Lead Opinion
OPINION
We granted allowance of appeal in the instant case to determine whether illegally-obtained evidence which is suppressed during criminal proceedings should likewise be suppressed during parole and probation revocation proceedings pursuant to Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitu
I. Factual and Procedural Background
At approximately 5:30 p.m. on May 15, 2013, Harrisburg Police Officer Darin Bates and Dauphin County Adult Probation Officer (“APO”) Richard Anglemeyer were traveling in an unmarked police vehicle in an area known for frequent drug activity when they observed two men conversing on a street comer; one of those men was Appellant. According to Officer Bates’ testimony, APO Anglemeyer recognized Appellant as one of his parolees,
The Commonwealth charged Appellant with possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. As a consequence of the new criminal charges, the Dauphin County Adult Probation and Parole Office issued
At the ensuing criminal proceedings on the new drug charges, commenced in the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas, Appellant filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized by APO Anglemeyer. The Honorable Andrew H. Dowling granted Appellant’s motion to suppress, concluding the search of Appellant was not supported by reasonable suspicion, as required under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9912(d)(l)(i). As discussed further below, pursuant to Section 9912(d)(l)(i), a parole officer may conduct a personal search of an offender, inter alia, “if there is a reasonable suspicion to believe that the offender possesses contraband or other evidence of violations of the conditions of supervision.” The Commonwealth did not appeal the trial court’s order, and instead filed a nolle prosequi Furthermore, in its brief to this Court, the Commonwealth does not contest the trial court’s determination that APO Anglemeyer did not have reasonable suspicion to conduct a search of Appellant pursuant to Section 9912(d)(l)(i), nor does the Commonwealth dispute that the evidence was properly suppressed in the criminal proceedings.
On January 13, 2014, in anticipation of his parole revocation hearing, and recognizing that the United States Supreme Court has ruled that the exclusionary rule is not applicable to revocation proceedings under the Fourth Amendment, Appellant filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized by APO Anglemeyer under the privacy protections of Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. At his parole revocation hearing, the trial judge, the Honorable Deborah E. Curcillo, denied Appellant’s suppression motion, revoked his parole, and resentenced Apрellant to serve the balance of his sentence. In an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), the trial court relied on Commonwealth v. Lehman,
Appellant filed a petition for allowance of appeal, and this Court granted allocatur to consider whethеr the Superior Court erred in upholding the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s motion to suppress based on Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Commonwealth v. Arter,
II. Analysis
As Appellant challenges the Superior Court’s decision affirming the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress, we first note our well established standard of review of claims regarding the denial of a suppression motion:
We may consider only the Commonwealth’s evidence and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontra-dicted when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the record supports the factual findings of the trial court, we are bound by those facts and may reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are in error. An*547 appellate court, of course, is not bound by the suppression court’s conclusions of law.
Commonwealth v. Gary,
The instant matter implicates both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const, amend. IV.
Article I, Section 8 provides:
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from unreasonable searches and seizures, and no warrant to search any place or to seize any person or things shall issue without describing them as nearly as may be, nor without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation subscribed to by the affiant.
Pa. Const, art. I, § 8.
Plainly speaking, both the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution generally require that, prior to conducting a search of an individual or his or her property, the police must obtain a warrant, supported by probable cause and issued by a neutral magistrate. Commonwealth v. Petroll,
To effectuate the rights guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment, in the early part of the last century, the United
The high Court has repeatedly explained that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is not to “cure the invasion of the defendant's rights which he has already suffered.” United States v. Leon,
Of particular relevance to the instant case, in accordance with this balancing approach—requiring that the exclusionary rule’s deterrence benefits outweigh its social costs—the United States Supreme Court consistently has declined to extend the exclusionary rule to proceedings other than criminal trials.
Finally, and dispositive of Appellant’s right to relief under the Fourth Amendment, in Scott, the high Court specifically declined to extend application of the exclusionary rule to parole revocation proceedings. In Scott, which arose out of Pennsylvania state proceedings, a condition of Scott’s parole was that he refrain from owning or possessing weapons. Scott signed a parole agreement which provided:
I expressly consent to the search of my person, property and residence, without a warrant by agents of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole. Any items, in [sic] the possession of which constitutes a violation of parole/reparole shall be subject to seizure, and may be used as evidence in the parole revocation process.
