Common Cause Georgia v. Secretary, State of Georgia, 17 F.4th 102

In November 2018 Common Cause Georgia sued Secretary of State Brian Kemp challenging security vulnerabilities in Georgia’s voter-registration system (My Voter Page) that risked wrongful removal/manipulation and rejection of provisional ballots.
Common Cause moved (Nov. 7–8, 2018) for expedited discovery and a narrow temporary restraining order (TRO) barring final rejection of provisional ballots for voters missing from the registration database while possible manipulation was investigated.
The district court granted a TRO (Nov. 12, 2018), finding likelihood of success on the merits and enjoining the Secretary from certifying results before Nov. 16, requiring a hotline/website for provisional voters, expanded information to voters, and independent/good-faith review beyond My Voter Page data.
After 2019 legislative changes addressing related procedures, the parties stipulated to dismiss the suit with prejudice; Common Cause then sought attorneys’ fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 for work through the TRO and preparing the fee motion.
The district court awarded $161,682.50 in fees and $4,527.59 in expenses; the Secretary appealed, arguing Common Cause was not a "prevailing party" and the award was excessive. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Common Cause is a "prevailing party" under 42 U.S.C. § 1988	TRO granted merits-based relief that materially altered legal relationship and benefited Common Cause and its members	TRO did not substantially modify Secretary’s statutory authority or achieve significant relief from the suit	Held: Yes — TRO was merits-based, altered the parties' legal relationship, and conferred prevailing-party status
Whether a temporary restraining order (as opposed to a preliminary injunction) can support a fee award	TRO here provided notice and merits relief, so it should qualify like a preliminary injunction	TRO is temporary/limited and therefore insufficient for prevailing-party status	Held: TRO can confer prevailing-party status when it provides merits-based relief and judicial imprimatur (court relied on notice and substance of TRO)
Whether the fee award was reasonable in amount	Requested fees were for hours reasonably expended at reasonable rates and were necessary to obtain relief	Award should be reduced (taxpayer/sovereign interests and scope of relief warrant reduction)	Held: District court did not abuse discretion; its lodestar and adjustments were reasonable and factual findings not clearly erroneous

Sole v. Wyner, 551 U.S. 74 (2007) (describes when a plaintiff is a prevailing party under § 1988)
Tex. State Tchrs. Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782 (1989) (success on any significant claim—pendente lite or final—can confer prevailing-party status)
Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups, 554 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir. 2009) (preliminary injunctions can entitle a plaintiff to prevailing-party status)
Smalbein ex rel. Estate of Smalbein v. City of Daytona Beach, 353 F.3d 901 (11th Cir. 2003) (judicial imprimatur test for change in legal relationship)
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983) (lodestar method: hours reasonably expended times reasonable rate; district court discretion)
Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992) (degree of plaintiff’s success does not determine eligibility for fees)
United States v. Alabama, 791 F.2d 1450 (11th Cir. 1986) (TRO with notice and merits-based relief can be treated like a preliminary injunction)
Brooks v. Ga. State Bd. of Elections, 997 F.2d 857 (11th Cir. 1993) (district courts’ wide latitude in fee determinations)
Webb v. Bd. of Educ., 471 U.S. 234 (1985) (district court expertise and discretion in fee awards)
Dillard v. City of Greensboro, 213 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2000) (plaintiff need not obtain relief identical to that demanded; obtaining something of same general type suffices)