*1 44
713 A.2d Pennsylvania, Appellee, COMMONWEALTH
v. SNYDER, Appellant. E. Keith Pennsylvania. Supreme Court 23, 1998. April on Briefs Submitted May 1998. Decided *2 Moses, Gelso, Barre, John P. Charles P. Wilkes for Keith E. Snyder. Olszewski, Nast, Barre,
Peter Paul Michael G. Wilkes for Com. FLAHERTY, C.J., ZAPPALA, CAPPY,
Before CASTILLE, NIGRO, SAYLOR, NEWMAN and JJ.
OPINION NEWMAN, Justice. from the Order of (Appellant) appeals Snyder E.
Keith of the Judgment of Sentence affirmed the Court that Superior (trial court) County of Luzerne Pleas of Common Court in the first two counts of murder following his conviction degree. charging complaint a criminal filed
The Commonwealth and two years eleven counts of murder with two seven alleged crimes and to the of the date subsequent months Based on the investigation. conclusion of its after the us, only reason appears it record before limited poli- was because arrested the Commonwealth changed Attorney’s Office County District of the Luzerne cies took office. This Court attorney newly elected district when Appeal Allowance of Petition for the Appellant’s granted *3 the delay denied extraordinary pre-arrest whether decide Superior of law. We reverse due Appellant case to the trial court. remand this Order and Court’s
FACTS 1982, six-week-old son died 2, wife and July Appellant’s On Luzerne Wright Township, in their home in a fire inside to work The was scheduled Appellant County, Pennsylvania. Earlier day of the fire. p.m. until 10:00 on p.m. from 1:00 house leave the Appellant saw the day, neighbor a Later, young boys, ages two p.m. 12:20 between 12:15 and they when twelve, neighbor’s yard in a playing were nine and house. fire and ran to the house was on Snyder saw the locked, front was house because the door to enter the Unable at 1:31 department who notified the fire neighbor they told minutes four approximately arrived within fighters Fire p.m. in the master bed- wife and child found the poisoning. Autopsy monoxide room, from carbon both dead blood, Snyder’s and alcohol Mrs. revealed barbiturates tests .046%. The Commonwealth’s content of with a blood alcohol nature, incendiary that the fire opined witness expert and that it was deprived oxygen, which caused it to smolder hour, for approximately filling one the house with smoke. incident, Immediately after this the Wright Township Police Police, Department, Pennsylvania State and the Luzerne County Attorney’s District Office an investigation, commenced 1984, yield any which did not arrests after two years. County Attorney empaneled Luzerne District special investi- gating grand jury probe the deaths of Mrs. Snyder and her grand jury child. The investigation continued until some time when it without returning any ended indictments. Appellant The continued to live and work in Luzerne Coun- ty, investigation and the remained throughout dormant administrations of several District No Attorneys. new or additional evidence known grand jury became after the con- investigation cluded its During newly 1986. elected District Attorney of Luzerne Paul County, Peter Olsz- ewski, Jr., reopened the case. The Commonwealth filed a criminal complaint charging Appellant with two counts of September murder on 1993. pretrial
A charges Motion to Dismiss the was filed in the trial court by due to pre-arrest delay. He passing claimed that the of more than eleven violated his due process rights pursuant to the Constitutions of the United States and Pennsylvania. claimed that evidence rendered him unavailable to passing time was exculpatory substantially prejudiced him in presenting his defense that his wife committed suicide. The Joseph Augello Honorable M. evidentiary hearings held *4 which the Appellant introduced establishing certain witnesses close to the decedent were dead or otherwise unavailable, and that other witnesses could not remember many facts because their memories had Appel- dimmed. The argued lant that these unavailable witnesses would have testi- fied that Mrs. Snyder severely was depressed after the birth of her son and that testimony their would have proven she committed suicide. of Matthew testimony presented