Several months after he was paroled, parole officers suspected that Scott had violated several conditions of his parole, including the prohibition against possessing firearms. The parole officers arrested Scott at a local diner, whereupon Scott gave the parole officers the keys to his residence, which was owned by his mother. Without obtaining a warrant, the parole
Scott appealed, and the Commonwealth Court reversed and remanded, holding the search of Scott’s residence was conducted without the owner’s consent, and, moreover, was not authorized by any state statutory or regulatory framework ensuring the reasonableness of searches by parole officers. Commonwealth v. Scott,
Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, and reversed this Court’s decision. Reiterating that the federal exclusionary rule is designed to deter illegal searches and seizures, and, thus, should only be applied where the deterrence objective can be served, and noting that it previously declined to extend the exclusionary rule to proceedings other than criminal trials, see Janis, Calandra, and Lopez-Mendoza, the high Court concluded:
Application of the exclusionary rule would both hinder the functioning of state parole systems and alter the traditionally flexible, administrative nature of parole revocation proceedings. The rule would provide only minimal deterrence benefits in this context, because application of the rule in the criminal trial context already provides significant deterrence of unconstitutional searches.
While, as a federal matter, it is undisputed that the exclusionary rule does not apply to revocation proceedings, in the case sub judice, Appellant argues that this Court should apply the exclusionary rule to probation and parole revocation proceedings pursuant to the distinct privacy protections of Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Indeed, it is well settled that, in interpreting a provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution, this Court is not bound by decisions of the United States Supreme Court which interpret similar federal constitutional provisions. Commonwealth v. Edmunds,
As we further explained in Edmunds, when a litigant seeks relief based exclusively on the Pennsylvania Constitution, as does Appellant in this case, it is important that the litigant brief and analyze the following four factors: (1) the text of the Pennsylvania constitutional provision; (2) the history of the provision, including Pennsylvania case law; (3) relevant case law from other jurisdictions; and (4) policy considerations, including unique issues of state and local concern, and applicability within modern Pennsylvania jurisprudence. Edmunds,
A. Comparative text of federal and state constitutional provisions
The first prong of an Edmunds analysis requires an examination of the text of the relevant state constitutional provisions. As set forth above, Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides:
Security from searches and seizures
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from unreasonable searches and seizures, and no warrant to search any place or to seize any person or things shall issue without describing them as nearly as may be, nor without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation subscribed to by the affiant.
Pa. Const, art. I, § 8.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
*553 The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the plaсe to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const, amend. IV.
The text of the Pennsylvania Constitution is undeniably similar to that of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. We note that both provisions guarantee an individual’s right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures of their “person.” Further, neither provision specifically precludes application to probationers and/or parolees. Thus, we find a comparison of the text of the two provisions provides little guidance as to whether the exclusionary rule should apply to revocation proceedings pursuant to Article I, Section 8. Moreover, despite the similarity of the language, we are not bound to interpret the two provisions as if they were mirror images. See Edmunds,
B. History of Article I, Section 8 and interpretative case law
As this Court recounted in Edmunds, despite a common misconception that Pennsylvania’s state constitution is patterned after the United States Constitution, the reverse is actually true: “[t]he federal Bill of Rights borrowed heavily from the Declarations of Rights contained in the constitutions of Pennsylvania and other colonies.” Id. at 896. In fact, Article I, Section 8 of our Commonwealth’s Constitution, contained in Clause 10 of Pennsylvania’s original Constitution of 1776,
In construing Article I, section 8, we find it highly significant that the language employed in that provision does not vary in any significant respect from the words of its counterpart in our first constitution. The text of Article I, section 8 thus provides no basis for the conclusion that the philosophy and purpose it embodies today differs from those which first prompted the Commonwealth to guarantee protection from unreasonable governmental intrusion. Rather, the survival of the language now employed in Article I, section 8 through over 200 years of profound change in other areas demonstrates that the paramount concern for privacy first adopted as part of our organic law in 1776 continues to enjoy the mandate of the people of this Commonwealth.
