Commonwealth v. Morgan
476 Mass. 768
| Mass. | 2017Background
- Defendant Joel D. Morgan, a U.S. Army veteran with combat service and diagnosed PTSD, was arrested (2014) for OUI (second offense), possession of heroin, negligent operation, and leaving scene; he admitted to sufficient facts on a prior OUI in 2004.
- After arrest Morgan engaged in VA treatment (detox, PTSD counseling, medication-assisted treatment) and maintained steady employment; counsel moved under the VALOR Act (G. L. c. 276A §§ 10–11) for pretrial diversion seeking either a continuance without a finding (CWOF) or dismissal upon successful completion.
- The prosecutor opposed CWOF or dismissal for the OUI second-offense charge based on G. L. c. 90, § 24/24D, which generally precludes filing or CWOF for repeat OUI offenders.
- The trial judge reported two questions of law to the Appeals Court: (1) whether a judge may enter a CWOF after an admission to an OUI second-offense under the VALOR Act; and (2) if CWOF is unavailable, whether the court may dismiss the charge upon successful diversion over the Commonwealth’s objection.
- The Supreme Judicial Court granted direct review to decide whether the VALOR Act amendments to the pretrial diversion statute authorize dismissal or CWOF for qualifying veterans charged with OUI second-offense notwithstanding G. L. c. 90 constraints.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether G. L. c. 276A (as amended by VALOR Act §§10–11) authorizes a judge to enter a CWOF or dismiss charges after successful diversion for qualifying veterans | Commonwealth: VALOR only permits a short continuance/assessment; it does not authorize alternative dispositions (CWOF/dismissal), so prosecution would resume | Morgan: VALOR incorporated pretrial diversion protections (CWOF/dismissal) for veterans, like §2 for young adults, so judge may order CWOF or dismissal after successful program completion | Yes. Court: VALOR intended veterans to receive the same diversion benefits (CWOF/dismissal) as young adults; judges may order those dispositions in appropriate cases |
| Whether the VALOR Act’s authorization conflicts with G. L. c. 90 (OUI statute) which restricts CWOF/dismissal for second/subsequent OUI offenses | Commonwealth: OUI statute controls as more specific and precludes CWOF/dismissal for second-offense, thus VALOR cannot override those limits | Morgan: VALOR reflects legislative policy to provide rehabilitative options for veterans; statutes overlap and should be harmonized to allow discretionary diversion in appropriate cases | Yes. Court: Neither statute is clearly superior; read harmoniously, VALOR authorizes discretionary CWOF/dismissal for eligible military defendants despite OUI statute’s general limits; judges retain discretion and public-safety considerations guide decisions |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Cole, 468 Mass. 294 (addresses limits on judicial dismissal over prosecutorial objection)
- Commonwealth v. Cheney, 440 Mass. 568 (judicial dismissal requires statutory authority)
- Commonwealth v. Guzman, 446 Mass. 344 (statuteally authorized dismissal does not violate separation of powers)
- Commonwealth v. Pyles, 423 Mass. 717 (continuance without a finding upheld where statutorily authorized)
- Commonwealth v. Harris, 443 Mass. 714 (more-specific statute canon explained)
- Commonwealth v. Ventura, 465 Mass. 202 (read related statutes harmoniously)
- Wing v. Commissioner of Probation, 473 Mass. 368 (statutory interpretation principles: mischief and purpose)
- Commonwealth v. Figueroa, 464 Mass. 365 (avoid construing statutes to render provisions null or absurd)
- Commonwealth v. Pon, 469 Mass. 296 (collateral consequences of conviction)
