*1 89 on parties, July 15,1974, having Per Curiam. in stipulated writing that he (1) case present consolidated for with the purpose appeal Joseph’s Silverman v. St. appeal the case of Hospital, 168 that 22, (2) Conn. A.2d briefs appeal and apply here, (3) our decision in that and con binding appeal trolling in this we we did in the appeal, find, as Silverman v. Hospital St. Joseph’s appeal, supra, no error.
There is no error. Rights City v. Human Groton Commission Opportunities Company v. No. Inc. Pioneer Hose Rights Opportunities Commission on Human House, Cotter, Bogdanski, Js. J., Loiselle, MacDonald C.
Argued March 7 decision released July 8, Bernard F. McGovern, Jr., assistant attorney general, with whom, on the R. Carl were brief, A j ello, attorney Ahern, F. Michael general, assistant attorney for general, appellant (defendant in both cases).
Thomas B. Wilson, with on the whom, brief, was James F. Brennan, Jr., for the appellee (plaintiff in the first case). E.
Joseph Moukawsher, (plain- appellee tiff in the second ease). J. These two from appeals judg-
MacDonald, ment rendered by sustaining Court Superior Pioneer appeals by Hose No. herein- Company after Pioneer, and city Groton, hereinafter from an Groton, order of the on Human Commission Rights hereinafter Opportunities, commission, have been ordered consolidated motion of upon parties. and, The basic facts are not in dispute with the relevant together procedural background, have been set forth in the memorandum fully statement by decision filed the trial court and the commission. facts and filed finding complaint dated Jan- appeals from a arise here- uary Richardson, M. 1968, filed Charles against commission Richardson, inafter alleging in that of discrimination Pioneer an act membership in the vol- Pioneer denied Richardson company in violation fire because of his race unteer hearing tribunal A Statutes 31-126. General appointed com- the commission held a continuing mencing September on on days until terminated various thereafter *3 rendered its 10, December 1968. The commission finding May in the facts 13, 1969, and included following: one which it found were the Pioneer is organized companies of two volunteer fire in Groton. On October a resident 11, 1967, Richardson, personally appeared meeting Groton, at Pioneer’s applied appli- room where he for and submitted an membership. application pro- for cation The form space signature applicant’s for vided a of the sponsor and when Richardson was advised Donald S. the foreman Rollins, that he Pioneer, sponsor, might needed a Richardson asked if he have a relative who was a or fireman mеmber of the Mystic Department sign sponsor. Fire as his Rich- only ardson was advised that he could not since a sponsor. member of Pioneer could act as a Never- application theless, Richardson submitted his with- sponsor’s signature application out a and the was accepted by During portion Rollins. regular meeting applications of Pioneer when for appli- new members were submitted, Richardson’s membership cation for was not read, as was cus- tomary. membership Instead, was asked if anyone sign application, upon would his receiving response, secretary no was directed application to return the to Richardson, who was October dated letter, notified certified it lacked in that application not valid was his bylaws required signature sponsor’s a bylaws organization. con the official In fact, any requirement pertaining prоvision no tained application signature sponsor’s on an for for a long prior membership; for a time however, organization application, the had Richardson’s cus tomarily signature required sponsor’s pre as a requisite membership. application The con inquiry concerning applicant’s tained no com petency experience firefighter. as a Richardson no black, there were black members application, Pioneer at the time Richardson made appear nor did it that there ever had been black members of Pioneer. January
On 9, 1968, Richardson executed com- plaint personally under oath and delivered to a representative investigator of the commission. representative actually commission’s did not *4 bring complaint to the commission’s officeuntil morning, January ninety-one next days 10,1968, meeting after thе October 1967. That com- 11, plaint April was amended on joining party, Groton as a in adding addition to to the com- plaint specific a claim of a violation of 58-34 as September to both Pioneer and Groton. On 18,1968, September and to the com- 24, 1968, again mission was amended, net effect of the being allege amendments that Pioneer was an quasi-official official or agency of Groton, and to specify that alleging Richardson was discrimination (a) subsection 31-126. hearing
