City of Magnolia 4A Economic Development Corp. v. Smedley, 533 S.W.3d 297

Landowner David Smedley sued municipal development corporations (MDCs) after construction allegedly caused surface-water flooding; he sought injunctive relief and damages under negligence, the Texas Takings Clause, and Tex. Water Code § 11.086.
MDCs filed a May 2015 motion to dismiss / plea to the jurisdiction (Rule 91a), arguing Smedley’s pleadings failed to establish waiver of immunity, takings elements, and redressability for injunctive relief because MDCs did not own/control the relevant property.
Trial court granted dismissal of negligence and money-damages claims on June 15, 2015, but left injunctive claims under the Water Code and Takings Clause; MDCs did not immediately appeal that partial ruling.
MDCs filed a hybrid no-evidence and traditional summary-judgment motion on June 24, 2015 asserting, with new evidence (e.g., a city official declaration), that the MDCs do not own/control the property and thus injunctive relief is not redressable; the trial court denied the motion on July 27, 2015.
MDCs filed an interlocutory appeal on August 3, 2015; the court of appeals dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, reasoning the summary-judgment motion raised essentially the same immunity arguments as the earlier plea and did not reset the 20-day appeal clock.
The Texas Supreme Court reviewed whether the 20-day interlocutory appeal period runs from the earlier plea or from the later summary-judgment motion when both challenge jurisdictional issues.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the 20-day interlocutory appeal period runs from the first plea to the jurisdiction or from a later plea/motion that raises similar grounds	MDCs (as appellants) argued the later hybrid summary-judgment motion was a distinct, evidence-based jurisdictional challenge, so the 20-day period ran from its denial	Smedley argued the summary-judgment motion merely rehashed the same immunity-based arguments from the earlier plea and was a motion to reconsider, so the clock did not restart	The Supreme Court held the 20-day period runs separately from each distinct jurisdictional motion; the hybrid summary-judgment motion was materially different (evidence-based) and reset the clock, so the MDCs’ appeal was timely

City of Houston v. Estate of Jones, 388 S.W.3d 663 (Tex. 2012) (discusses when an amended plea is a mere motion to reconsider for interlocutory-appeal timing)
Bally Total Fitness Corp. v. Jackson, 53 S.W.3d 352 (Tex. 2001) (warning against permitting successive interlocutory appeals that undermine the 20-day rule)
Thomas v. Long, 207 S.W.3d 334 (Tex. 2006) (interlocutory appeal jurisdiction for denials of pleas or motions challenging subject-matter jurisdiction)
Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. 2004) (distinguishes pleadings challenges from evidence-based jurisdictional challenges)
Houston Belt & Terminal Ry. Co. v. City of Houston, 487 S.W.3d 154 (Tex. 2016) (governmental immunity implicates subject-matter jurisdiction)