Commonwealth, Aplt. v. Burton, S.
2017 Pa. LEXIS 664
| Pa. | 2017Background
- Inmate Shaun (Shawn) Burton was convicted in 1993 of first‑degree murder and conspiracy in the ligature death of fellow inmate Seth Floyd and sentenced to life. Direct appeals were denied and his judgment became final in 1997.
- Burton filed a second pro se PCRA petition in 2013 after receiving a 2013 letter from the Pennsylvania Innocence Project that enclosed Melvin Goodwine’s 2009 Motion to Expunge, in which Goodwine asserted he killed Floyd in self‑defense and claimed an innocent man was convicted for his crime.
- The PCRA court dismissed Burton’s 2013 petition as untimely and held Burton had not pleaded an exception to the PCRA one‑year time bar; the Superior Court en banc vacated and remanded for an evidentiary hearing.
- The central legal question was whether the long‑standing presumption—that facts in the public record cannot be “unknown” for the PCRA newly‑discovered‑facts timeliness exception—applies to incarcerated pro se petitioners.
- The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held the public‑record presumption does not apply to pro se incarcerated PCRA petitioners and remanded for the PCRA court to determine (possibly after a hearing) whether Burton actually lacked knowledge and exercised due diligence to discover the facts.
Issues
| Issue | Burton's Argument | Commonwealth's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the public‑record presumption (that publicly available facts are not “unknown” under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii)) applies to pro se incarcerated PCRA petitioners | Bennett controls: incarcerated pro se petitioners lack access to public records; presumption should not apply; Burton first learned of Goodwine’s statements in 2013 | The presumption applies generally; creating a pro se exception contradicts precedent, shifts burden to Commonwealth, and assumes lack of inmate access without record support | The Court held the presumption does not apply to pro se incarcerated petitioners; courts must first determine whether the facts were actually unknown to the petitioner and then address due diligence and access to public records (may require hearing) |
| Scope of § 9545(b)(1)(ii) terminology: newly‑discovered facts vs. after‑discovered evidence | Burton relied on the statutory text; focus should be on whether facts were unknown and not discoverable with due diligence | Commonwealth urged adherence to existing case law treating public records as known | Court reiterated correct terminology is “newly‑discovered facts” and focused analysis on whether the facts were unknown to petitioner and not ascertainable through due diligence |
| Burden of pleading/proof on timeliness exception | Burton: petitioner must prove facts were unknown and not discoverable; courts should assess petitioner’s access circumstances | Commonwealth: exception should not shift burden to Commonwealth; public records presumptively known | Court held petitioner still bears burden to allege and prove the exception; the decision does not reallocate burdens but removes an unjustified presumption for incarcerated pro se petitioners |
| Remand necessity and factual development | Burton: factual issues about when he learned of Goodwine’s motion and his access justify an evidentiary hearing | Commonwealth: no factual showing that Burton lacked access; Superior Court erred in creating broad exception | Court affirmed Superior Court’s remand for further fact‑finding (hearing if necessary) to resolve whether Burton lacked knowledge and acted with due diligence |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264 (Pa. 2007) (held public‑record presumption inapplicable where counsel abandoned incarcerated petitioner; factual inquiry required)
- Commonwealth v. Lark, 746 A.2d 585 (Pa. 2000) (noted that statistics and other public records cannot be considered “unknown” to petitioner)
- Commonwealth v. Chester, 895 A.2d 520 (Pa. 2006) (applied public‑record presumption to deny newly‑discovered‑facts exception where evidence was in clerk’s file)
- Commonwealth v. Taylor, 67 A.3d 1245 (Pa. 2013) (reinforced rule that matters of public record are not “unknown” for § 9545(b)(1)(ii) in counseled cases)
- Commonwealth v. Lambert, 884 A.2d 848 (Pa. 2005) (explained § 9545(b)(1)(ii) focuses on whether facts were unknown and discoverable, not merits of underlying claim)
- Commonwealth v. Cox, 146 A.3d 221 (Pa. 2016) (refers to use of “newly‑discovered facts” terminology and PCRA timeliness analysis)