The tribunal was of the opinion that the original January dated 9,. 1968, and as adding April as Groton 1968, amended filing ninety-day party, duly was filed within provided and limitation as then assisting while Groton’s Pioneer, further, regularly department fire fire in its constituted gov- fighting performing essential was an functions, agent an ernmental function, and, therefore, carrying statutory assisting of Groton it in out its duty providing protection fire citizens. its The finally procedure tribunal concluded that requiring applicant sponsor to obtain a exclu- sively among membership from its own discrim- against minority inated blacks and other members of groups. On these bases the commission found that Pioneer and Groton violated General Statutes (a) §§ 31-126 as amended, and issued a cease and desist order as set forth in the footnote.1 The tribunal did not conclude that Rich- membership ardson was, fact, excluded from presented because of race; his nor was there to the any tribunal direct evidence of discrimination because of race. Richardson stated in his 1Section 31-127 provide has since been amended to one hundred eighty days complaints. which to file such Company 2 “1. Pioneer Inc., respondent Hose No. herein, . . . cease procedures and desist from the use of membership such [shall] require applicants membership for active in a volunteer fire com pany provide sponsor exclusively from within its own member ship procedures effectively prevent membership other which organization solely race, in their because of color. creed or city “2. Groton, Connecticut, respondent . herein, . . furnishing any cease and desist from aid or comfort of what- [shall] *5 ever nature Company to the Pioneer Hose 1, Inc., long No. as as they employ shall continue membership procedures require such as applicants membership active in a company pro- volunteer fire sponsor exclusively vide membership from within its own procedures effectively other prevent orga- which membership in their solely race, nization because creed or color.” January applica
dated 9, 1968, that he believed his membership tion for was considered and accepted because his race. he However, had appears earlier stated on October that “it that I was turned result of down as a a lack knowledge company’s membership.” of the In view finding appears of the and orders evident issued, original that the tribunal had its abandoned claim membership that Richardson himself was denied because his race and had substituted the broader procedures claim discrimination based on the admitting used Pioneer new members, although proceeding original in the context of the complaint. Richardson plaintiffs appealed ruling
The the tribunal’s Superior which concluded the com Court, jurisdiction mission was without to issue the cease against plaintiff. prin and desist order either cipal bases for this conclusion were the court’s findings orig that the to the commission, inally prior hearing, and as amended to the was failing spеcific defective in to refer to the subsection of General Statutes 31-126 claimed to have been and further violated, had not ninety days been filed within act of required by discrimination, then 31-127. The court act of found the discrimination to be Pioneer’s accept application refusal to Richardson’s on Octo filing ninety-one ber and the date days January. complaint, later, 10, 1968, the date the entered the offices of the commission. The court never discussed substantive issues involved beyond the observation that no direct evidence of presented racial discrimination to the parties assigned tribunal. The have error in the *6 constrained are court, but we conclusions been which we find have issues with those deal appeal. of this within the context raised appeal plain and in this the trial court Before rejected by tribunal, issue, tiffs raised the hearing upоn the have terminated death should appendices of Richardson. The to Pioneer’s brief present and the brief an commission’s additional background requires factual which discussion. During pendency hearing of the before tri bunal, October Richardson and the died, attorney general requested appropriate post an ponement proceedings in a letter to Arthur L. then director of Green, the commission. In a correspondence, further dated October 15, 1968, attorney general assistant Robert L. Hirtle, Jr., serving attorney who was then as for the commis prosecuting complaint, sion the Richardson recom following mended the to director Green: “Because the unfortunate circumstances which have requesting I am occurred, that the Commission on Rights Opportunities Unman terminate hearing pending now on the Richardson employment practice. аs an unfair I However, am recommending also that the continue before investigation the same tribunal under Section 31-125 of the General Statutes, into the broader public issues raised in this matter. These issues are first; whether the Pioneer Hose Co. 1,No. Inc., public quasi-public of Groton is a agency of City of by-laws Groton and second; whether the company provide of this procedure volunteer fire against Negro for applicant discrimination membership in violation of basic constitutional guarantees.” rejected Attorney Director Green *7 in a 1968, on 17,
Hirtle’s recommendation October rele- letter the attorney addressed the general, vant in the footnote.3 which are portions printed
