper and permitted | Held: Court must hypothesize a reasonably narrow unifying subject; suggested broad topics here were too expansive to satisfy the single-subject requirement |
| Severability — whether Megan’s Law provisions could be severed and preserved | If any severance, the Megan’s Law provisions should be preserved (they formed the largest portion) or else invalidate whole act | Severability statute (1 Pa.C.S. § 1925) permits saving independent provisions; sever Megan’s Law and sustain it | Held: Severing was inappropriate here — when an omnibus act violates the single-subject rule, all provisions are tainted and the entire act must be struck down |
| Remedy and transitional relief | N/A (appellant sought invalidation beneficial to him) | General Assembly warned of reliance interests and requested stay to mitigate disruption | Held: Act 152 invalidated in its entirety, but the judgment stayed 90 days to allow the legislature time to respond |
Key Cases Cited
- City of Philadelphia v. Commonwealth, 838 A.2d 566 (Pa. 2003) (articulates single-subject analysis and rejects overly broad unifying topics)
- Pennsylvanians Against Gambling Expansion Fund, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 877 A.2d 383 (Pa. 2005) (permits severance of narrow non-germane provisions when statute contains severability language and a clear primary purpose)
- Pennsylvania State Ass’n of Jury Comm’rs v. Commonwealth, 64 A.3d 611 (Pa. 2013) (explains single-subject test and title/germaneness requirements)
- State Bd. of Chiropractic Examiners v. Life Fellowship of Pa., 272 A.2d 478 (Pa. 1971) (legislative intent is primary in severability analysis)
- Stilp v. Commonwealth, 905 A.2d 918 (Pa. 2006) (court’s role in reviewing Article III procedural challenges; presumption of constitutionality)