Specifically, M.D., experience perform- with some psychiatrist a Berger, psychiatric that a explained He autopsies.1 ing psychiatric state mental of the decedent’s is an assessment autopsy death, of more than lapse and that before immediately psychiatric a performing him from years prevented eleven at the Snyder’s mental condition Diane to ascertain autopsy of the that because Berger Dr. testified of her death. time and from close friends time, not discover he could passage facts Snyder pertinent Mrs. members who knew family from psychiat- she suffered him whether enable to determine including partum depression. post ric problems that with the defense testified witnesses presented Other defense evidence much time rendered certain of so passing longer or could no had died people unavailable at trial because that these facts. The contends relevant remember severely that Mrs. was Snyder have testified would (cid:127)witnesses Monsignor Specifically, of her son. after the birth depressed parish priest, Nolan, family friend Snyders’ who was the Nolan had Monsignor arrest. died before he before her death because Snyder "withMrs. many contacts which baby’s baptism, for the prepare with her to working According Marga- fire. day for the after the was scheduled autop- psychiatric psychological law review article describes 1. One person’s examining life and the circumstances a "method[s] sies as identify contributing attempt the factors leading in an to her suicide they belong in Psychological Autopsies: Do decision.” to the suicidal 123, Fall, Biffl, Courtroom?, 1996. 24 Am.J.Crim.Law Elizabeth following: article states the Another law review determining autopsies historically on Although psychological focused death, death, death, accidental natural suicide versus the manner of homicide, broadly to include technique can be defined more or whereby profes- health group techniques a mental techniques or a mental state of a deceased attempts to describe or discern the sional W. Ebert prior point in time. Bruce missing person at some or "process designed to assess psychological autopsy as a defined the behavior, feelings, including thoughts, and relation- variety of factors expansive Given this more ships definition, individual who is deceased.” of an investigations/as- only psychological autopsy describes not death, any but also assess- designed to determine mode of sessments person. prior mental state of deceased ments of Psychological Autopsy: Legal Perspectives, St. Louis Clinical 607, 610, LJ. 1993.
49 Snyder to the home to Krupa, Monsignor ret who drove the rites, Monsignor told her that after administer the last house, Snyder the bodies in the he believed that Mrs. seeing Monsignor suicide. Because Nolan died before the committed not charges, Commonwealth filed these could concerning Monsignor’s the basis for the present Snyder that Mrs. committed suicide. opinion father, Appellant’s George Snyder, was also deceased Appellant’s the time of the trial. The brother said that Mrs. Snyder’s George Snyder good- co-workers told that she said bye day to her co-workers the before the fire. Appellant’s Monsignor Appel- brother also testified that Nolan told the Snyder lant’s father that he believed that Mrs. had committed Howrath, father, Emil Snyder’s suicide. Diane also died Kochanski, friend, before the trial. a Amy family testified death, day that the after his Mr. daughter’s Howrath told her that he had wished that daughter “Midnight his did not watch movie, a Offerings,” immediately television before fire.2 obstetrician, Snyder’s Horan, M.D., Mrs. Walter was also unavailable to at trial. Dr. testify explained Horan’s wife he suffered from severe Alzheimer’s disease that resulted his inability understand or answer questions. Sny- Mrs. der’s medical records reflect that she weight lost the from her pregnancy very quickly.3 film, argued
2. The defense this when considered in the context of occurrences, Snyder’s heightened supernatural Mrs. interest awas trial, factor in her decision to At commit suicide. the defense intro- Snyder periodicals dealing duced evidence that Mrs. subscribed to with addition, astrology psychic phenomena. In died she on her birth- day, day which was baptism also the before her son. videotape Midnight The trial court Offerings, viewed a which the allegedly nights decedent watched two before the fire. The trial court witches, movie, stated that the movie involved and at the end of the daughter character in the movie threw and her herself into a fire. scene, another a character in the movie took sedatives and went to bed movie, viewing while someone started fire in her bedroom. After Appellant's request jury the trial court denied the for the to view the movie. son, Snyder weighed pounds. 