The moved to dismiss the plaintiffs proceedings on November was 25, 1968, hearing when the tri- resumed, because of death. The Richardson’s bunal denied the motions and the hearing proceeded to a final this disposition. The included plaintiffs 3 portions 17, 1968, Relevant of director letter of October Green's attorney general: to the “I think it that the contents is unfortunate your of . . . press, letter carried the October were [of 1968] a since in discussion of recent date Mr. Orenstein Hirtle, between Mr. and me it suggestion by was decided that con the Mr. Hirtle of tinuing investigatory the Pioneer Hose matter in an form altered up was to be taken meeting me with our At a Commissioners. our Enforcement Committee the Wednesday, October Committee was unanimous and adamant in the conclusion that the hearing present seehing Sichardson form, should contimie in its binding order the particularly tribunal. The Committee was from altering concerned that proceedings suggested by in the form Mr. Hirtle result, would at best, furnishing in this Commission's recommendations city to the already Groton which have been rejected. “At а meeting of the full Commission on October 1968 the entire Commission similarly carry unanimous in the resolve to Richardson to a present conclusion in its form. “The Commission intends to continue under those sections law which can lead a binding order the tribunal rather than general investigation of broad sought issues. While the order might, before Mr. Richardson’s death, city have been company fire cease and desist refusing from membership specifically to him because of color, his sought order to be point from this should city be that the company and fire cease and desist from requirement for a prior recommendation from a member of the company, each every one of white, subjection whom is and the applicant of an to a system blackball dealing when persons with seeking membership publicly in a company. legal financed fire bases, as stated in original cоmplaint, practice are that such violates either or both of the Employment Connecticut Pair Practices Law and Section 53-34 of the General Statutes concerning the denial of constitutionally protected rights.” (Emphasis added.) Superior appeal ground Court to the for their as a in its brief. the issue Pioneer has discussed “[a]lthough com concluded that The court plainant’s right personal survive, not relief did right public’s to relief would interest and complainant extinguished the death of a agree proceeding.” a valid We cannot court in this conclusion. 1969), (Sup.
Chapter General Statutes Employment §§ Prac entitled 31-122to Pair power granted to the commis tices, delineates *8 may power be in sion and the manner which that (e) Specifically, com invoked. granted power initiate, receive, mission is “to investigate complaints mediate of unfаir employment practices.” relevant statutes and The regulations the trifurcated the related delineate invoking of the commission’s remedial manner (1) “Any person claiming powers follows: by employment prac aggrieved unfair sign may, by attorney, himself or make, tice his complaint writing the commission a and file with (2) under oath.” “The when 31-127; commission, any person reason to believe has ever has that engaged engaged employ or is been an unfair may complaint.” practice, ment issue a Ibid. (3) “Any employer employees, or whose comply them, refuse threaten to refuse to may provisions chapter of this file with the asking commission written a under oath for assistance conciliation or other remedial Regs., Agencies action.” Ibid. See Conn. State (Civil Rights Employment Commission—Pair Act—Procedure) § Practices 31-125-3. (1) may (2) apply
Procedures to similar еmployment that where an unfair situations, is, practice or a the commission exist, is claimed to practice aggrieved by person claiming that to be practice. In file a review sought by present means review was case procedure (1), personal of Rich however, ardson. The that could be afforded, relief complaint. is Veeder- dictated the limits Rights Oppor Root v. on Human Co. Commission & tunities, 165 443. In Veeder- Conn. A.2d complainant person Boot to be claimed aggrieved by practice employer her which, she alleged, against constituted discrimination her on hearing appointed basis sex. The tribunal, hearing complaint, to conduct a on the issued an directing order Veeder-Root to cease and desist department-wide from sex discrimination. appointed state referee to hear Veeder-Root’s appeаl from the tribunal’s order modified part grant only of the order to relief to the complainant depart individual and not to the entire complainant employed. ment in which the In affirming4 this action the referee we stated (p. 327): plaintiff *9 “The claims that the order went beyond scope pleadings, of and in this we agree. must As stated the referee, ‘the clear import complaint [Hilda . was that . . Moe], department, as one of the women in the without was, any occupational' qualification bona fide or need, being against compensation discriminated in complaint because her sex. . . . The could not properly attempt represent, be construed as an speak department for, the other women in the as ” a class.’