Indeed, since 1973, this Court has repeatedly emphasized that Article I, Section 8, “is meant to embody a strong notion for privacy, carefully safeguarded in this Commonwealth for the past two centuries.” Edmunds,
We have further declared that “[t]he notion of privacy in Article I, § 8 is greater than that of the Fourth Amendment,” and, when compared to federal courts, Pennsylvania courts “have given greater weight to an individual’s privacy interests when balancing the importance of privacy against the needs of
Significantly, with respect to our employment of the exclusionary rule, in Edmunds, we most emphatically explicated the privacy focus of Article I, Section 8, in distinction to the deterrence-based Fourth Amendment. In Edmunds, we determined that, where the affidavit in an application for a search warrant was insufficient to establish probable cause, application of the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, as articulated by thе United States Supreme Court in Leon, supra, would frustrate the guarantees embodied in Article I, Section 8:
Whether the United States Supreme Court has determined that the exclusionary rule does not advance the 4th Amendment purpose of deterring police conduct is irrelevant. Indeed, we disagree with that Court’s suggestion in Leon that we in Pennsylvania have been employing the exclusionary rule all these years to deter police corruption. We flatly reject this notion. We have no reason to believe that police officers or district justices in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania do not engage in “good faith” in carrying out their duties. What is significant, however, is that our Constitution has historically been interpreted to incorporate a strong right of privacy, and an equally strong adherence to the requirement of probable cause under Article 1, Section 8. Citizens in this Commonwealth possess such rights, even where a police officer in “good faith” carrying out his or her duties inadvertently invades the privacy or circumvents the strictures of probable cause. To adopt a*556 “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule, we believe, would virtually emasculate those clear safeguards which have been carefully developed under the Pennsylvania Constitution over the past 200 years.
Edmunds,
Following Edmunds, we have continued to emphasize the uniquе privacy focus of Article I, Section 8. In Commonwealth v. Mason,
In Commonwealth v. Matos,
In Commonwealth v. Johnston,
Although we have not prеviously addressed whether the state exclusionary rule applies to revocation proceedings, in Williams, supra, we declined to hold that Article I, Section 8 of
This Court reversed the Superior Court’s decision. We first observed that probationers and parolees have “limited Fourth Amendment rights because of a diminished expectation of privacy,” such that a parole officer does not need probable cause to obtain a search warrant before conducting a search.
We recognized, however, that, while diminished, a parolee does have a protected privacy interest under the Fourth Amendment, and, therefore, searches of probationers and parolees must be “reasonable.” Williams,
As Williams alternatively sought suppression of the evidence pursuant to Article I, Section 8, this Court then proceeded to conduct an Edmunds analysis. After considering the decisions from several other state courts which had concluded that their state constitutions do not afford greater protection for probationers or parolees thаn does the Fourth Amendment, see State v. Lucas,
Notably, however, the critical issue in Williams, and in the cases relied on therein, was, in the first instance, the legality of the warrantless search under the federal and state constitutions. See Williams; People v. Slusher,
By contrast, in the present case, the trial court determined that the search of Appellant was illegal in that it was not supported by probable cause or reasonable suspicion, a finding not presently before this Court. Rather, the issue before us is whether the illegally obtained evidence should have been suppressed in Appellant’s parole revocation proceedings under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, even though it would not be subject to the exclusionary rule under the Fourth Amendment.
The decisions of this Court, discussed above, evidence that “the purpose underlying the exclusionary rule in this Commonwealth is quite distinct from the purpose underlying the
C. Case law from other jurisdictions
We now turn to the third prong of Edmunds, which requires an examination of the decisions of our sister states that have сonsidered whether their state constitutions afford greater protection than the Fourth Amendment with respect to application of the exclusionary rule in probation and parole revocation proceedings. Appellant cites several decisions in which appellate courts have determined, based on the strong notion of the protection of privacy interests embodied in their state constitutions, that the exclusionary rule applies to revocation proceedings. In State v. Marquart,
The New Mexico Supreme Court in [State v. Gutierrez,116 N.M. 431 ,863 P.2d 1052 (1993),] distinguished its rationale for application of the exclusionary rule from that of the United States Supreme Court. While the United States Supreme Court held that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct, the New Mexico Supreme Court has held that the focus of the exclusionary rule “is to effectuate in the pending case the constitutional right of the accused to be free from unreasonable search and seizure.” ... Accordingly, our Supreme Court in Gutierrez emphasizes that our state constitution focuses on the constitutional [privacy] rights of individuals; thus, the exclusionary rule is not a “mere ‘judicial remedy’ ” for unconstitutionally seized evidence.... Application of the exclusionary rule to proba*561 tion revocation proceedings is consistent with this state’s constitutional purpose.
