Commonwealth, Aplt. v. Farabaugh, R.
128 A.3d 1191
| Pa. | 2015Background
- In 2011 Farabaugh pled guilty to indecent assault (18 Pa.C.S. § 3126(a)(8)), a second-degree misdemeanor, and was sentenced to two years probation before Megan’s Law required registration.
- Megan’s Law IV (effective Dec. 20, 2012) created a three-tier registration scheme and made many offenders, including some indecent-assault convicts, subject to registration.
- Farabaugh challenged application of Megan’s Law IV to him (arguing plea/constitutional defects); trial court denied relief and he appealed.
- While the Superior Court appeal was pending, Act 19 (Mar. 14, 2014) amended 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.13 to add ¶ (3.1), which for purposes of that paragraph excludes second-degree-misdemeanor indecent-assault convictions from the definition of “sexually violent offense,” and Act 19 was made retroactive to Dec. 20, 2012.
- The Superior Court sua sponte held Act 19’s exclusion removed Farabaugh from any registration requirement and vacated the trial court’s order; the Commonwealth appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Farabaugh) | Defendant's Argument (Commonwealth) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Act 19’s language excluding § 3126 second-degree misdemeanors from the definition of “sexually violent offense” removes those convictions from all registrant classes in § 9799.13 (i.e., exempts Farabaugh from registration) | ¶ (3.1)’s exclusion applies broadly and, because Act 19 is retroactive, Farabaugh was never subject to Megan’s Law registration — ¶ (3.1) is an exception to the general rule | The exclusion applies only “for purposes of this paragraph” (¶ (3.1)) and does not alter other, independent classes (e.g., ¶ (2)); ¶ (3.1) is a technical, limited definition and the statute’s plain text controls | The Supreme Court reversed: the phrase “for purposes of this paragraph” is technical and limits the exclusion to ¶ (3.1); Farabaugh remains subject to registration under ¶ (2) |
| Whether ¶ (2) and ¶ (3.1) are irreconcilable such that the specific ¶ (3.1) should control over the general ¶ (2) | ¶ (3.1) and ¶ (2) conflict for overlap cases like Farabaugh, so the special, later provision (¶ (3.1)) should prevail | The provisions are reconcilable: ¶ (2) targets those supervised on/after Dec. 20, 2012; ¶ (3.1) preserves limited historic registrants (Jan 23, 2005–Dec 19, 2012) and uses a restricted definition for that purpose | The Court held they are not irreconcilable; ¶ (3.1)’s restricted definition applies only within that paragraph and does not exempt ¶ (2) registrants |
Key Cases Cited
- Rump v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 710 A.2d 1093 (Pa. 1998) (interpretation of statutory term “paragraph” and statutory drafting conventions)
- Commonwealth v. Neiman, 84 A.3d 603 (Pa. 2013) (invalidated prior Megan’s Law amendments on single-subject grounds; prompted Act 19)
- Cedarbrook Realty, Inc. v. Nahill, 399 A.2d 374 (Pa. 1979) (overlap between statutory schemes does not necessarily create irreconcilable conflict)
- Commonwealth v. Leidig, 956 A.2d 399 (Pa. 2008) (registration/reporting held collateral, civil consequences)
- Commonwealth v. Stotelmyer, 110 A.3d 146 (Pa. 2015) (standards for de novo statutory interpretation review)