Continuing procedural with a discussion of problems in Veeder-Root similar to those involved
[4] Error was found on. other grounds. 328): in its (p. “Furthermore, here, we stated ‘any plaintiff of Section denied violation answer the (a), Chapter the Gen 563 of subsection 31-126, as amended eral Statutes Connecticut [emphasis respect Complainant Moe Hilda G. plead added].’ The issue was thus framed —ings depart in was there sex discrimination against plaintiff’s plant ment 99 in the directed hearing progressed Hilda Moe? As the apparent in became that sex discrimination existed department department-wide basis, provided whereby statute, the means commission could have com either amended the plaint department-wide to include an attach on the discrimination or in the issued a new allega containing name the commission such tion. Had the commission taken either of these question actions there would have been no being litigated involving issues that were department-wide scope discrimination and оf the might of the order the commission issue. no Instead, amendment or new was issued plain with the result that the commission and the actually tiff are now at odds about what issues were litigated legality and about of the commission’s (Emphasis added.) order.” language peculiarly applicable In to the case (p. 329): before us, we concluded Veeder-Root clearly provides respondent “Section 31-127 that the hearing appear ‘to before the tribunal order charges complaint.’ [the] This answer the of . . . charges that the in the means frame issues to be decided tribunal. Since *10 fairly complaint read, of Moe, the individual Hilda plaintiff, provide respondent, the did the scope com- notice of of the action and since the the Statutes, General mission, the wider % 31-127 of attaching complaint empowered to issue a new was department-wide sex which wоuld discrimination apprised plaintiff scope the the the have of of justified plaintiff action, we conclude that was in its belief the commission’s attack solely only applied directed at sex discrimination as improper to Hilda was, therefore, Moe. It for the requiring plaintiff commission to issue an order department-wide to cease and desist from discrim- (Emphasis added.) ination.” Upon Richardson’s death the could commission complaint empowered have amended as was §§ to do under 31-125 and 31-127. Instead, it chose ignore attorney gen- the advice the assistant previously quoted proceeded eral to seek an general applicability upon personal order Authority then Richardson, deceased. complaint, to make reasonable amendments to a during, hearing, granted even is regula- General Statutes and 31-125-9of the clearly empowered by tions. The commission is prosecute complaints statute to public on issues of strictly comply interest but it gov- must with the erning regulations statutes and the it has caused to be issued. prosecutes
If the commission an unfair employment practice upon indi- initiating separate vidual without its own, com- plaint, proper authorizing absent amendment remedy relief, broader tribunal fashion a only within the confines and afford only complainant. Upon relief to the individual complainant death of an individual is tribunal powerless conformity rendered to issue an award
101
personal complaint.
with the decedent’s
Since the
commission failed to amend the
to sub
complainant seeking
stitute itself as
in
relief
general public,
interest of the
it was error for the
deny
plaintiffs’ timely
tribunal
motions
Despite
precise
dismiss.
the fact that this
issue was
specifically assigned
this
еrror,
court
question
jurisdiction,
consider
lack of
by
parties;
whether or not it is raised
it cannot
by
parties
be waived
silence
the failure
to raise the issue in the trial court. Simmons v.
State,
There is no error. opinion In this House, C. J., J., and Loiselue, concurred. (concurring). J. I concur the result
Cotter, majority. reached
I agree I that, under General Stat charges pursuant utes, in a filed to our Employment Fair Practices Act “frame the issues to be decided tribunal”; Veeder-Root & Opportuni on Human Rights v. Co. Commission and that 334 A.2d ties, 443, 165 Conn. *12 to tribunal hearing by favorable relief granted com the limits of the “is dictated complainant majority in the I as stated agree, further plaint.” Veeder-Root, the commis in discussing opinion under may, sion on human rights opportunities include an amend the to 31-127, either § issue or discrimination attack department-wide such containing in name a new its own being action of either of which the effect allegation, which order of relief scope to enlarge issue. tribunal hearing might in manner consistent The commission proceeded so much of Consequently, with these requirements. vio- allegations as involved proceedings other than (a) affecting persons lations com- survived the death of the original Richardson commission’s “amendment” plainant. its in Richardson’s amended complaint, signed before on September name and filed not that article only 5, § Richardson died, alleged “when Pioneer’s bylaws implemented denies to effectively facts in the instant case Richardson, rights M. his Charles complainant, changed later 53-34,” Sec. 31-126 and guaranteed by that article to read 31-126 but also (a) which 1 of “sets forth a bylaws procedure those vehicle of discrimination” and “is an improper is a of a used in the conduct public standard be filed two ordered to be agency.” allegations, These of dis- case, charges constituted properly crimination in their affect- far-reaching impact, tribunal was justi- not Richardson. The merely ing least, deciding in a sense at fied, procedural ultimately of discrimination before the enough was broad amended the commission similarly relief, broad authorize issuance and desist orders. viz., the cease by the The “net effect” of the amendments filed merely allege commission was not “to that Pioneer quasi-official agency an official of Croton, specify alleging and to that Richardson was dis- (a) crimination under subsection 31-126.” enlarge Rathеr, their effect was to issues be decided tribunal and to as the serve only applicable basis for the issuance of relief persons might similarly to Richardson but to who *13 by allegedly discriminatory practices affected the of Pioneer. agreed, proceedings