Marquart,
In State ex rel Juvenile Dep’t of Multnomah County v. Rogers,
“[U]nlike the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, which has been based on deterring police misconduct, exclusions under Article I, section 9 [of the Oregon Constitution] have been based on the personal right to be free from an unlawful search and seizure.” Thus, when the government violates an individual’s Article I, section 9, rights by conducting an unreasonable search or seizure in obtaining evidence, the individual’s state constitutional right to be secure against that unlawful search or seizure is protected “through the sanction of [the] suppression of evidence.” This court has consistently reaffirmed that personal rights underlie the Oregon exclusionary rule.
Id. at 129-30 (citing, inter alia, State v. Tanner,
In State v. Lampman,
Guided by this emphasis on the right to privacy, we hold that article 1, section 7 requires application of the exclusionary rule, without exception, to probation revocation prоceedings. The exclusionary rule, under article 1, section 7, is a remedy for a violation of an individual’s right to privacy. If a probationer’s right to privacy is violated, the exclusionary rale should be invoked regardless of the particular proceeding involved. A probationer, however, has a diminished expectation of privacy, which, in effect, means a diminished right of privacy.[7 ] That diminished expectation or right of privacy is reflected in the warrantless search excepted [sic] that Washington courts apply to reasonable searches of probationers. The standard for determining whether a war-rantless search of a probationer is reasonable is whether the police or probation officer has a well-founded suspicion that a probation violation has occurred.
The determination of whether a probationer’s right to privacy has been violated is dependent, then, on the nature of the search conducted and is not dependent on the nature of the proceeding in which the fruits of the search are to be admitted.
Appellant also cites Mason v. State,
The Commonwealth, in its brief, cites a number of decisions in which state courts have concluded that evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment is admissible at probation and parole revocation proceedings under their state constitutions. In Connecticut v. Foster,
Finally, the Commonwealth relies on Massachusetts v. Olsen,
Some states have determined that the exclusionary rule applies to parole or probation proceedings only in certain сircumstances. For example, the Supreme Court of Virginia, in Logan v. Commonwealth,
Our review of the decisions of our sister states reveals that those courts which refuse to apply the exclusionary rule to parole and probation proceedings construe the exclusionary rule as a judicially created remedy intended to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights through deterrence, and have concluded that application of the rule would only marginally serve their respective constitutions’ primary interest of deterrence. In contrast, those courts which view the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule as protecting individual privacy interests have concluded that the exclusionary rule is applicable to parole and probation revocation proceedings. In light of this Court’s long-standing interpretation of Article I, Section 8 as embodying a strong individual privacy right, our perspective on this issue is more aligned with the decisions of those states that have applied the exclusionary rule to parole and probation revocation proceedings.
D. Policy considerations
The final prong of an Edmunds analysis is an examination of the relevant policy considerations at stake, particularly those of state аnd local concern in our Commonwealth. Appellant first contends that applying the exclusionary rule to parole and probation proceedings under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution is consistent with the existing legislative scheme that allows warrantless searches by parole and probation officers upon reasonable suspicion. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9912(d)(l)(i). In this regard, Appellant argues that applica
In response to Appellant’s arguments, the Commonwealth argues that “the Pennsylvania Constitution does not recognize any more privacy protection than the Federal constitution with regard to probationers and parolees,” and submits that “the exclusionary rule, as it applies to criminal proceedings in the Commonwealth, provides a strong deterrent from any misbehavior on the part of parole and probation agents.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 25-26 (citing Pickron, supra). The Commonwealth also emphasizes that “parole is viewed as a favor that is bestowed upon offenders who are likely to be law abiding citizens if given the chance at early release,” and suggests that application of the exclusionary rule in the instant case in particular would “fly in the face of the goals of probation and parole.” Id. at 31-32. The Commonwealth additionally posits that applying the exclusionary rule to probation revocation proceedings could negatively affect public safety, contending that, if Appellant had been found to be in possession of a weapon, it would have been “reckless” to exclude evidence of the weapon in a revocation proceeding. Id. at 32. Finally, the Commonwealth maintains that applying the exclusionary rule to both criminal proceedings and revocation proceedings would eliminate the ability of probation and parole
While this Court appreciates the policy arguments made by the Commonwealth, as well as those considered by our sister states,
(a) General rule.—Officers are in a supervisory relationship with their offenders. The purpose of this supervision is to assist the offenders in their rehabilitation and reassimilation into the community and to protect the public.
