Commonwealth v. Caban
60 A.3d 120
| Pa. Super. Ct. | 2012Background
- Caban and Veras were stopped on I-80 for speeding; marijuana odor was detected later leading to a search of the car.
- Veras and Caban gave inconsistent answers about their destination and ownership of the car; the vehicle was owned by a third party (Caban’s father).
- Trooper Jones eventually obtained Veras’s and then Caban’s consent to search after smelling marijuana and after attempting a dog sniff; a large box containing marijuana was found in the trunk.
- The trial court denied suppression; both defendants were convicted of possession with intent to deliver, conspiracy, and paraphernalia offenses; sentences were identical for both.
- On appeal, the court addressed standing to suppress, the legality of consent, and sufficiency of the drug paraphernalia conviction, ultimately affirming the judgments of sentence.
- The opinion also discusses whether Trooper Jones’s detention was lawful and whether Caban, as a non-driver, could validly consent to search.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the search was suppressible as illegal. | Caban sought suppression based on illegality. | Caban/Veras claimed improper search and lack of standing. | Suppression denied; valid consent and reasonable suspicion supported the search. |
| Was Caban's consent to search legally operative? | Caban lacked authority/standing as a passenger. | Caban had a reasonable expectation of privacy and could consent. | Consent valid under totality of circumstances; voluntary and effective. |
| Was there sufficient evidence to convict for drug paraphernalia? | Paraphernalia knowledge was not shown; box contents unknown without opening. | No proof defendants knew of cellophane packaging inside box. | Sufficient evidence; jury reasonably inferred knowledge of contents and concealment as paraphernalia. |
| Did Caban have power/authority to consent as Veras’s co-occupant/driver? | Passenger status does not bar consent given shared possessory interest. | Passenger lacked control/ownership to consent; no privacy interest. | Caban had a reasonable expectation of privacy and could consent; veras’s argument waived. |
Key Cases Cited
- Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218 (U.S. 1973) (consent to search must be voluntary)
- Commonwealth v. Cleckley, 558 Pa. 517 (Pa. 1999) (standard for voluntariness of consent)
- Commonwealth v. Strickler, 563 Pa. 47 (Pa. 2000) (three-category police-citizen encounters; voluntariness factors)
- Commonwealth v. Rogers, 578 Pa. 127 (Pa. 2004) (reasonable suspicion as to continue detention)
- Commonwealth v. Kemp, 961 A.2d 1247 (Pa.Super. 2008) (en banc: factors for voluntariness of consent)
- Commonwealth v. Dales, 820 A.2d 807 (Pa. Super. 2003) (insufficient reasonable suspicion after stop)
- Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 14 A.3d 907 (Pa. Super. 2011) (authorization to use vehicle; ownership/permission)
- Commonwealth v. Joseph, 34 A.3d 855 (Pa. Super. 2011) (fact pattern analogous to present case; applicability unclear)
- Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 594 Pa. 319 (Pa. 2007) (probable cause and exigent circumstances for vehicle searches)
- Commonwealth v. Jones, 874 A.2d 108 (Pa. Super. 2005) (standing and suppression standards in search cases)
- Commonwealth v. Burton, 973 A.2d 428 (Pa. Super. 2009) (en banc: steps in determining detention after stop)
- Commonwealth v. Millner, 585 Pa. 237 (Pa. 2005) (ownership/permission to use vehicle affects privacy)
- Commonwealth v. Powell, 994 A.2d 1096 (Pa. Super. 2010) (standing to challenge search where vehicle ownership not shown)