3. Before the birth of her Mrs. 150 At the later, thirty-seven days weighed time of her death pounds. she All together, thirty-five pounds thirty-seven days. she lost any present not evidence or did offer The Commonwealth At the conclusion of hearing. at the any pre-trial witnesses denied the evidentiary hearing, Judge Augello *6 The charges pre-arrest delay. based on motion to dismiss the trial. Mundy assigned Judge F. was Hugh Honorable issue of argument pre- oral on the Mundy also entertained not Appellant that was delay, agreed and he arrest Opinion, Judge In his charges. to a dismissal of entitled of time did not cause the passing held that’ the Mundy acknowledged he prejudice. Although substantial Appellant died, of others had had and the memories that some witnesses faded, Appellant sought held that the evidence Judge Mundy capable not or was exculpatory, “was either present Opin- Trial Court through other witnesses.” being presented ion, Mundy Appellant 7. concluded because p. Judge proving prejudice, sustain his burden of substantial did not nor to determine requirement was neither reason “there proper.”4 or investigatory delay was intentional whether 9. Opinion, p. Trial Court trial, of arson two jury Appellant convicted
Following jury The returned sentences first-degree counts of murder. murder, degree of first charge for each imprisonment life to two consecutive the trial court sentenced the year prison with a concurrent five imprisonment, terms of life Court affirmed Superior for the arson conviction. term 13, 1995, in a Memo- September of sentence on judgment Opinion. randum for Allowance of Petition granted
This Court
than eleven
pre-arrest delay
whether
of more
Appeal
decide
him
of law.5 Because the trial court
denied
Mundy
period
Mrs.
Although Judge
labeled the
of time between
4.
“investigatory delay,”
Snyder’s
Appellant’s arrest as
there
death and the
required for
the record to conclude that this
is no basis in
investigation.
contrary,
there is no evidence in the
further
To the
investigation
any additional
occurred in this
record to establish that
after 1986.
case
rights pursuant
alleges
speedy trial
also
a violation of his
5.
e.g.,
of the United States Constitution. See
Barker
the Sixth Amendment
514,
2182,
(1972).
Wingo,
51 requirement it held that there was no to consider erred when postponing filing the Commonwealth’s reasons the Order of the charges, Superior we reverse Court and remand this case to the trial court.
DISCUSSION
In Pennsylvania,
there is no statute of limitations
§
42
to murder
Pa.C.S.
5551. Our
applies
prosecutions.
courts have affirmed convictions in
cases
appellate
numerous
in which defendants were arrested and convicted of homicide
charges many years after the commission of a crime due to
lengthy investigations
recently discovered evidence.
and/or
Clayton,
See Commonwealth v.
516 Pa.
A.2d 749
than
years);
three
Colson,
denied,
cert.
(1985),
507 Pa.
52 stale having defendants from defend process protects also if improper criminal should be dismissed charges, charges and to a right to the defendant’s prejudice causes pre-arrest Daniels, 340, Pa. 390 A.2d v. 480 fair trial. Commonwealth (1978). to the 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment 172 Section Constitution, that “no pertinent part, declares United States life, or any person liberty, property, ... deprive state shall XIV, § 1. of law.” U.S. Const. Amend. process without due I, Pennsylvania 9 of the is Article Section Constitution to as due clause of our state commonly process referred constitution, as follows: provides life, or deprived liberty, an accused be of his can
[N]or or law of by judgment peers of his property unless the land. is has held that “law of the land” phrase
This Court in the United States equivalent process language to the due Davis, v. 526 Pa. 586 A.2d Constitution. Commonwealth (1991). 914 Marion, v. 92 S.Ct. 30 United States U.S. (1971), Supreme the United States Court ad
L.Ed.2d pre-arrest delay the issue of when constitutes dressed to the United States deprivation process pursuant The defendants Marion moved dismiss Constitution. them, against claiming government returned indictments unreasonably oppressive “an following the indictments offenses,” alleged and that unjustifiable time after rights wait them of to due of law three-year deprived trial as secured the Fifth and Sixth Amend speedy *8 No the defendants specific prejudice alleged ments. Marion, the indictments re they argued defending but memory many specific of acts and conversations quired before, filing and the cause of the late occurring several negligence was the or indifference charges prosecutor’s grand jury. the case and it to the investigating presenting hearing, After a the United States District Court pre-trial