Commonwealth v. Delgros, E., Aplt., 183 A.3d 352

Appellant Edward Delgros was convicted of third‑degree receiving stolen property after I‑beams were found used in his porch; he was sentenced only to restitution and a $15,000 fine (no incarceration, probation, or parole).
New counsel filed post‑sentence motions asserting ineffective assistance of trial counsel (failure to contest property value to reduce grading; failure to seek suppression of the warrant) and requested an evidentiary hearing.
The trial court denied relief, holding ineffectiveness claims are collateral and must be raised under the PCRA, but Delgros is ineligible for PCRA relief because he is not serving a sentence of imprisonment, probation, or parole.
The Superior Court affirmed, concluding Delgros could not invoke Holmes’ waiver/good‑cause exception because that exception presumes PCRA eligibility and found no due process violation.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allowance, reviewed precedent (Grant, Bomar, O'Berg, Holmes, Turner), and adopted a new exception requiring trial courts to consider ineffectiveness claims presented in post‑sentence motions when the defendant is statutorily precluded from obtaining PCRA review.

Issue	Delgros' Argument	Commonwealth's Argument	Held
Whether a defendant sentenced only to pay a fine (statutorily ineligible for PCRA) may obtain review of ineffective assistance claims in post‑sentence motions	Denial forecloses any opportunity to vindicate Sixth Amendment right; Holmes’ waiver/good‑cause rationale supports review for those ineligible for PCRA	Holmes’ exception requires PCRA eligibility to waive; no liberty interest (no custody) so no due process right to collateral review	Court adopted an additional exception to Grant: trial courts must address ineffectiveness claims raised in post‑sentence motions when the defendant is statutorily precluded from PCRA review; vacated Superior and remanded
Whether post‑sentence ineffectiveness claims are governed by PCRA eligibility requirements (i.e., are they "collateral")	Post‑sentence motions are part of direct review and not "collateral" PCRA claims; statutory PCRA eligibility should not bar trial‑court consideration	PCRA governs collateral claims; allowing review would circumvent PCRA scheme and Grant’s deferral policy	Court held post‑sentence ineffectiveness claims are not "collateral" simply because they allege counsel ineffectiveness; PCRA eligibility does not bar trial courts from considering such post‑sentence motions when the defendant cannot obtain subsequent PCRA review

Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.2d 726 (Pa. 2002) (adopted general rule deferring ineffective‑assistance claims to collateral PCRA review)
Commonwealth v. Bomar, 826 A.2d 831 (Pa. 2003) (limited Grant where trial court had developed record and ruled on ineffectiveness claims pre‑Grant)
Commonwealth v. O'Berg, 880 A.2d 597 (Pa. 2005) (declined categorical short‑sentence exception to Grant)
Commonwealth v. Holmes, 79 A.3d 562 (Pa. 2013) (recognized two exceptions: record‑apparent meritorious claims and good‑cause plus waiver of future PCRA review)
Commonwealth v. Turner, 80 A.3d 754 (Pa. 2013) (upheld PCRA eligibility limits against as‑applied due process challenge for a former custodial petitioner)
Commonwealth v. Fisher, 703 A.2d 714 (Pa. Super. 1997) (held PCRA ineligibility for defendants sentenced only to fines)
Commonwealth v. Reigel, 75 A.3d 1284 (Pa. Super. 2013) (refused direct‑appeal review of ineffectiveness claims after fine‑only sentence under existing law)