Commonwealth v. LaChance
469 Mass. 854
| Mass. | 2014Background
- Defendant LaChance was convicted in 2001 of multiple crimes; after direct appeals and two prior post-affirmance motions, he filed a third post-affirmance motion (2011) claiming a Sixth Amendment public-trial violation because family members were excluded during jury empanelment and trial counsel failed to object.
- Affidavits from the defendant, family, and counsel described that family members were removed from the courtroom during voir dire and prevented from reentering; trial counsel admitted he believed courtroom closure was standard practice and did not object or know the right extended to empanelment.
- The trial judge (who presided at trial) denied the new-trial motion without a hearing as procedurally waived for failure to object, and found no substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice from the closure.
- After this court’s decisions in Lavoie and Hardy, defendant sought reconsideration arguing that prejudice should be presumed for an ineffective-assistance claim because the public-trial right is a structural right; the judge again assumed deficiency but found no presumed prejudice and denied relief.
- The Supreme Judicial Court majority held that where a public-trial claim was procedurally waived at trial and is now raised as ineffective assistance of counsel on collateral review, the defendant must affirmatively show prejudice (substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice); the presumption of prejudice applicable to preserved structural errors does not apply.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether prejudice is presumed for an ineffective-assistance claim premised on counsel's failure to object to courtroom closure during jury empanelment | LaChance: Because the public-trial right is structural, prejudice should be presumed when counsel fails to object | Commonwealth: When the claim was waived at trial and raised later as ineffective assistance, defendant must show actual prejudice (substantial risk of miscarriage of justice) | Prejudice is not presumed; defendant must affirmatively show prejudice on collateral review |
| Effect of waiver on structural-error claims | LaChance: waiver by counsel should not foreclose collateral relief when counsel's performance was deficient | Commonwealth: Waiver doctrine applies to structural errors; preserved vs. waived claims are treated differently to protect finality | Waiver doctrine applies; preserved structural errors get automatic reversal, waived ones require substantial-risk review |
| Applicable standard for ineffective-assistance claims based on failure to object to structural error | LaChance: Strickland/Cronic exceptions should allow presumption of prejudice for public-trial structural error | Commonwealth: Strickland/Cronic presumption limited to denial of counsel, state interference, or conflicts; none apply here | Strickland governs; absent the narrow Cronic/Strickland exceptions, prejudice must be shown |
| Whether collateral-review finality/comity concerns justify requiring prejudice | LaChance: Finality and waiver jurisprudence justify requiring a showing of prejudice on collateral review | LaChance dissent: Structural nature of public-trial right and impracticability of proving prejudice counsel in favor of presumption | Majority: Finality and established waiver rules control; presumption would undermine finality and efficiency |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258 (2010) (recognizes violation of public-trial right as structural error)
- Commonwealth v. Cohen, 456 Mass. 94 (2010) (preserved objection to courtroom closure during voir dire triggers presumption of prejudice)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (standard for ineffective assistance; prejudice required except limited structural exceptions)
- United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984) (identifies circumstances where prejudice may be presumed for denial of counsel)
- Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984) (framework for evaluating whether courtroom closure is justified)
- Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976) (presumption of prejudice for a constitutional claim may not be available on collateral review when claim was procedurally defaulted)
- Purvis v. Crosby, 451 F.3d 734 (11th Cir. 2006) (on habeas review, held presumption of prejudice for structural error not applicable to ineffective-assistance claim absent Strickland/Cronic exceptions)
- Owens v. United States, 483 F.3d 48 (1st Cir. 2007) (held prejudice may be presumed for ineffective-assistance claims based on waived structural errors; discussed by both sides)
- Commonwealth v. Lavoie, 464 Mass. 83 (2013) (discusses waiver and review standard for courtroom closures during juror selection)
- Commonwealth v. Morganti, 467 Mass. 96 (2014) (applies waiver doctrine to unobjected courtroom closures)
- Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89 (1974) (standard for ineffective assistance resulting in a new trial when counsel's deficient performance deprives defendant of an otherwise available substantial ground of defense)
- People v. Vaughn, 491 Mich. 642 (2012) (concluded presumption of prejudice inappropriate for ineffective-assistance claims predicated on waived structural error)