indictments, motion and dismissed the granted defendants’ seriously that the defense was “bound to have been holding 310, 92 404 U.S. at S.Ct. three-year delay. by the prejudiced” took a direct at 472. The Government 30 L.Ed.2d Court, which reversed Supreme to the United States appeal may Process Clause held that the Due District Court and can if the defense an indictment dismissing a basis for provide prejudiced has that prosecutorial show at trial However, held that fair trial. the Court right to a defendant’s nor actual alleged proved in Manon neither the defendants pre- of time and their resulting passage from the prejudice and speculative prema- claims were therefore trial due of the case. pre-trial posture in the ture explained further its Supreme Court The United States Lovasco, 783, 97 v. 431 U.S. United States Manon decision (1977), govern- case the which 52 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. eigh- than the defendant more against filed indictments ment from firearms stolen allegedly possessed months after he teen a license. sold them without States mail and the United the defendant investigation, first month of the Within the possessed and sold agents he had government admitted strong guns, agents developed stolen had some of the Investigators weapons. him to other linking evidence in the next seventeen uncovered little additional months. charges pre- due to moved to dismiss the
The defendant
Court held that the defen-
delay and the District
indictment
died,
witness
because material
prejudice
dant suffered
af-
Appeals
The Court
the indictment was dismissed.
(8th
Lovasco,
firmed,
54
Based on counsel’s representations, the United States Supreme Court that investigatory delay concluded postponed indictment, the filing of the and the Court that prosecut held ing a defendant such an following investigation proper. The Court further reasoned that the Due of Process Clause the United States Constitution did not require a dismissal of the indictment because of an if investigation, lapse even the defense, might time have somewhat prejudiced stating following:
Thus,
proof
Manon makes clear that
is
prejudice
gener-
ally necessary
but not sufficient element of a
process
claim,
process
and that the due
inquiry must consider the
delay
reasons for the
as well as the prejudice to the accused.
2044,
Lovasco at
at
S.Ct.
Lovasco which the police arrested the defendant six and nine months after the homicide occurred. The victim Daniels was twenty-one years age and lived at a private boarding school for mentally retarded students. The attendant, defendant worked the school as a night numerous former residents testified that engaged Daniels an ongoing of violent pattern physical abuse the victim against until he became ill seriously and died on May 1967. The abuse prolonged exposure included to cold weather while naked, immersing water, his head under and violent beatings resulting broken bones.
No one claimed the body, victim’s which was sent to Temple University Medical School and was eventually cremated with- out an autopsy being performed. The Commonwealth’s ex- pert testified that the cause of the victim’s death was bronchial factors includ- multiple of the was the result which pneumonia, victim, a that weakened the abuse dehydration, physical ing susceptible him more that made infection prior ongoing *10 abuse, accelerating the and climatologic of and physical effects that the defen- He further testified pneumonia. of process process the disease victim accelerated abuse of the dant’s caused his death. 1967, 19, on and the Daniels May died victim 28, 1974, more than six January on was arrested
defendant an applica- The defendant filed months later. eight delay, pre-arrest of indictment because tion to dismiss the by Daniels was convicted court denied. which the trial appeal, On this Court manslaughter. involuntary jury conviction, was no noting that there Daniels’ affirmed became defense witnesses in Daniels exhibiting that material arrest. the defendant’s unavailable before have might or alibi defenses insanity claimed that Daniels sooner. This him if arrest had occurred available to his been testimony because the rejected those assertions Court abuser was substantial and him as the victim’s identified that the defendant’s own also stated unequivocal. Our Court employed on the regularly that he was testimony established at work on present and that he was shift at the school night death, that Daniels’ concluding night before the victim’s specula- no more than or alibi defenses were alleged insanity tion.
