Com. v. Stern, N., 1959 MDA 2016

Background

On August 19, 2014, a 12-gauge shotgun was used to kill Malik Stern-Jones in Harrisburg; the victim was shot through a car window.
Appellant Niejea Franklin Stern (age 15 at the time) was identified by multiple witnesses; he was later arrested on a juvenile-warrant escape charge and then formally charged with murder.
At trial the Commonwealth admitted preliminary-hearing testimony of witness Freddie Williams, who had been murdered before trial.
Appellant was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder and an unlicensed-firearm offense; sentenced to life without parole plus a concurrent term for the firearm offense.
Appellant appealed, challenging: admission of Williams’s preliminary-hearing testimony (confrontation/cross-examination), the juvenile life-without-parole sentence under Miller/Montgomery, the photo-array identifications, and the excessiveness of sentence.
The Superior Court affirmed evidentiary rulings but vacated the life-without-parole sentence and remanded for resentencing under Commonwealth v. Batts (Batts II) standards.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Commonwealth)	Defendant's Argument (Stern)	Held
1. Admissibility of preliminary-hearing testimony of unavailable witness (Williams)	Testimony admissible under Pa.R.E. 804(b)(1); defendant had counsel and opportunity to cross-examine at preliminary hearing.	Counsel lacked a full and fair opportunity to cross-examine Williams; admission violated Confrontation Clause.	Admitted. Court found defense counsel conducted extensive cross-examination and no "vital impeachment" was withheld; Confrontation Clause not violated.
2. Juvenile life-without-parole sentence (Eighth Amendment/Miller/Montgomery)	Sentence lawful if trial court considered Miller factors and statutory §1102.1 findings.	LWOP for a 15-year-old is cruel and violates Miller/Montgomery; sentencing procedure insufficient.	Vacated and remanded for resentencing under Batts II: presumption against LWOP for juveniles; Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that juvenile is irreparably incorrigible.
3. Challenge to sentence as excessive and ignoring rehabilitative needs	Commonwealth relied on court’s discretion and statutory scheme.	Sentence was excessive, unreasonable, and failed to account for youth/rehabilitation; lesser mandatory minimum available.	Not addressed on merits because remand required by Batts II; preserved for resentencing.
4. Suppression of photographic-array identifications	Arrays were conducted before formal charges; Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not attached; arrays not unduly suggestive.	Arrays impermissibly suggestive (only photo in green, complexion differences) and counsel’s absence violated rights.	Denied. Court found Appellant was not yet charged (right to counsel at arrays did not attach) and the photo array was not unduly suggestive under totality of circumstances.

Key Cases Cited

Commonwealth v. Eichinger, 915 A.2d 1122 (Pa. 2007) (standard of review for suppression rulings)
Commonwealth v. McCrae, 832 A.2d 1026 (Pa. 2003) (preliminary-hearing testimony admissible if full opportunity to cross-examine existed)
Commonwealth v. Bazemore, 614 A.2d 684 (Pa. 1992) (prejudice where defense lacked knowledge to impeach preliminary-hearing witness)
Commonwealth v. Batts, 66 A.3d 286 (Pa. 2013) (juvenile LWOP sentencing must consider Miller factors)
Commonwealth v. Batts, 163 A.3d 410 (Pa. 2017) (Batts II) (presumption against juvenile LWOP; Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt juvenile is incapable of rehabilitation)
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (U.S. 2012) (mandatory LWOP for juveniles unconstitutional)
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (U.S. 2016) (Miller is retroactive; requires individualized juvenile sentencing)
Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 860 A.2d 102 (Pa. 2004) (due-process standard for suppressing out-of-court identifications)
Commonwealth v. Fisher, 769 A.2d 1116 (Pa. 2001) (photographic arrays not unduly suggestive if suspect does not ‘‘stand out’’)