Commonwealth v. LaPlante, 123 N.E.3d 759

In 1987, 17-year-old Daniel J. LaPlante broke into the Gustafson home, raped and murdered Priscilla Gustafson and drowned her two young children; he was convicted of three counts of first‑degree murder.
LaPlante was originally sentenced in 1988 to three consecutive life terms without parole; this Court affirmed his convictions on direct appeal.
After Miller v. Alabama, and this Court’s Diatchenko decisions, mandatory LWOP for juveniles and discretionary LWOP under art. 26 were held unconstitutional; affected sentences were restructured so juveniles became parole‑eligible.
Under applicable restructuring and parole rules, LaPlante’s three consecutive life terms were adjusted so he would be eligible to seek parole after an aggregate 45 years.
Following Commonwealth v. Costa, LaPlante received a resentencing/Costa hearing considering Miller factors, psychological evidence, and post‑sentencing conduct; the judge reinstated three consecutive life terms with parole eligibility after 45 years.
LaPlante appealed under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, arguing that requiring a juvenile homicide offender to serve 45 years before parole violates art. 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether three consecutive life terms with parole eligibility after 45 years violates art. 26 (cruel or unusual punishment)	Commonwealth: sentence is permissible; followed Costa and considered Miller factors at resentencing	LaPlante: 45‑year aggregate before first parole opportunity is the functional equivalent of LWOP and violates art. 26	Court: No; on these facts the sentence is constitutional — proportionate under art. 26 when Miller/Costa factors and post‑sentencing conduct are considered
Whether a bright‑line ceiling or categorical rule (e.g., aggregate limit) should be adopted for juvenile homicide parole eligibility	Commonwealth: aggregate terms composed of individually permissible terms should not automatically trigger proportionality review	LaPlante: requests a bright‑line rule limiting aggregate parole delay	Court: Declines to adopt a bright‑line rule; proportionality is fact specific and requires consideration of Miller factors, offender characteristics, and postsentencing conduct

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (Eighth Amendment bars mandatory LWOP for juveniles)
Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass. 655 (2013) (Mass. art. 26 prohibits life sentences without parole for juveniles; meaningful opportunity for release required)
Commonwealth v. Costa, 472 Mass. 139 (2015) (resentencing procedure: consider Miller factors, psychological evidence, and postsentencing conduct)
Commonwealth v. Brown, 466 Mass. 676 (2013) (legislature/judges may distinguish among degrees of murder; avoid functional LWOP)
Commonwealth v. Perez, 477 Mass. 677 (2017) (apply Cepulonis disproportionality test; aggregate parole periods may be reviewed)
Commonwealth v. Okoro, 471 Mass. 51 (2015) (15‑year parole eligibility constitutional for juvenile second‑degree murder)
Commonwealth v. LaPlante, 416 Mass. 433 (1993) (direct appeal affirming convictions)