It is that the below however, respect allegations were rendered moot with to the (a) §31-126 of violations in the amended com- plaint affecting personally. Richardson An action respects survive some but abate as to others. Northrop, Booth v. 27 Conn. 328. Connecticut’s provides “[n]o survival-of-aetions statute that civil proceeding by action or shall abate reason of the Genera], any party death of thereto.” Statutes party 52-599. To survive the death in such proceeding, provides action or however, statute for the executor or administrator of the decedent cоntinue case on behalf Ibid. decedent. any record this ease does not disclose admin- istrator having or executor of Richardson’s taken any such In action. addition, further statute provisions apply states its “shall not proceeding object . . . purpose civil action or or of which is defeated or rendered useless any party death of thereto.” Ibid. To extent purposes proceeding that one of the of the below as to afford indicated in the amended specific the Pair Richardson relief available Employment useless it was rendered Practices Act, Accordingly, saving provisions of his death. apply this the survival-of-actions statute did aspect proceedings. indicated Nonetheless, of the con- on the above, this circumstance had no effect respect tinuing vitality proceedings allegations viola- in the amended (a) affecting persons than tions of other 31-126 Richardson. part
In involved of the action which addition, also a claimed violation of 53-34 General Statutes abated with the death of Richardson. Section “[a]ny person subjects, states that who or causes subjected, any deprivation person to be other to the any rights, privileges or secured immunities, protected the constitution or laws of this state alienage, or of the United on account of States, color or race, shall be fined not more than one thou year imprisoned sand dollars or than not more one Although or both.”1 violations of the statute con subject stitute criminal offenses and offender penal Vogt, *14 to Zucker 426 sanctions; v. 329 F.2d (2d Cir.); Waterbury v. on Human Commission Rights Opportunities, & 160 278 Conn. provides A.2d 771; section 53-36 also in addi that, penalties provided any § tion to the 53-34, under aggrieved by person claiming to be a violation may sign this section and file with com “make, the rights opportunities mission on human a complaint . . . which shall state the circumstances particulars of such violation and the thereof and shall contain such other information as 1 prohibition statute has since been amended to include a deprivation rights on account of sex. Public Act No. 74-80. Thereupon, under required the commission.” upon may proceed “such § the commission 53-36, same manner and with the in the same chapter provided powers case of the practices.” proce- employment this When unfair in this the commis- case, dure is as was followed, provide only nonpenal sion is such authorized powers Fair remedies as are within its under the Employment § inasmuch as 53-36 Act, Practices provisions states that the of that act “as to the powers, rights of duties and commission, complainant, attorney general, court, respondent counsel for the commission and the shall apply proceeding provisions under of this Essentially, right § section.” then, 53-36 confers a upon person injured by a criminal offense under provisions nonpenal § of 53-34 remedies Employment available under the Fair Practices purpose § opening Act. The as its words suggest (“In penalties provided addition to the [and] violation of 53-35”) sections 53-34 .. . secondary to afford a level of relief—civil relief— persons injured by Rights Civil Act violations; purpose Employment its was not to amend the Fair by placing disposal Practices Act at the of the com- rights entirely mission on civil new substantive cause of action. That this is so is confirmed § fact that “may 53-36 the commission issue complaint” only on its own behalf when it has rea- son to believe 53-35 or 53-35a has been or being is violated, not when it has reasоn to believe being has been or Signifi- is violated. cantly, specifically survival-of-actions statute provisions states that allowing its proceedings to remain unaffected party the death of a “shall *15 apply any not to right cause or any of action or to
106 of civil or or object action the purpose proceeding which the death by is defeated or rendered useless of any thereto.” 52-599. party General Statutes § The remedies which is empowered the commission issu under 31-127—for provide example, ance of ordering a cease and order, desist of to, affirmative but action, including, limited reinstatement hiring complaining employees—would Richardson have benefited per sonally only while he was so that alive, “pur pose” any undertaken pursuant proceeding 53-36 was death, rendered “useless” his within of our survival-of-actions stat contemрlation ute. In the absence other statutory provi sion or rule of law survival of authorizing the pro commission ceedings conducted upon death of the individual claimed have been aggrieved alleged violation such must be proceeding deemed to have abated with individual’s death. See 1 C.J.S., Abatement and Revival, 132, 133, 134; §§ Am. Jur. Abate 2d, ment, Survival, and Revival, 51 et note, seq.; §§ 1153, A.L.R.2d 1156.
