City of San Antonio v. Armando D. Riojas, 640 S.W.3d 534

Officer Vincent Tristan, a 29‑year SAPD veteran, was in the right exit lane on I‑37 when he observed a sudden traffic slowdown and activated his emergency overhead lights to warn following motorists.
Armando Riojas was riding a motorcycle three lanes to Tristan’s left; he swerved to avoid braking traffic and crashed; the collision occurred out of the dash‑cam view and other drivers’ actions also contributed.
Witnesses at the scene blamed Tristan’s lights for “scaring” drivers; Tristan reported the white sedan had stopped in the freeway and called for it to be stopped.
Riojas sued the City under the Texas Tort Claims Act, alleging Tristan’s negligence in activating his emergency lights caused his injuries.
The City moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, arguing sovereign immunity remained because Tristan was entitled to official immunity (good‑faith discretionary conduct); the trial court denied the plea and the court of appeals affirmed, applying a Chambers/Wadewitz need–risk balancing test.
The Texas Supreme Court reversed: it held the need–risk balancing test is limited to pursuits and emergency responses and applied the Telthorster standard (a reasonably prudent officer could have believed the conduct justified) — Tristan’s affidavit met that test and Riojas offered no contradictory evidence, so the claims were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Standard for proving officer good faith / official immunity	Riojas: officer must perform a need–risk balancing (Chambers/Wadewitz) before activating lights	City: need–risk limited to high‑speed chases/emergencies; Telthorster standard (could a reasonably prudent officer have believed conduct justified) applies	Held: Need–risk balancing is limited to pursuits/emergency responses; Telthorster test governs here
Whether Tristan’s affidavit conclusively proves good faith	Riojas: affidavit insufficient; witnesses blamed officer; no showing Tristan reasonably believed lights were justified	City: Tristan’s experience and affidavit showing he observed sudden slowdown and acted per training is sufficient	Held: Tristan’s affidavit suffices; Riojas produced no contrary evidence; good faith established as a matter of law
Whether the City negated proximate cause under the Tort Claims Act	Riojas: injuries arose from officer’s activation of lights	City: injuries caused by other drivers and too attenuated	Held: Supreme Court did not resolve proximate‑cause issue here and addressed only official immunity

City of Lancaster v. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. 1994) (articulated need–risk balancing for police pursuits/emergency driving)
Wadewitz v. Montgomery, 951 S.W.2d 464 (Tex. 1997) (applied Chambers need–risk factors in emergency‑response context)
Telthorster v. Tennell, 92 S.W.3d 457 (Tex. 2002) (held need–risk assessment not required for arrests; announced the "reasonably prudent officer could have believed" good‑faith standard)
Texas Dep't of Public Safety v. Bonilla, 481 S.W.3d 640 (Tex. 2015) (reaffirmed officer protection and that detailed recitation of factors is not always required)
DeWitt v. Harris County, 904 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. 1995) (explained official immunity preserves governmental unit’s sovereign immunity)
University of Houston v. Clark, 38 S.W.3d 578 (Tex. 2000) (applied need–risk framework to pursuits and clarified the standard’s flexibility)