Furthermore,
victim’s
regarding the
death
investigation
in Daniels police inquiry
and involved
long
complex,
at
school beginning
deaths
suspicious
into numerous other
100 for
interviewed more than
police
in October 1972. The
residents,
investigation,
of the
were
who
the time
mer
were the resi
Adding to the difficulties
widely dispersed.
infirmities,
unavailability
the deceased’s
dents’ mental
of the
management
and the former
body,
autopsy,
lack of an
This Court also noted
hindering
investigations.
school
pre-arrest delay
conclude that the
that there was no basis to
tactical
in Daniels “was an intentional device
gain
advan
Marion,
accused,”
citing
404 U.S.
tage over the
at 465,
also, Lovasco,
5.Ct.
Instead, we have
phrase
held
“law of the
land” in the due
process
Pennsylvania
clause
Constitu
meaning
tion has the same
as the
in the
language
*11
also,
United States Constitution. Davis. See
Commonwealth
Lindenmuth,
(1989) (“as
v.
381 Pa.Super.
6.
Commonwealth v.
526 Pa.
At and Snyder depressed that Mrs. was defense Appellant’s setting fire to by taking committed suicide barbiturates house, establish Mrs. herself and her son. To killing mind, introduced the Commonwealth exten- Snyder’s state including testimony lay twelve witnesses sive evidence shortly they contacts with her before who testified that had of her child. happy after the birth appeared death she Mrs. Snyder’s raised the issue of After Commonwealth case-in-chief, attempted of mind its defense state showing contrary with evidence she rebut her death. The testified on his depressed before three wit- testimony own behalf and introduced the other Snyder Mrs. before nesses who had contact with she died.8 Wecht, M.D., also as a pathologist Cyril Forensic testified Commonwealth, According waived. to the state consti- Appeal Allowance of tutional claim "was not raised in Petition for preserved any stage Appellee, p. Brief of not raised or below.” *12 reject 12. We this assertion. contrary, Appellant that the raised this issue To the the record reveals Court, motion, Superior pre-trial in his brief to the in his omnibus Appeal Accordingly, to in his Petition for Allowance of this Court. Furthermore, are Appellant’s constitutional claims not waived. state thorough Appellant’s we note brief contains discussion that Edmunds, 374, 586 Pa. A.2d 887 pursuant Commonwealth v. (1991), analysis specific constitutional be used which sets forth Pennsylvania argue Consti- when defendants in criminal cases that the provides protections States Constitution. greater than United tution Barnes, Mary Chapman McCullough, testified that 8. Pamela Lois appeared depressed after the birth her child. the decedent be witness, defense opined that his review of all of the available evidence him led to conclude that Mrs. Snyder committed suicide. The Appellant’s toxicologist that testified the barbiturates in Snyder’s Mrs. system could not have been given to her secretly food or a drink because they had a bad taste.
In addition to the witnesses who became unavailable be- time, cause of passing the record is replete with instances where prosecution and defense witnesses who their changed testimony or could not specific remember de- tails they when testified at trial. For example, Hu- George dock, M.D., a forensic pathologist who performed an autopsy on Mrs. Snyder, testified at the preliminary hearing he had not prepared any slides this case. He later testified slides, that he prepare did but that he forgotten had that fact due to the lapse of time.
At the completion trial, of the was jury faced with two diametrically opposed theories. The Commonwealth argued that Mrs. Snyder was happy after the birth of her son and Appellant killed her. The argued defense that Mrs. Snyder was depressed and that she killed herself. Just as the Commonwealth’s against case entirely cir- cumstantial, defense that she had committed suicide was dependent upon using evidence to circumstantial establish Snyder’s Mrs. depressed mental state immediately before her death.
Because of the developments in trial, the case at Commonwealth introducing considerable evidence concerning mind, Mrs. Snyder’s state of and the unavailability key witnesses close to Mrs. Snyder, we conclude that the Com monwealth’s failure to file these charges sooner resulted prejudice actual to the presenting his defense at trial.
