Comcast Corp. v. National Assn. of African-American Owned Media
140 S. Ct. 1009
| SCOTUS | 2020Background
- Byron Allen’s Entertainment Studios Network (ESN), an African‑American–owned broadcaster, sought carriage on Comcast’s cable systems; Comcast declined citing low demand, bandwidth, and programming preferences.
- ESN sued under 42 U.S.C. §1981 alleging Comcast’s refusals were racially motivated and part of a pattern disadvantaging Black‑owned media; ESN claimed Comcast masked discrimination with pretextual business reasons.
- The district court dismissed ESN’s complaint after multiple amendments, concluding ESN failed plausibly to allege that race was a but‑for cause of Comcast’s refusal to contract.
- The Ninth Circuit reversed, applying a more lenient test: §1981 requires only that race play “some role” (a motivating‑factor or “any role”) in the defendant’s decisionmaking to survive dismissal.
- The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the circuit split over §1981’s causation standard and whether a motivating‑factor test (or a relaxed pleading‑stage standard) governs.
- The Court held §1981 plaintiffs must plead and ultimately prove that race was a but‑for cause of the injury; it vacated and remanded for the Ninth Circuit to reassess the complaint under that standard, and it declined to decide whether §1981 protects the entire contracting process (Justice Ginsburg concurred, urging a broader reading).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Causation standard under §1981 | §1981 requires only that race be a motivating factor or play "some role" in the decision | §1981 follows ordinary tort but‑for causation; plaintiff must show race was the but‑for cause | Court: §1981 requires but‑for causation; plaintiff must plead and prove race was a but‑for cause |
| Pleading‑stage standard (motivation vs. but‑for) | A motivating‑factor allegation suffices to survive a motion to dismiss even if but‑for required at trial | Elements of the claim don’t change during litigation; plaintiff must plead facts sufficient for but‑for causation | Court: No special pleading exception; burden remains constant from filing through trial |
| Scope of §1981 (process vs. outcome) | §1981 protects the entire contracting process (preformation conduct) | §1981 covers only discrete formation/outcome decisions | Court: Did not decide; reserved for lower courts on remand; Ginsburg concurred that §1981 protects the whole contracting process |
Key Cases Cited
- University of Tex. Southwestern Medical Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (U.S. 2013) (but‑for causation as default in discrimination/retaliation cases)
- Gross v. FBL Financial Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (U.S. 2009) (declining motivating‑factor standard in ADEA context)
- Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (U.S. 1975) (recognition of a §1981 private cause of action)
- Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (U.S. 1917) (statutory language construed as requiring action "because of" race)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (U.S. 1973) (burden‑shifting framework for indirect proof of discrimination)
- Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (U.S. 1989) (motivating‑factor standard in Title VII plurality)
- Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (U.S. 1989) (prior narrow reading of §1981 that Congress amended in 1991)
- CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442 (U.S. 2008) (construing §§1981 and 1982 similarly post‑amendment)
- Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (U.S. 1968) (broad congressional purpose to eradicate racial barriers to contractual rights)