Commonwealth v. Dragotta, 476 Mass. 680

Heather Dragotta was convicted after a bench trial under G. L. c. 265, § 13J for wantonly or recklessly permitting an assault and battery causing bodily injury to her infant daughter; conviction reversed on appeal.
The infant sustained an interhemispheric subdural hematoma and multiple fractures; Steven Amos (the mother's boyfriend) was found to have inflicted the injuries and was separately convicted.
In the weeks before the hematoma, Amos used a forceful leg-pushing technique (distinct from a pediatrician-taught “bicycle” maneuver) to relieve the infant’s gas; Dragotta once told him to stop after she heard a noise she did not like and believed he complied.
Dragotta routinely left the baby with Amos for brief periods (e.g., while she showered); she had no reason to believe Amos intended to hurt the child or had caused serious injury before medical discovery.
Rib fractures were not discovered until a second skeletal survey on June 4; prior medical visits and the initial evaluation showed no outward signs that would have put a reasonable caregiver on notice of serious injury.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Dragotta acted wantonly or recklessly in leaving the baby with Amos	Dragotta knew Amos used a forceful technique that caused pain and thus unreasonably risked serious harm	Dragotta believed Amos had stopped after she told him to stop and had no reason to suspect serious injury	Reversed: evidence insufficient to prove wanton/reckless conduct
Whether Dragotta reasonably should have recognized a high likelihood of substantial harm	Commonwealth: observable force and prior distress put Dragotta on notice	Dragotta: no signs (bruising, unusual crying, or medical findings) that would have indicated serious injury	Court: objective evidence did not show a reasonable person would have anticipated grave danger
Whether later admissions that Amos’s technique could cause fractures prove prior knowledge	Commonwealth: post‑injury statements show Dragotta foresaw risk earlier	Dragotta: statements reflect post hoc inference after learning fractures existed	Court: statements are rationally explained as making the connection only after fractures were discovered
Whether brief duration of leaving child alone affects recklessness assessment	Commonwealth: brief time does not absolve recklessness if risk is great	Dragotta: short duration and Amos’s non‑intentional conduct reduce gravity of risk	Court: duration and Amos’s non‑intentional status are relevant; not enough risk to satisfy §13J standard

Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671 (bench‑trial evidence standard for reviewing facts)
Commonwealth v. Michaud, 389 Mass. 491 (recklessness requires more than gross negligence)
Commonwealth v. Welansky, 316 Mass. 383 (definition of conduct involving high likelihood of substantial harm)
Commonwealth v. Pugh, 462 Mass. 482 (objective reasonable‑person inquiry for recklessness)
Commonwealth v. Levesque, 436 Mass. 443 (risk must be known or reasonably apparent)
Sandler v. Commonwealth, 419 Mass. 334 (quotation on risk and probable consequence standard)
Commonwealth v. Garcia, 47 Mass. App. Ct. 419 (upholding §13J conviction where bruising and obvious pain supported notice of injury)