Commonwealth v. Arter, K., Aplt.
2016 Pa. LEXIS 2916
| Pa. | 2016Background
- On May 15, 2013, a Dauphin County adult probation officer (APO) identified Arter as a parolee, asked him to speak, requested consent to search, and—despite Arter’s refusal—conducted a pat‑down that produced suspected crack cocaine; police then arrested him and found additional contraband.
- Criminal charges were filed; the trial court granted Arter’s suppression motion for the criminal prosecution, finding no reasonable suspicion under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9912(d)(1)(i); the Commonwealth nolle prossed the criminal case and does not contest that suppression ruling.
- Separately, Arter faced parole revocation based on the seizure; at the revocation hearing he moved to suppress under Article I, § 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution; the trial court denied suppression and revoked parole.
- The Superior Court affirmed, relying on Lehman and United States Supreme Court precedent (Pa. Bd. of Probation & Parole v. Scott) that the federal exclusionary rule does not apply in revocation proceedings.
- The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allocatur to decide whether Article I, § 8 requires suppression of illegally obtained evidence in parole/probation revocation proceedings; it concluded that Article I, § 8 does require suppression, vacated revocation, and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether illegally obtained evidence suppressed in criminal proceedings must also be suppressed in parole/probation revocation hearings under Article I, § 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution | Arter: Pennsylvania Constitution affords greater privacy protection and the state exclusionary rule should apply in revocation proceedings to vindicate privacy and give effect to statutory safeguards (§ 9912) | Commonwealth: Federal precedent (Scott) controls; exclusionary rule is deterrence‑based and its application in revocation hearings would impose marginal deterrence while impairing supervision and public safety | Pennsylvania Supreme Court: Article I, § 8’s text, history, precedent (Edmunds line), and state policy support applying the exclusionary rule in revocation proceedings; suppression required where search lacked reasonable suspicion |
Key Cases Cited
- Pa. Bd. of Probation & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357 (1998) (U.S. Supreme Court: exclusionary rule does not apply to parole revocation hearings under the Fourth Amendment)
- Edmunds v. Commonwealth, 526 Pa. 374, 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991) (framework for independent state‑constitutional analysis and factors to consider)
- Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (incorporation of exclusionary rule to states)
- Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (origin of the exclusionary rule in federal prosecutions)
- United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (good‑faith exception and remedial/deterrence focus of the federal exclusionary rule)
- United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (exclusionary rule as deterrent; limits on extending it outside criminal trials)
- United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976) (declining exclusionary rule in certain civil contexts when deterrence negligible)
- Commonwealth v. Williams, 547 Pa. 577, 692 A.2d 1031 (1997) (parolee’s diminished privacy interest but recognition of reasonableness requirement; state constitutional analysis in parole context)