Colon v. Tracey, 717 F.3d 43

Colón appeals a grant of summary judgment in a Title VII retaliation action against Infotech Aerospace Services, Inc. (IAS).
Colón was an HR Generalist at IAS from 2007 to her resignation on March 8, 2010; Luis Mercado was HR Manager, with Tracey and Aviléz in supervisory roles.
Alleged retaliatory actions include a January 2009 demotion-like reassignment to Business Partner duties and a June 2009 three-day paid suspension related to confidential salary disclosures.
Colón had previously prepared IAS's 2008 Affirmative Action Plan, which was found deficient by an outside consultant in 2009.
IAS justified actions as legitimate business decisions to create a more flexible HR function; Colón resigned after the suspension and investigation.
The district court granted summary judgment, concluding Colón could not establish a prima facie retaliation claim or that IAS's reasons were pretextual; the First Circuit affirms.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Did Colón's January 2009 reassignment constitute an adverse action?	Colón contends the cross-training/reassignment was a demotion.	IAS argues the change was not materially adverse and was a legitimate business reorganization.	No material adverse action; affirmed summary judgment on this ground.
Was the January 2009 reassignment pretext for retaliation?	Colón argues the timing shows retaliatory animus.	Defendants offered a legitimate independent rationale (flexible HR staff) not pretextual.	Temporal proximity alone insufficient; rationales independent and legitimate; no pretext found.
Did Colón's June 2009 suspension constitute an adverse action?	Colón claims the suspension was retaliatory.	Suspension was based on policy violations (confidentiality and handling of salary data) and thus not retaliation.	The suspension was not retaliatory; upheld summary judgment on this issue.
Did the sources of justification for the suspension show pretext?	Colón alleges the reasons are pretextual.	Evidence of policy violations and failure to obtain prior authorization supports liability-free action.	No evidence of pretext; reasons adequately supported.

Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (U.S. 2006) (employer actions must dissuade a reasonable worker from filing a discrimination claim)
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (U.S. 1973) (framework for pretext and retaliation burden-shifting)
Noviello v. City of Boston, 398 F.3d 76 (1st Cir. 2005) (causation and prima facie elements in retaliation claims)
Morales-Vallellanes v. Potter, 605 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2010) (standard for evaluating adverse actions in Title VII retaliation)
Ahern v. Shinseki, 629 F.3d 49 (1st Cir. 2010) (materially adverse actions and employment decisions)
Valentín-Almeyda v. Municipality of Aguadilla, 447 F.3d 85 (1st Cir. 2006) (McDonnell Douglas framework guidance in First Circuit)
McMillan v. Massachusetts Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 140 F.3d 288 (1st Cir. 1998) (pretext and retaliation analysis within McDonnell Douglas)
Cortés-Irizarry v. Corporación Assurances, 111 F.3d 184 (1st Cir. 1997) (summary judgment standard in First Circuit retaliation reviews)