II filing complaint on January against Pioneer did not constitute filing against Groton at time. The provisions of the Pair Employment Practices Act governing procedure thereunder are precise and unambiguous specify- ing that a complaint arising the act must state “the name and address the person, employer, labor organization or employment agency have committed the unfair employment practice” and must “set forth the particulars thereof and contain such other information
107
Statutes
required
General
commission.”
January
complaint
1968,
10,
on
filed
The
31-127.
only,
Pioneer
of
address
name and
mentioned the
of Groton.
and address
the name
not contain
and did
argues, an
the defendant
even
as
Furthermore,
if,
“agency” relationship
between Groton
existed
implementing
former’s stat
the latter
Pioneer,
utory duty
providing
protection,
Groton
fire
distinguishable
entity
from Pioneer under
still an
pur
in the act
definitional terms
relevant
arising
being
poses
thereu
named in a
filing
of the amended
Thus,
nder.2
April
containing the name and address
24, 1968,
on
respect
city,
represented,
with
to the
Groton,
filing
altogether
complaint which did not
of an
new
complaint against
filing
“relate back”
January
K all
all,
Pioneer on
10.
els
v. Kels
139
However,
utes person and all divisions and employer employees Under $ undertaking political with three or or (b), opportunities agencAes thereof”; act, “person” subdivisions (e), (f). more or without means “the state and all (Emphasis persons work”; “employer” thereof “employment and means added.) his compensation employ.” agency” includes the “any political General Stat means person procure state “any sub
III
against
amended,
filed
Pioneer,
allege
practice”
employment
failed to
an “unfair
*17
engaged
contemplаtion
in
Pioneer within
of
(a), contrary
General Statutes
what
argued.
per
commission has
The
statute states,
part,
employ
“[i]t
tinent
shall be an unfair
practice
employer, by
ment
. . . for an
himself or
agent,
.
his
. . because of the
...
of
race
employ
individual, to refuse to hire or
or to
bar
discharge
employment
from
such individual or
against
compensation
to discriminate
him in
or in
privileges
employment.”
terms, conditions or
“employ,”
“employment”
The terms “hire,”
and
are
specifically
defined
the statute.
In the
specificity,
absence of such
the common understand
ing
appropriately
applied
of those terms
should
construing provisions
when
of the statute affected
e.g.,
terms.
those
Fruco
See,
Construction Co.
(8th Cir.) (con
v.
192
McClelland,
F.2d 241, 244-45
struing
“employer”
undefined term
in the federal
according
Fair Labor
Act
Standards
to common
usage).
“employ,”
“employ
The terms “hire,”
generally
relationship,
ment” all
refer to a
involv
ing compensation,
person
between
has
who
authority
person
per
to hire
fire
and a
who
Kenyon,
forms the services.
v.
Inc.,
State
153
(Tex.
App.)
(“hire”);
195,
S.W.2d
197
Civ.
Ten
Iron
Coal,
nessee
& R. Co. v.
No.
Muscoda Local
64
321 U.S.
S.
88
590,
698,
Ct.
L. Ed.
v.
949; Slocum Straw Works
Industrial Commis
(“employ”)
sion, 232 Wis.
286
71, 76,
N.W. 593
;
Foster,
v.
404;
State
37 Iowa
State v.
108
Deck,
App.
(“employment”);
Mo.