(b) Searches and seizures authorized.—
(1) Officers and, where they are responsible for the supervision of county offenders, State parole agents may search the person and property of offenders in accordance with the provisions of this section.
(2) ... (iii) Nothing in this section shall be construed to permit searches or seizures in violation of the Constitution of the United States or section 8 of Article I of the Constitution of Pennsylvania.
(c) Effect of violation.—No violation of this section shall constitute an independent ground for suppression of evidence in any probation and parole or criminal proceeding.
(d) Grounds for personal search.—
(1) A personal search of an offender may be conducted by an officer;
*568 (1) if there is a reasonable suspicion to believe that the offender possesses contraband or other evidence of violations of the conditions of supervision;
* * *
(2) A property search may be conducted by an officer if there is reasonable suspicion to believe that the real or other property in the possession of or under the control of the offender contains contraband or other evidence of violations of the conditions of supervision.
(3) Prior approval of a supervisor shall be obtained for a property search absent exigent circumstances. No prior approval shall be required for a personal search.
(4) A written report of every property search conducted without prior approval shall be prepared by the officer who conducted the search and filed in the offender’s case record. The exigent circumstances shall be stated in the report.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9912(a)-(d).
We agree with Appellant’s suggestion that applying the exclusionary rule to probationers and parolees under Article I, Section 8 is consistent with the requirements of Section 9912. In fact, in Commonwealth v. Wilson,
With regard to the Commonwealth’s suggestion that application of the exclusionary rule to parole and probation revocation proceedings will “strip” probation and parole authorities of the ability to enforce the terms and conditions of an individual’s probation or parole, Commonwealth’s Brief at 33, this Court addressed a similar argument in Wilson. In Wilson, the appellant was convicted of, inter alia, persons not to possess firearms, and sentenced to 2½ tо 5 years incarceration, followed by 3 years probation. As a condition of probation, the trial court authorized warrantless, suspicionless searches of the appellant’s residence for weapons. The appellant challenged the propriety of the condition allowing random searches, arguing that the condition violated his rights under both the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 8, of the Pennsylvania Constitution, and that the condition was in conflict with Section 9912. This Court determined that, notwithstanding the language of 42 Pa.C.S. § 9754(c)(13), which authorizes a trial court to require a probationer to satisfy conditions “reasonably related to the rehabilitation of the defendant and not unduly restrictive of his liberty or incompatible with his freedom of conscience,” sentencing courts “are not empowered to direct that a probation officer may conduct warrantless, suspicionless searches of a probationer as a condition of probation,” because such a condition violates Section 9912(d). Wilson,
Although this Court based its holding in Wilson on the statutory language at issue, as opposed to the parties’ constitutional arguments, our reasoning in Wilson answers the Commonwealth’s present argument that its ability to enforce the terms of an individual’s probation or parole effectively outweighs the recognized privacy rights of a probationer or parolee. As we stated in Williams, in deciding whether a warrantless search by a parole officer conducted pursuant to a parolee’s signed parole agreement authorizing warrantless searches could survive constitutional scrutiny, we “must balance the governmental interests involved in granting parole and supervising parolees with that interest of the private individual, i.e., the parolee, which has been affected by the governmental action.” Williams,
Finally, we conclude that application of the exclusionary rule to revocation proceedings is in accord with this Court’s consistent and repeated emphasis that the primary purpоse of the exclusionary rule under Article I, Section 8, is protecting the individual privacy rights of our citizens, as opposed to deterring police misconduct. This purpose is equally applicable to criminal proceedings and revocation proceedings. Accord Rogers,
III. Conclusion
As it is undisputed that there was no reasonable suspicion for the parole officer’s warrantless search of Appellant, we hold that, pursuant to Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, the evidence seized as a result of the search was inadmissible at Appellant’s parole revocation proceedings, and, thus, Appellant’s motion to suppress filed with respect to those proceedings should have been granted. Accordingly, we reverse the order of the Superior Court, vacate the order revoking Appellant’s parole, and remand this matter to the Superior Court for remand to the trial court for further proceedings.
Justices Baer, Donohue, Dougherty and Wecht join the opinion.
Chief Justice Saylor files a dissenting opinion.
Notes
. Appellant had been released on parole ten days earlier, after serving a sentence for receiving stolen property and carrying a firearm without a license.