Looking to the prong second of the Marion /Lovasco test, we must next decide whether the Commonwealth’s rea sons for postponing the Appellant’s arrest were Al proper. though it is clear from the record that this investigation was *13 1993, no new surfaced 1986 until and evidence dormant from time, is of evidence totally record devoid during that the arrest. deferring establishing reason not sustain trial held that because the did court not re- it was proving prejudice, of substantial his burden delay proper pre-arrest to determine whether quired disagree. or We improper. as “sub- “actual as well phrase prejudice” used the
Marion
of proving
to
burden
describe
defendant’s
prejudice”
stantial
to
The Court
process
pre-arrest delay.
violation due
a due
following:
first
nevertheless
stated
require
...
dismissal of
Due Process Clause
would
[T]he
trial
the pre-
if
were shown at
that
the indictment
it
delay
prejudice
in this case caused substantial
indictment
delay
fair
and that the
was an
rights to a
trial
[defendants’]
over the ac-
gain
advantage
device to
tactical
intentional
cused.
(citations
324, 92
at
Marion at S.Ct. added). The also stat- Court omitted)(emphasis and footnote following: ed the that the appellees adequately pre-
Nor have
demonstrated
Due
Pro-
indictment
the Government violated
to the
prejudice
No
conduct
cess Clause.
actual
showing
is
alleged
and there
no
proved,
defense is
or
some tactical
intentionally delayed
gain
the Government
rely
or to
them. Appellees
over
harass
advantage
appellees
in any
inherent
solely
prejudice
on the real
possibility
dim, witnesses become
delay: that memories will
extended
inaccessible,
light
applicable
In
be lost.
however,
are
limitations,
possibilities
these
not
statute of
cannot
enough
appellees
to demonstrate
themselves
justify
trial
the dismissal of
receive a fair
therefore
may
actual
of the trial
demonstrate
indictment. Events
appellees’
time
prejudice,
present
but
speculative
premature.
claims are
Marion at
“[Marion]
that proof of actual prejudice
makes a
process
due
claim concrete
ripe
for adjudica-
tion, not that
it makes
claim automatically
...
valid
the.
Marion makes clear that proof of prejudice is generally a
necessary but not sufficient element of a
process
due
”
claim....
Lovasco at
The Commonwealth relies on Colson to support its position that it required was not to prosecute the Appellant sooner. In Colson, this rejected Court a claim that a defendant was process denied due by law the passing more than three years before his arrest. The argued defendant that certain potential defense witnesses were dead or located, could not be those who could be found no longer had independent recollec- events, tions of and that the defendant himself no longer had a clear memory of events at the time of However, the murder. the defendant and his co-defendants had fled the Common- by wealth the time the State probable Police had cause to Later, arrest them. the State Police learned that the defen- dant inwas Wisconsin and times, Florida at different they followed in leads both states and ultimately discovered and arrested the in defendant Tampa, Florida. facts,
Based on these this Court held that there was no evidence to support the defendant’s claim that he suffered prejudice because the defendant had notice that he was a suspect, Commonwealth, he fled from the and he made incrim- inating statements to other witnesses that he committed the murder. We concluded that there was no viola- tion because the pre-arrest delay reasonable view of ascertaining police the difficulty experienced initial the Commonwealth, and facts, flight from the the the defendant’s Thus, the suspects. all efforts to find diligent readily in Colson makes that case diligence Commonwealth’s case, no in which there is present from the distinguishable this inves- diligently pursued Commonwealth tigation. Sneed, A.2d 749 v. 514 Pa. Commonwealth
