Background
- The Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (CHRO) filed administrative complaints against Travelers Indemnity Company and Yale University, alleging age discrimination based on job postings seeking "recent college graduates" or "recent graduate."
- The complainant, Glenn Liou, aged in his fifties, argued that these job postings deterred older candidates from applying, violating Connecticut General Statutes § 46a-60 (b)(6).
- Human rights referees dismissed both complaints, finding no evidence that the job postings were age proxies or restricted opportunities by age.
- The CHRO appealed these dismissals to the Superior Court, which also rejected the complaints, holding that the phrases at issue did not constitute per se age discrimination.
- CHRO then filed separate appeals to the Appellate Court, primarily arguing that the posting language constitutes illegal discrimination per se and that the lower courts applied an incorrect legal theory.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether "recent graduate" language is per se age discrimination | CHRO: The phrases are a proxy for age and inherently discriminatory based on prior precedent. | Defendants: The phrases are not inherently age-related; anyone can be a recent graduate. | Not per se discriminatory; phrases do not evidence age preference. |
| Whether CHRO had standing to bring the action | CHRO: Statutorily authorized to pursue public interest cases alleging discrimination. | Defendants: No demonstrable injury to any individual or the public. | CHRO had statutory standing based on colorable claim of public interest discrimination. |
| Whether the case was moot after Travelers stopped using the language | CHRO: Cessation was voluntary and could resume; controversy persists. | Defendants: Voluntary discontinuance of complained-of language moots the case. | Not moot; voluntary cessation by private entity does not foreclose future recurrence. |
| Whether the referee and court erred by not applying the "per se" theory as advanced by CHRO | CHRO: The referee misapplied legal theory by not accepting per se discrimination and by re-framing the claim. | Defendants: Referee addressed and properly rejected the per se argument on merits. | Referee and court correctly identified and rejected the per se discrimination theory argued by CHRO. |
Key Cases Cited
Evening Sentinel v. National Organization for Women, 168 Conn. 26 (Conn. 1975) (Held that job ads "Help Wanted Male/Female" were per se sex discrimination, but did not address age discrimination or whether "recent graduate" is a proxy for age.)
Hepburn v. Brill, 348 Conn. 827 (Conn. 2024) (Discusses subject matter jurisdiction standards.)
McWeeny v. Hartford, 287 Conn. 56 (Conn. 2008) (Defines classical and statutory aggrievement for purposes of standing.)
Groton v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 169 Conn. 89 (Conn. 1975) (Affirms CHRO's authority to pursue complaints in the public interest.)
Boisvert v. Gavis, 332 Conn. 115 (Conn. 2019) (Discusses exception to mootness for voluntary cessation by private actors.)
CT Freedom Alliance, LLC v. Dept. of Education, 346 Conn. 1 (Conn. 2023) (Covers judicial deference to government actors' claim of voluntary cessation.)
Sullivan v. McDonald, 281 Conn. 122 (Conn. 2007) (Also on deference to governmental voluntary cessation.)
Kemon v. Boudreau, 205 Conn. App. 448 (Conn. App. Ct. 2021) (Mootness standards and practical relief in justiciability.)
Gonzalez v. Commissioner of Correction, 107 Conn. App. 507 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008) (Subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time.)