Commonwealth v. Brown
466 Mass. 676
Mass.2013Background
- Marquise Brown, age 17 at the time of the June 20, 2009 killing, was convicted in Superior Court of first‑degree murder and related weapons offenses; sentencing was stayed pending legal briefing.
- Massachusetts statutory scheme mandated life without parole for first‑degree murder for defendants over 14, but the judge concluded Miller v. Alabama precluded imposing that mandatory sentence on Brown.
- The judge declined to conduct a Miller hearing (saying the Legislature had not prescribed procedures) and proposed severing the parole‑ineligibility clause so Brown would receive life with parole eligibility per the parole statute in effect at the time of the offense (parole eligibility after 15 years).
- The Commonwealth sought relief; a single justice reserved and reported the matter to the full court; Brown remained unsentenced.
- The court applied Griffith v. Kentucky to grant Brown the benefit of Miller and, relying on its contemporaneous decision in Diatchenko, held that juveniles may not receive life without parole (mandatory or discretionary) under the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.
Issues
| Issue | Brown's Argument | Commonwealth's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Miller applies to Brown (case not final) | Miller applies; mandatory LWOP unconstitutional for juveniles | Argued for authority to conduct Miller hearings and to set parole dates | Miller applies because Brown was unsentenced when Miller issued; he is entitled to its protections |
| Whether court may impose LWOP after a Miller hearing absent legislative procedures | Miller requires broader discretionary sentencing; mandatory schemes for juveniles generally invalid — Brown urged broader relief (apply manslaughter range) | Judges have inherent authority to craft Miller hearing procedures and set parole eligibility using common usage and G. L. c. 279, § 5 | Court refused judicially to create a new sentencing scheme; declined Brown’s request to apply manslaughter range and rejected Commonwealth’s ad hoc scheme |
| Proper remedy when statute’s application to juveniles is unconstitutional | Seek full discretion or different statutory range | Preserve legislative scheme where possible; sever unconstitutional application | Applied severability: omit parole‑ineligibility exception for first‑degree murder as applied to juveniles; sentence becomes mandatory life with parole eligibility per existing parole statute (15 years for Brown) |
| Which parole eligibility statute applies (timing/ex post facto) | Brown favored earlier parole eligibility | Commonwealth sought flexibility under newer statute allowing 15–25 years | Court held Brown must be sentenced under the parole statute in effect at the time of the crime (15 years); the 2012 amendment (15–25) cannot be applied retroactively |
Key Cases Cited
- Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (mandatory life without parole for juvenile homicide offenders violates the Eighth Amendment; courts must consider youth and attendant characteristics before imposing LWOP)
- Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987) (new decisional rule applies to cases not yet final when decision issued)
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (life without parole for nonhomicide juveniles violates Eighth Amendment; discussed as precedent distinguishing LWOP's severity)
- Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (death penalty cases leading to vacatur; cited for precedent of substituting lesser penalties after invalidation)
- Commonwealth v. Bongarzone, 390 Mass. 326 (1983) (when part of penalty statute void, courts may sentence under next‑most‑severe valid offense)
- Commonwealth v. Cassesso, 368 Mass. 124 (1975) (after Furman vacatur, defendants could be sentenced to life under remaining statute)