292, 293-94,
109 (“hire”), Ed.) Dictionary (Rev. 863 4th Law Black, case, (“employment”). In this (“employ”), 618 alleged not against Pioneer however, meaning any employment within the the refusal “application” (a) of an but the denial of 31-126 “voluntary “membership” associa- is a in what for Going v. Cromwell connection, in this See, tion.” where 267 A.2d District, Fire Conn. “employer” relationship between referred we “employee,” volunteer statute for created applicability purposes state’s of this firemen compensation to be “fiсtitious” laws, workmen’s relationship. complainant, in sense, then, this alleging sufficient its facts failed to meet burden requirements proceeding bring this within *18 Hope, (a). § v. 31-126 See 156 Conn. Senior A.2d 486. foregoing I result. For the concur in the reasons, (concurring dissenting). I J. Bogdanski, agree deprived cannot the death Richardson jurisdiction com- the commission of hear the majority opinion plaint. The concludes “[s]ince the commission failed to the com- amend complainant seeking plaint to substitute itself as general public, relief in the it was interest the deny plaintiffs’ timely for the error the tribunal to motions to dismiss.” That however, statement, erroneously assumes that Richardson was a neces- sary party proceedings. commission Pursu- §.§. ant to 31-127 of the Statutes, and 53-36 General any person claiming aggrieved by to be employment practice § unfair as in defined claiming deprived General Statutes to be rights § of constitutional defined in 53-34 of the complaint, General Statutes file a written person, the commission. Such oath, with having complaint, than filed a then becomes no more party potential an interested witness in subse- proceedings. quent is It is the commission which investigate required and to employment prac- to eliminate “endeavor the unfair deprivation rights] [or com- tice constitutional plained persua- conciliation and conference, Failing sion.” General Statutes 31-127. that, proceeds hearing hearing matter to a before a tri- only party required bunal. Under' appear person [or] be served and to is “the . . . employer complaint, . . . . . named such . respondent referred to as .... The case support presented shall be' at the hearing by attorney general, coun- who shall be added.) (Emphasis sel the commission . . . .” original necessary complainant The then not a is party procedure under the set forth in 31-127. proceeding is one in which commission on rights opportunities prosecutes human the com- plaint appointed before a tribunal (cid:127) procedure of chairman which is commission, similar to that established for numerous other “watchdog” agencies.1 administrative Moreover, *19 only may petition the commission the court for the any enforcement of cease and desist order issued by (a). the §31-128 tribunal. General Statutes It 1See, e.g., (Rev. 1975) General Statutes 14-4a, 14-67c, 14-64, §§ 14-111b, 14-110 to and 14-114 of the Statutes, regarding General the commissioner; motor vehicles 15-124, 19-513a, 22a-5, §§ 19-514 and regarding the commissioner of protection; 16-8, environmental §§ 16-9, 16-12 16-13, regarding and public the commission; utilities 20-45 20-46, regarding and $§ examining boards; the medical 20-321, §§ 20-320 and regarding the real commission; estate regarding liquor the control commission; 38-62, regarding and § the insurance commissioner.
111 original respondent the the true that either is the appeal action of the complainant from now (d). §31-128 hearing General Statutes tribunal. originally right appeal, was however, That Sup. complainant; 1866i; 1947 see to the extended complainant was 1963 that the not until was appeal. Acts 472. right Public No. given the appeal right complainant’s is the Nevertheless, §of the framework not inconsistent respond- designates the the commission which necessary purposes only parties for ent the hearing the tribunal, which, before the relegates complainant implication, to the status party. of an interested majority on Veeder-Root reliance Co. Opportunities, Rights Human &
v. Commission misplaced. A.2d 443, is The issue 165 Conn. granted was within there was whether relief wording complaint, whether of the i.e., respondent scope notice оf had action. nothing ques 329. case had to do with the Id., That standing, although way tion it did indicate dicta that commission could have amended the Moe of Hilda to include attack on department-wide 328. Id., discrimination. If the original complainant’s commission can amend complaint, it then follows that the commission is adversary respondent the real to the in the before the tribunal. At rate, commission present did amend the in the case. As concurring opinion, noted the amended com plaint alleged using Pioneer a “member ship” procedure which was “vehicle of discrimina improper tion” and “an standard to be used in the agency.” public agree conduct of a I with the con curring opinion that the amended *20 tribunal before the to he decided the issues
