City of Plymouth v. Longeway
818 N.W.2d 419
Mich. Ct. App.2012Background
- Doorman alerted Officer Chumney that several females in a Pontiac G6 appeared drunk after leaving a Martini bar.
- The car was legally parked, engine running, with backup lights on and transmission seemingly in park.
- Defendant was charged with OWI under MCL 257.625(1) and moved to dismiss arguing she did not operate the vehicle as defined in MCL 257.35a.
- The district court denied the motion; the circuit court reversed, relying on People v Wood to hold the car was not moving and thus not operated.
- The court of appeals granted review; the Michigan Supreme Court ultimately held defendant operated the vehicle under MCL 257.35a due to actual physical control, and remanded for reinstatement of the charge.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether stationary control constitutes operating under MCL 257.35a. | Wood limits operation to movement or high-risk positions. | Stationary car was not in motion or posing risk; not operating. | Yes; actual physical control can satisfy operating even if stationary. |
| Scope of Wood after subsequent cases (Yamat, Lechleitner) on ‘operate’ definitions. | Wood should govern unless distinguishable by context. | Wood misapplied; other cases limit its reach. | Wood confined to unconscious/sleeping contexts; here, braking and shifting show actual physical control. |
| Whether shifting from park to reverse and back constitutes actual physical control. | Shifting gears while engine runs demonstrates control. | Control alone does not show operation if no movement or risk. | Yes; constitutes actual physical control under MCL 257.35a. |
Key Cases Cited
- People v Wood, 450 Mich 399 (1995) (definitional framework for ‘operate’ in OUIL contexts; whether moving or high-risk position ends operation depends on danger)
- People v Pomeroy (On Rehearing), 419 Mich 441 (1984) (defined ‘operator’ as in actual physical control; moving or risk context matters)
- People v Fulcher (On Rehearing), 419 Mich 441 (1984) (discussed in Pomeroy/Fulcher context of operating a motor vehicle)
- People v Lechleitner, 291 Mich App 56 (2010) (applied Wood to a conscious but stationary scenario; limited scope of Wood)
- People v Yamat, 475 Mich 49 (2006) (defined ‘operate’ with dictionary sense for felonious driving; supports broad meaning)