Commonwealth v. Lekka
210 A.3d 343
| Pa. Super. Ct. | 2019Background
- In 1978, 17-year-old John Lekka and co-defendant Robert Buli brutally murdered 17-year-old Diana Goeke; Lekka was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life in 1979.
- Lekka served decades in prison and sought post-conviction relief; after Miller v. Alabama and Montgomery v. Louisiana, his mandatory life-without-parole sentence was vacated and he was remanded for resentencing.
- At a multi-day resentencing in October 2017 the court imposed 45 years to life (credit for time served), concurrent to an earlier 5–10 year conspiracy term; the court also ordered $1,000 restitution for funeral expenses.
- Lekka sought to introduce an exhibit (D-1) summarizing resentencings of 120 juvenile homicide offenders to argue disparity and uniformity; the court denied admission at the reconsideration hearing.
- On appeal Lekka raised challenges to the discretionary aspects of the 45-to-life sentence, the court’s failure to apply Miller factors, whether the term was a de facto life sentence, the exclusion of Exhibit D-1, and the legality of the restitution order.
- The Superior Court vacated the restitution award and affirmed the sentence in all other respects.
Issues
| Issue | Lekka's Argument | Commonwealth / Sentencing Court Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether court abused discretion by imposing 45-to-life when Batts II suggested 35-year minimum guidance | Sentence was 10 years above the Batts II/§1102.1 suggested starting point without explanation | Court followed Batts II guidance, considered §9721(b) factors, and was not required to recite exact reasons for deviating from the 35-year guide | No abuse of discretion; sentence affirmed |
| Whether court improperly discounted rehabilitation and overemphasized lack of insight | Lekka argued extensive rehabilitation, low recidivism risk, and exemplary prison record warranted lesser term | Sentencing court considered rehabilitation but gave weight to brutal facts and Lekka’s lack of true insight; balancing is for trial court | No reversible error; sentencing court reasonably weighed §9721(b) factors |
| Whether exclusion of Exhibit D-1 (comparative resentencings) was erroneous | Exhibit showed disparity and promoted uniformity; relevant to resentencing | Exhibit was not tied to individualized factors (offense/defendant details) and could have been offered earlier; relevancy and timing justified exclusion | No abuse of discretion in excluding Exhibit D-1 |
| Whether restitution order of $1,000 was lawful without Commonwealth request or evidentiary support | Restitution improper because not requested originally or at resentencing and amount unsupported | Commonwealth conceded award was improper | Restitution vacated as illegal; remainder of sentence affirmed |
| Whether Miller factors had to be considered at resentencing where Commonwealth withdrew notice to seek LWOP | Lekka: Miller factors mandatory whenever LWOP was statutorily possible for pre-Miller convictions | Court relied on Batts II and White: Miller factors required only when Commonwealth seeks LWOP; here Commonwealth withdrew LWOP notice | No error—Miller factors not required in this resentencing because LWOP was not sought |
| Whether 45-to-life is a de facto LWOP sentence | Lekka relied on life expectancy data and argued no meaningful chance of release | Precedent (Bebout, Foust) rejects bright-line and requires plausibility of surviving to earliest parole date; no workable standard shown to deem this de facto LWOP | 45-to-life not de facto LWOP on these facts; claim rejected |
Key Cases Cited
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (mandatory life without parole for juveniles violates Eighth Amendment and requires consideration of youth-related factors)
- Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016) (Miller announced a substantive rule made retroactive on collateral review)
- Commonwealth v. Batts, 163 A.3d 410 (Pa. 2017) (Batts II) (sentencing courts should look to §1102.1 minima for guidance and apply §9721(b) where LWOP is not sought)
- Commonwealth v. White, 193 A.3d 977 (Pa. Super. 2018) (Miller factors need only be considered when Commonwealth seeks LWOP)
- Commonwealth v. Bebout, 186 A.3d 462 (Pa. Super. 2018) (45-to-life sentence not necessarily de facto LWOP; must be plausible defendant could survive to parole eligibility)
- Commonwealth v. Foust, 180 A.3d 416 (Pa. Super. 2018) (declined to adopt bright-line rule for when term-of-years equals de facto LWOP)