enlarged against of discrimination the beyond question far did death that Richardson’s alone, Richardson of tribunal jurisdiction the not facto ipso deprive the hearing. with to proceed the that the concurring opinion with I also agree unfair employment to an allege failed commission the of of 31-126 (a) the meaning § within practice in the amended com- Nowhere Statutes. General employer that either is an is Groton alleged plaint Pioneer in “membership” for or that an application with for employment in an effect, application is, facts sufficient allege that failure Since Groton. of requirements the within bring the proceeding in their plaintiffs raised the 31-126 was (a) § defect filed the the tribunal, motions to dismiss with dis- have and the tribunal should waived of complaint missed that portion (a). a violation of 31-126 § with tribunal, however, proceeded properly broader to the respect allegations complaint which claimed that the “membership” procedure vehicle by Pioneer, agent Groton, used was “a in discrimination” violation 53-34 of § Under it is General Statutes. unlawful other to the any person subject any person of constitutional on account deprivation rights race or alienage, color, sex. Section provides 53-36 a violation of aggrieved by person file commission which then on such a “in the same proceeds manner and with same powers provided . . . case of unfair employment practices.” commission is Thus, moving press- party final ing disposition, survival-of-actions 52-599 of statute, the General *21 orig- apply upon not the death Statutes, does complaint complainant, has been inal the when discriminatory practices allege that amended to generally. properly public affect the The trial court though right complainant’s “[ a] 1 to noted the personal public’s relief did not the interest survive, right by extinguished and to relief would not be complainant proceeding.” death of a under a valid prosecution § Under 53-34, a criminal not would upon complaining abate death a since witness, wrong against a violation of that is statute a people scope of this state. The of the harm to be prevented merely not is lessened because the com- public agency designated mission becomes the remedy by per- the situation means of conciliation, hearing. suasion only and administrative That a person aggrieved by iswho a violation of 53-34 complaint file a with the commission should not may only construed mean that the commission seek relief for depriva- that individual. The harm, rights, tion of society constitutional is one which has preventing by stake in sought and the relief commission is public, for the benefit of merely complaint. for the individual who files the
I would therefore conclude that Richardson’s prevent going death did not the commission from plaintiffs forward with the claim that the were vio- lating 53-34 of the General Statutes maintain- ing “membership” requirements that set forth “a vehicle of discrimination.” actually
The issues appeal raised on this parties briefed should be reached. As noted majority opinion, in the trial court determined that the jurisdiction tribunal was without against issue the plain cease and desist order tiffs. The court complaint concluded that the com filed with the not been had
amended act after ninety days mission within of the Gen as required discrimination and amended Statutes, eral make refe failing were defective *22 r of the General the subsection § ence to com the the regulations as required by Statutes error in both has assigned The commission mission. of those conclusions. of the commission finding from the
It appears in Pioneer for membership that Richаrdson applied on contained that the 11, 1967; application October no as a experience about the applicant’s inquiry the that required signa the firefighter; application of a that member only ture sponsor; present Pioneer could act as a that Richardson sponsor; the submitted without a application sponsor’s signa the accepted by and that was ture; application 17, It until foreman Pioneer. was not October his that Richardson sent notice that 1967, appli was a sponsor’s cation was invalid because lacked signature. Whether Richardson’s was on on 9, 1968, filed with commission January no The ninety- is of following day, consequence. day limitation in 31-127 of the filing General Stat not start run until utes actual possibly could rejection notice of the of the was sent application to Richardson. Otherwise, could wait respondent out then ninety-day filing period, notify of its that decision, claim com applicant plaint filed with the commission thereafter well timely 31-127. Common sense as dictate no case law such can loophole exist provided by procedure legislature filing the commission. See International complaints Brotherhood Electrical Local Workers 35 v. Rights, on Commission Civil 140 Conn. A.2d 537, 102 complaint against 366. Pioneer Thus, Richardson’s ninety days commission was filed with the within act of which occurred discrimination, on October the date notice was sent to concluding Richardson. The court erred in trial the act of discrimination on 11, occurred October calculating ninety-day filing period and in 1967, subsequent from that date. It well be that the April amendment of the party, which added Groton as a was the commence proceeding against ment of a new Groton which was beyond ninety-day period of limitation. See, generally, 51 Am. 2d, Jur. Limitation of Actions, require 272. That defect, did not however, dis proceeding against missal of the Pioneer. *23 ground
The second on which the trial court based appeals its decision to sustain the was the failure and the amended make § reference to the subsection of 31-126 of the plaintiffs allegedly General Statutes which the were violating. argues The commission that that omis- complaint fatally sion did not render the defective for several not the least reasons, of which is plain- fact that the also that the § tiffs had violated 53-34 the General Statutes. Any regarding charge defect under separate charge could not affect the 53-34. tribunal concluded that Pioneer had violated 53-34. The trial court therefore should proceeded have appeal to hear the merits of regard allegation. to that sustaining I would find error in the of the Pioneer appeal, judgment vacate the and remand the case for consideration of the substantive issues raised appeal. in