Commonwealth v. Littles, 477 Mass. 382

Between July 26–28, 2013 the defendant deposited four checks totaling $15,000 drawn on a Citizens Bank account that had been closed for years; all four checks later bounced.
Defendant used ATM electronic posting and transferred funds between TD Bank accounts before the checks cleared (consistent with a check‑kiting scheme), then spent substantial sums and overdrew TD accounts by about $12,000.
TD Bank notified defendant that the checks were returned; she promised to remedy it but made no repayment and later became unreachable; demand letter showed an outstanding balance of $11,664.20 and no repayment for nine months.
At trial defendant testified she believed the Citizens account was open and had “forgotten” to repay because of personal and family health problems.
Jury convicted on four counts of larceny by uttering false checks; defendant appealed based on the jury instruction implementing G. L. c. 266, § 37, which deems failure to make good on a bounced check within two days of notice "prima facie evidence" of knowledge of insufficient funds and intent to defraud.

Issue	Commonwealth's Argument	Littles' Argument	Held
Whether § 37 and the model jury instruction permissibly create a permissive inference (prima facie evidence) that failure to pay within two days of notice proves knowledge of insufficient funds and intent to defraud	§ 37 and the instruction merely allow the jury to infer knowledge/intent from failure to pay within two days; they are proper permissive inferences and do not relieve the Commonwealth of its burden	The two‑day failure to pay is not sufficiently and rationally connected to the defendant’s state of mind when the check was written; the prima facie designation and instruction unconstitutionally permit conviction without proof beyond a reasonable doubt	The court held § 37’s prima facie designation and the corresponding instruction are unconstitutional because failure to pay within two days, by itself, is not a sufficiently strong logical connection to prove knowledge and intent at the time the check was written; however, the instructional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in this case and convictions were affirmed.

Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (addresses limits on permissive inferences where innocent explanations are probable)
Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837 (upheld inference of guilty knowledge from unexplained possession of recently stolen checks)
Commonwealth v. Pauley, 368 Mass. 286 (discusses permissive inferences and owner‑driver inference)
Commonwealth v. Maloney, 447 Mass. 577 (explains prima facie designation in criminal cases and permissive inference effect)
Commonwealth v. Klein, 400 Mass. 309 (related discussion and dissent on § 37’s inference)
Commonwealth v. Nolin, 448 Mass. 207 (harmless‑error framework for instructions)
Commonwealth v. Petetabella, 459 Mass. 177 (standard for preserved constitutional error reversal)
Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 456 Mass. 350 (harmless‑error analysis where other evidence is overwhelming)
Williams v. United States, 458 U.S. 279 (definition/example of check‑kiting scheme)