. Prior to this Court deciding the case, the Commonwealth Court, in Kyte v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole,
. Clause 10 provided:
That the people have a right to hold themselves, their houses, papers, and possessions free from search and seizure, and therefore warrants without oaths or affirmations first made, affording a sufficient foundation for them, and whereby any officer or messenger may be commanded or required to search suspected places, or to seize any person or persons, his or their property, not particularly described, are contrary to that right, and ought not be granted.
. The words "subscribed to by the affiant" were added by the Constitutional Convention of 1873.
. In Pickron, the appellant did not present a claim under the Pennsylvania Constitution.
. Specifically, wе noted in Williams that the information received from the confidential informant, who the parole officer believed to be reliable, that appellee was dealing drugs, and which "was independently corroborated by the parole agent” based on a conversation with local police, established that the parole officer had a reasonable suspicion that appellee had violated the terms of his parole.
. The court explained that "diminished right of privacy” means that, “insofar as the State has a continuing interest in the defendant and its supervision of him as a probationer, the defendant can expect State officers and their agents to scrutinize him closely and search his person, home and effects on less than probable cause.” Lampman,
. In Olsen, the evidence obtained as a result of the search of the defendant’s home, for which police had a warrant, ultimately was suppressed at the defendant's criminal trial, for reasons not of record.
. We note that the Massachusetts Supreme Court, in Olsen, supra, offered two additional policy considerations in support of its refusal to extend application of the exclusionary rule to probation proceedings. The court first proposed that excluding evidence from probation revocation hearings might result in a disinclination to order рrobation in the first instance. The court further opined that its decision "protects the public interest in having access to all reliable evidence relevant to the probationer’s conduct and rehabilitation.”
, Initially, we note that the Commonwealth does not argue that subsection 9912(c) requires affirmance. Moreover, while subsection 9912(c) provides that a violation of subsection 9912(d) will not alone constitute a basis for suppressing the evidence in a revocation proceeding, subsection 9912(b)(2)(iii) nevertheless specifies that Section 9912 shall not be construed as permitting searches or seizures which violate
. As discussed above, we ultimately concluded in Williams that a warrantless search pursuant to a signed parole agreement did not violate the defendant’s rights under the Fourth Amendment or Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
Dissenting Opinion
Dissenting
I respectfully dissent, since, as a predicate to application of the exclusionary rule in the context of parole revocation proceedings, I would require a factual determination concerning whether officers involved proceeded with an improper motive.
Since state courts, in the 1970s, began to ground departures from federal constitutional doctrine upon interpretations of their own state constitutions’ counterparts to provisions of the United States Constitution, this “new judicial federalism” has been the subject of substantial debate. A prominent line of controversy centers upon the imposition, by state courts, of an
In terms of considering when the Pennsylvania Constitution should be invoked to justify suppression of evidence in the search-and-seizure setting, I agree with those who emphasize that Article I, Section 8 of the state charter and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution reflect what, to their respective framers, was the same normative protection. See Commonwealth v. Schaeffer,
From my point of view, the failure to remediate the early lapses in the above respects—as the new judicial federalism has matured and the Court has continued to selectively sanction instances of departure from federal constitutional doctrine—has left the Court vulnerable to criticisms of revisionism and diminished legitimacy in this line of decisions. See, e.g., McCarthy, Counterfeit Interpretations,
The Court had recently moved to a more overt cost-benefit balancing between the value of extending exclusion as a “remedy,”
Finally, I would also suggest that such an apрroach would have a greater potential for sustainability relative to a balancing assessment concerning which reasonable minds will always differ. Accord Henderson,
. For example, the majority references Commonwealth v. Sell,
. Parenthetically, I observe that this Court’s Article I, Section 8 jurisprudence otherwise seemed to have been trending toward retrenchment in recent years. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gary,
. Notably, the remedial aspect of suppression is indirect, as the exclusion of evidence does not, "strictly speaking, remedy the privacy, dignity, and security harms that the relevant constitutional provisions seek to prevent.” Aziz Z. Huq, Judicial Independence and the Rationing of Constitutional Remedies, 65 Duke L.J. 1, 18 (2015). Nevertheless, I recognize that "[ejxclusion is fairly ranked as a remedy to the extent it is sought by a putatively injured party, and purports to eliminate an advantage that the state as counterparty possesses as a consequence of the constitutional wrong.” Id.