Colvin v. Giguere, 330 P.3d 83

Kelly Colvin (foreman) and coworker Joseph Giguere were employees of Advanced Millwork; they traveled to VA/MD for extended cabinet-installation projects in an Advanced van.
After the second employee quit, Giguere was sent to assist; Advanced intended Giguere to return to Utah in the company van with Colvin.
Thompson (owner) asked Colvin to return to Utah immediately to fix a project in Spanish Fork; Colvin and Giguere agreed to drive straight through without rest, sharing driving duties.
During the pre-dawn drive through Kansas, Giguere swerved to avoid an object, the van rolled, and Colvin was killed.
Advanced (through its insurer/WCF) treated Colvin’s death as a work-related injury; WCF tendered benefits to Mrs. Colvin, who initially refused but later accepted benefits.
Plaintiffs sued Giguere for negligence; district court granted summary judgment for Giguere, holding the special-errand (and continuous-coverage) exceptions to the going-and-coming rule applied and the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA) exclusive-remedy barred the suit.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the accident was "in the course of employment" such that WCA exclusive remedy bars tort suit	Colvin was on the return (unpaid) trip; contractual term denying pay for return travel shows trip was not within employment scope	Trip was a special errand: employer benefitted (return of van/tools, need to finish Spanish Fork job), employer controlled/expected the trip; sharing driving advanced employer’s interests	Held: yes — special-errand exception applies; accident occurred in course of employment and WCA exclusive remedy bars the suit
Whether Giguere’s employment contract denying pay for return travel is dispositive	Contract language makes return travel non-compensable and therefore outside course of employment	Contract is relevant but not dispositive; actual dealings, employer benefit and control govern compensability	Held: Contract not dispositive; facts show employer benefit/control so trip was within scope
Whether continuous-coverage/instrumentality doctrines are required to decide coverage	Plaintiffs argued going-and-coming rule applies; district court invoked continuous coverage but plaintiffs contested exceptions	Defendant relied primarily on special errand; court considered continuous coverage but resolved case on special errand	Held: Court affirmed on special-errand ground and did not need to resolve continuous-coverage issue further

Jex v. Utah Labor Comm’n, 306 P.3d 799 (Utah 2013) (tests and factors for determining scope of employment and exceptions to going-and-coming rule)
Lundberg v. Cream O’Weber/Federated Dairy Farms, Inc., 465 P.2d 175 (Utah 1970) (establishing going-and-coming rule)
State Tax Comm’n v. Industrial Comm’n of Utah, 685 P.2d 1051 (Utah 1984) (defining the special-errand exception)
Drake v. Industrial Comm’n of Utah, 939 P.2d 177 (Utah 1997) (articulating three-factor Drake test for special errand)
Buczynski v. Industrial Comm’n of Utah, 934 P.2d 1169 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (continuous coverage exception discussion)
Utah Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Manning, 985 P.2d 243 (Utah 1999) (contracts not dispositive; actual dealings control workers’ compensation status)
Stamper v. Johnson, 232 P.3d 514 (Utah 2010) (receipt of workers’ compensation benefits establishes injury occurred in course of employment)