(1987), more than three the Commonwealth waited defendant, prejudice and the claimed defendant arrest However, in his arrest. two witnesses died before because Sneed, to arrest police gather did not sufficient evidence defendant, was, they know where he because nor did where was on unrelated Georgia, fled he arrested defendant information Georgia provided His cellmates then charges. authorities about defendant’s involvement prison *15 murder, the Georgia police and when contacted Pennsylvania they Philadelphia police, investigation. reactivated their attor- police new information enabled the district The persuade testify office to locate and witnesses to ney’s that the admit- Sneed’s trial. One witness testified defendant Therefore, shot killed the victim. the defen- ted that he Sneed, the of than law passage dant caused time rather if This held that Sneed enforcement authorities. Court even not, showing prejudice, this of which he did had met threshold not to relief the Com- he would have been entitled because arrest deferring for the the defendant’s monwealth’s reasons is from because proper. distinguishable were This case Sneed him to do not bring Commonwealth’s efforts to trial in the appear record. an of law conclude that the trial court committed error
We not sustain of Appellant when it held that the did his burden us, on hold Based the record before we proving prejudice. and our due Appellant prejudice, that the did establish actual process inquiry analyze therefore whether there were must waiting for arrest proper Appellant. reasons any reasons concerning proper is silent existence record delaying filing charges. of criminal for
The Appellant does not that argue prior District Attor- neys of County Luzerne intentionally postponed this prosecu- tion gain a tactical advantage over the Appellant. It appears that prosecutors, in the exercise of their discre- tion, record, decided for reasons that appear do not in the that this case lacked prosecutorial merit. Nor is there basis to any conclude that District Attorney Olszewski intentionally contin- prosecution ued defer this for inappropriate reasons. How- ever, asserts this reviving dormant investi- gation and filing charges homicide him against was improper, death, eleven after Mrs. Snyder’s solely based on changed policies the District Attorney’s Office. not,
Whether done intentionally or the Commonwealth gained a tremendous strategical advantage against the Appel- lant due to the passage of time and the loss of critical defense testimony through death and loss. memory This Court ex- pressly disapproves of subjecting delayed defendants to prose- cutions in cases which changing prosecutorial policies are the only reason to revive dormant investigations after the passage time causes actual prejudice to the defense. We that, hold based on all of case, the facts of this bringing this prosecution after more than eleven years actual preju- caused dice to deprived him of process due of law unless there proper were delay. reasons emphasize
We violations will occur in only cases, extreme in which no valid reasons justify a defendant’s arrest an after inordinate amount of time without investiga- tion. This Court recognizes that *16 prosecutions murder often come to fruition after many years of investigation. We do not intend to limit the power of the Commonwealth to prosecute a murderer if and when an investigation yields new evidence many after inactivity. However, if no additional evidence appears, the in results actual prejudice to the defendant, proper and there are no reasons for postponing arrest, defendant’s the due process clauses of the Constitu- tions of the United Pennsylvania States and require charges be dismissed.
63 apply that courts should with Commonwealth agree We “substantial to the pays a of review that deference” standard government deciding powers of the executive branch Daniels, stated the criminal we charges. when to file following: police be right no to arrested.
“There is
constitutional
moment
peril
precise
to
at their
required
guess
not
are
suspect,
cause to arrest a
they have probable
at which
they
if
act too
a violation of the Fourth Amendment
risking
soon,
they
if
wait
a violation of the Sixth Amendment
duty
no
to
Law
officers are under
long.
too
enforcement
have
they
a
the moment
investigation
a halt to criminal
call
cause,
quan
a
probable
minimum evidence to establish
far
amount
fall
short of the
may
tum of evidence which
v. Unit
support
to
a criminal conviction.”
necessary
Hoffa
States,
310,
408, 417,
293,
87
17 L.Ed.2d
ed
385 U.S.
S.Ct.
Marion,
(1966),
325 n.
374,
supra,
404 U.S. at
quoted
386
18,
18,
n.
