Com. v. Taylor, F.
630 WDA 2017
| Pa. Super. Ct. | Jan 3, 2018Background
- Fredrick Earl Taylor was convicted of robbery, two theft-related counts, and simple assault and sentenced to 10–20 years on September 9, 2010.
- Direct appeals were denied: Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed (June 1, 2011) and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allowance (Sept. 27, 2011); judgment of sentence became final after the 90-day certiorari period expired (Dec. 26, 2011).
- Taylor filed a pro se PCRA petition in 2013 alleging ineffective assistance; the PCRA court dismissed it and this Court rejected his attempt to invoke newly discovered facts as a timeliness exception.
- On July 20, 2016, Taylor filed a second (serial) PCRA petition pro se; counsel was appointed, submitted a Turner/Finley no-merit letter, and sought to withdraw.
- The PCRA court issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of intent to dismiss, Taylor did not respond, and the court dismissed the petition on February 28, 2017 as untimely and granted counsel’s withdrawal.
- Taylor appealed; the Superior Court addressed jurisdictional timeliness first and affirmed dismissal because he failed to invoke a recognized timeliness exception.
Issues
| Issue | Taylor's Argument | Commonwealth/PCRA Court's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Taylor’s opposition to the 907 notice was timely under the mailbox rule | Taylor contended his opposition was timely under the Institutionalized Persons (mailbox) rule | Court noted no timely response was filed and relied on the record showing no opposition | Denied — no timely opposition in record; dismissal stands |
| Whether prior PCRA counsel abandoned Taylor by filing a Turner/Finley no-merit letter instead of amending the petition | Taylor argued counsel abandoned him at crucial stages and should have amended the petition | Court treated ineffectiveness claims raised for first time on appeal as waived and not properly before the court | Denied — claims of PCRA counsel ineffectiveness not preserved and cannot be raised for first time on appeal |
| Whether Taylor’s claim qualifies for the newly recognized constitutional-right exception to PCRA timeliness ( § 9545(b)(1)(iii) ) based on Foster v. Chatman | Taylor relied on Foster to argue a newly recognized constitutional right triggers the 60-day exception | Commonwealth and court held Foster did not announce a new constitutional right but applied Batson to particular facts; exception not satisfied | Denied — Foster did not create a new right or a retroactive rule; petition untimely and court lacked jurisdiction |
Key Cases Cited
- Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737 (2016) (applied Batson principles to case facts; did not announce a new constitutional right)
- Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (prohibits race-based peremptory strikes)
- Commonwealth v. Ragan, 923 A.2d 1169 (Pa. Super. 2007) (standard of review for PCRA denials)
- Commonwealth v. Chambers, 35 A.3d 34 (Pa. Super. 2011) (explains requirements for newly recognized constitutional-right exception under § 9545)
- Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264 (Pa. 2007) (PCRA timeliness is jurisdictional and strict)