Com. v. Nifas, R.
1643 EDA 2021
| Pa. Super. Ct. | Apr 11, 2022Background
- Appellant Rasheen Nifas was convicted of first-degree murder in 1993 and sentenced to life in 1994; multiple prior PCRA petitions were litigated and largely denied.
- In April 2018 trial witness Troy Gillis executed an affidavit stating the prosecutor instructed him to testify falsely at Nifas’s 1993 trial; Nifas filed a pro se PCRA petition on May 7, 2018 based on that affidavit.
- The PCRA court issued a Rule 907 intent-to-dismiss notice and ultimately denied the petition as untimely and, alternatively, on the merits (focusing on the recantation’s reliability and other eyewitnesses).
- The Commonwealth did not contest timeliness but argued the Brady claim would fail on prejudice/materiality grounds.
- The Superior Court held the PCRA court erred: Nifas’s petition met the §9545(b)(2) filing deadline relative to the Gillis affidavit and, on the limited record, he acted with due diligence; the credibility of Gillis’s allegation that the prosecutor solicited false testimony (a Brady-type claim) remained unresolved.
- The Superior Court vacated the dismissal and remanded for an evidentiary hearing to assess Gillis’s credibility (and directed appointment of counsel if Nifas cannot afford one).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timeliness under 42 Pa.C.S. §9545(b)(2) (when claim could first be presented) | Nifas filed within 60 days (then amended to 1 year for claims after 12/24/2017) of receiving Gillis’s April 28, 2018 affidavit; petition dated May 7, 2018—so timely. | PCRA court assumed Nifas might have learned of the facts earlier and faulted his failure to specify when he first learned them. | Superior Court: PCRA court erred; record shows Gillis affidavit dated April 28 and petition filed within days—timeliness satisfied on the face of the record. |
| Applicability of government-interference exception (§9545(b)(1)(i)) and due diligence requirement | Nifas: §9545(b)(1)(i) has no due-diligence text; once he learned of prosecutorial interference via affidavit, he promptly filed. | Commonwealth: did not contest timeliness but urged merits; PCRA court required demonstration of due diligence. | Superior Court: §9545(b)(2) imposes a timing/due-diligence inquiry applicable to (b)(1) claims; on the record Nifas acted with due diligence in filing and the PCRA court’s contrary finding lacked support. |
| Credibility of Gillis’s original statement(s) and recantation | Nifas: Gillis’s affidavit reveals prosecutorial instruction to lie and recants his trial testimony; this undermines the Commonwealth witnesses’ credibility. | Commonwealth/PCRA court: Gillis previously gave inconsistent statements; recantations are inherently unreliable and other eyewitnesses still place Nifas at the scene. | Superior Court: Credibility is a live, material factual issue; PCRA court improperly resolved it without an evidentiary hearing. |
| Brady claim (prosecutor solicited false testimony) — suppression, materiality, prejudice | Nifas: Gillis’s affidavit alleges prosecutorial solicitation of false testimony; such misconduct, if credible, is classic Brady/impeachment evidence that could undermine confidence in the verdict. | Commonwealth: Even accepting Gillis’s recantation, the abundance of other eyewitness identifications means no reasonable probability of different result. | Superior Court: The trial outcome would be materially affected if prosecutorial misconduct were proven; because credibility and materiality were unresolved, the petition cannot be denied on the current record. |
| Entitlement to evidentiary hearing | Nifas: Hearing required to test Gillis’s affidavit, permit cross-examination, and develop record on government interference/Brady. | PCRA court: Denied hearing, finding untimely and alternatively concluding recantation would not change outcome. | Superior Court: Vacated denial and remanded for an evidentiary hearing to resolve the factual dispute over Gillis’s allegations; appointment of counsel if needed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (establishes prosecutor’s duty to disclose favorable evidence)
- United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976) (duty to disclose applies even without defense request)
- United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) (impeachment evidence falls within Brady disclosure obligations)
- Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) (materiality standard: suppressed evidence must undermine confidence in the verdict)
- Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264 (Pa. 2007) (PCRA timeliness rules implicate court jurisdiction)
- Commonwealth v. Holmes, 905 A.2d 507 (Pa. Super. 2006) (prior timeliness analysis regarding when petitioner first learned of after-discovered evidence)
- Commonwealth v. Weiss, 986 A.2d 808 (Pa. 2009) (Pennsylvania discussion of Brady materiality and prejudice)
- Commonwealth v. Carson, 913 A.2d 220 (Pa. 2006) (sets out elements of a Brady claim)
- Commonwealth v. Shiloh, 170 A.3d 553 (Pa. Super. 2017) (due diligence standard for PCRA timeliness is fact-sensitive)