18,
at 465
And, further there is no explained, as the Court in Lovasco when prosecution” to even sufficient evidence “right such beyond doubt. guilt has been adduced a reasonable prove resolving prosecutors into right pressure Such “would early cases in unwarrant- possibly doubtful favor —and prosecutions,” “preclude and would Government ed— of not desirability full giving from consideration 97 particular cases.” at S.Ct. prosecuting U.S. adopt contrary 52 L.Ed.2d decline to at at 761. We rule, assuming even that there was sufficient evidence by appellant. the times prosecution warrant at asserted However, that the at 180. we hold Daniels A.2d after than eleven prosecute decision to more investi- years, ongoing no and with no with additional evidence it cannot last is so gation years, egregious seven of review. withstand even the most deferential standard
CONCLUSION Because the trial court erred when it it held was not required to judge pre-arrest whether the was delay proper, the record is incomplete concerning the cause of the extensive pre-arrest delay. Accordingly, we must remand this case to the trial court for the limited purpose of if discovering there were valid reasons to justify filing charges these after this period remand, extensive of time. On the trial court shall determine delay whether the Commonwealth’s proper or improper. Because the lapse excessive of time caused actual prejudice to Appellant, the absence of valid reasons to justify the filing charges late will mandate the trial court to vacate the judgment of sentence discharge the Appellant.
Accordingly, we reverse the Order of the Superior Court and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
ZAPPALA, J., files a concurring and dissenting opinion in CAPPY, which JJ., FLAHERTY and join.
ZAPPALA, Justice, concurring and dissenting.
I join majority opinion, except the determination that a necessary remand is for the purpose of discovering whether there were valid reasons to justify the unusual delay of eleven years after the deaths of Appellant’s wife and child in filing charges against Appellant. The trial court con- ducted a pre-trial hearing to address Appellant’s motion to dismiss the charges pre-arrest due to delay. The Common- wealth had sufficient opportunity to introduce evidence of its reasons for the at that hearing. legitimate There is no reason to allow the Commonwealth a second opportunity to explain or justify delay.
The trial court did not foreclose the Commonwealth from introducing any pre-trial hearing to refute Appellant’s claim pre-arrest delay violated his due process rights under the state and federal constitutions. Commonwealth took the position the evidence offered Appellant at pre-trial hearing failed to establish substan- concluded, have delay. We because of the tial prejudice charges to file the however, failure that the Commonwealth’s *18 Appellant presenting to prejudice in actual resulted sooner supple- bis to failure trial. The Commonwealth’s at defense evidence that hearing with pre-trial at the position its ment hearing it to another does not entitle delay justifiable was chose not simply The Commonwealth that omission. rectify to it although had explain delay, to to introduce evidence to do so. opportunity to on this record any of
Because of the absence of sentence judgment I would vacate justify delay, a would create dan- To hold otherwise discharge Appellant. evidence at a allowing party present a to precedent gerous original at the hearing that was available evidentiary second case, In felt not this the Commonwealth hearing but offered. arguing prejudice the absence that it would be successful assumption pre-trial on that Appellant proceeded to incomplete, majority sug- is not as the hearing. The record delay that the elected not to submit evidence gests. Having to inadequate but justifiable, complete the record is was position. support the Commonwealth’s hearing that pre-trial introduced evidence at the prose- prepared that the Commonwealth was established delayed was by August prosecution cute him but that Appel- satisfied a of over seven This evidence period years1. support lant’s and is sufficient to determina- proof burden offered delay improper. tion that the was The Commonwealth The trial court found it was unneces- no evidence rebuttal. upon based delay proper whether the was sary determine not his burden of conclusion that had met its have determined prejudice. substantial Since we establishing was prejudice the trial court erred and that substantial no evidence exists by Appellant, and demonstrated Snyder Diane and her August four after the deaths of 1. child, investigating grand jury impaneled was in Luzerne special County investigate deaths. proper, Appellant record to find that the should be discharged. CAPPY, JJ., join
FLAHERTY and this Concurring and Dissenting Opinion.
v. TOWNSHIP, Township CONCORD Concord Supervisors Board of and United Artist *19 Realty Company, Appellees.
Supreme Pennsylvania. Court
Argued Oct. 1997. May Decided 1998.