Com. v. Booth, R.
Com. v. Booth, R. No. 1773 EDA 2016
| Pa. Super. Ct. | Jul 7, 2017Background
- Complainant (J.M.) alleged her uncle, Robert J. Booth, Jr., sexually abused her repeatedly between 1988–1991 when she was 8–11 years old, primarily on weekday afternoons/evenings in his bedroom.
- The alleged abuse was reported to police for the first time on August 22, 2014; Booth was arrested April 21, 2015 and charged with multiple sexual offenses.
- At a June 4, 2015 preliminary hearing, the victim could not specify dates/times, could not identify living witnesses, and offered no explanation for the ~23-year reporting delay.
- The trial court dismissed all charges on March 25, 2016 (order affirmed through denial of reconsideration May 25, 2016), finding the long delay prejudiced Booth’s ability to mount a defense.
- The Commonwealth appealed, arguing pre-arrest delay was not the Commonwealth’s fault and that alleged ongoing abuse permits less specificity in dates.
- The Superior Court reversed and remanded, holding prejudice was shown but the Commonwealth was not shown to have intentionally caused the delay (a required second prong), so dismissal was improper.
Issues
| Issue | Commonwealth's Argument | Booth's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did pre-arrest delay violate due process? | Delay attributable to victim’s late reporting; Commonwealth filed charges promptly after report so no prosecutorial fault. | Long (~25-year) delay caused loss of witnesses/memories and prevented meaningful defense. | Prejudice shown, but defendant failed to prove delay was caused intentionally by the Commonwealth; due process dismissal not warranted. |
| Must defendant show prosecutorial intent for pre-arrest delay relief? | Yes; relief only when delay is more than negligence and is an intentional device by prosecution. | Argued delay itself (regardless of intent) produced unfair tactical advantage. | Court required proof of intent or culpable conduct; absent such proof, second prong not satisfied. |
| Is pleading precise dates required for ongoing child sexual abuse spanning years? | Ongoing course of conduct permits relaxed date specificity; Niemetz supports less specificity for continuing abuse. | Vague multi-year date range (three-year span within ~25-year delay) prevents alibi or corroboration, causing prejudice. | Relaxed specificity acknowledged for ongoing abuse, but the extreme passage of time here contributed to prejudice—still insufficient without prosecutorial fault. |
| Was Devlin/Niemetz controlling for date-specificity? | Niemetz (ongoing abuse) more applicable; Devlin (single offense over a period) distinguishable. | Trial court relied on Devlin factors to find prejudice from lack of dates. | Court found Niemetz distinguishable given the long unexplained reporting delay; however, ultimate reversal turned on failure to show prosecutorial intent. |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Snyder, 713 A.2d 596 (establishes two-prong pre-arrest delay test: prejudice and causation by prosecution)
- Commonwealth v. Wright, 865 A.2d 894 (both prejudice and cause must be proven for due process violation)
- Commonwealth v. Neff, 860 A.2d 1063 (delay must be intentional device by prosecution to obtain relief)
- Commonwealth v. Devlin, 333 A.2d 888 (factors for date specificity and balancing victim age against accused’s rights)
- Commonwealth v. Niemetz, 422 A.2d 1369 (discusses relaxed date specificity for ongoing child sexual abuse)
- Commonwealth v. Levy, 23 A.2d 97 (reasonable certainty standard for proving date of offense)
- Commonwealth v. Wilson, 825 A.2d 710 (due process requires some particularity of dates to permit defense)
- Commonwealth v. Luktisch, 680 A.2d 877 (date need not be proved definitively; reasonable certainty suffices)