In this case, we must determine whether the twenty-day; period to bring an interlocutory appeal ran from the petitioners’ initial plea to the jurisdiction 'or from their later motion for summary judgment, both of which challenged the respondent’s claims on similar jurisdictional grounds. We hold that the twenty-day period ran separately from each motiоn, and that the petitioners timely filed their interlocutory appeal. Accordingly, we reverse in part the court of appeals’ judgment, which dismissed petitioners’ appeal for lack of jurisdiction, and remand the case to the court of appeals for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The dispute arosе'from the alleged im-poundment of surface water on respondent David Smedley’s property, which he claims was caused by construction of the “Magnolia Stroll,” a municipal hiking and walking path. The petitioners, municipal development corporations (MDCs), oversaw construction of the path.
Smedley filed suit against several parties under multiple theories of liability, but this appeal concerns only the claims against the MDCs.
In May 2015, the MDCs filed a motion to dismiss and plea to the jurisdiction, seeking dismissal under Rule 91a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 91a (relating to dismissal оf baseless causes of action). The MDCs argued that Smedley’s claims lacked a jurisdictional basis. Specifically, they claimed: (1) Smedley had not pled facts constituting claims for which the Texas Tort Claims Act or the Texas Water Code waives governmental immunity; (2) Smedley did not allege sufficient - facts as to the takings claim; and (3) the MDCs were immune from liability for any money damages under the Texas Local Government Code. Most importantly, the MDCs argued that Smedley had not alleged that the MDCs owned or controlled the property in question, which would be necessary for the MDCs to comply with any injunctive relief awarded to Smedley. Thus, the MDCs asserted, any claim' for injunctive relief lacked redressability. On June 15, 2015,
On June 24, 2015, the MDCs filed a hybrid no-evidence and traditional motion for summary judgment on the remaining claims for injunctive relief, arguing that Smedley’s claims lacked a jurisdictional basis and evidentiary merit. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a (relating to motions for summary judgment). In the motion, the MDCs argued that Smedley could .not establish standing as a matter of law because there was affirmative evidence that the MDCs do not own or control the Magnolia Stroll or Chicken Express, and thus could not perform the injunctive relief sought. Additionally, the MDCs argued that there was a lack of evidence as to Smedley’s claims against them under both the Water Code and Takings Clause. The MDCs included some of the same evidence they had provided in their prior plea to the jurisdiction, along with new evidence, including the declaration of City Administrator Paul Mendes to establish that the MDCs do not own or control the Magnolia Stroll. On July 27, 2015, the trial court denied the motion for summary judgment without explaining the basis for its decision.
On August 3, 2015, the MDCs filed a notice of appeal of the- trial court’s denial of their motion for summary judgment. The crucial question as to the timeliness of the appeal was whether the twenty-day period to bring an interlocutory appeal ran from the trial court’s denial of the MDCs’ original motion to dismiss and plea to the jurisdiction, which was denied in part and granted in part on June 15, 2015, or from the trial court’s denial of their hybrid mоtion for summary judgment, which was denied on-July 27,2015. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.1(b) (providing that a timely interlocutory appeal must be filed-within twenty days after the challenged order was signed). If it was the former, the twenty-day period expired before the MDCs filed their notice of appeal, depriving the court of - appeals of jurisdiction. If it was the latter, the-MDCs filеd their appeal timely.
' The court of appeals held that because the MDCs’ hybrid motion for summary judgment raised “essentially the same immunity-based arguments” as their earlier motion to dismiss and plea to the jurisdiction, the later motion was little more than a motion for reconsideration and the clock did not reset.
A party may appeal an interlocutory order that grants or denies a plea to the jurisdiction by a governmental unit. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(a)(8). This Court considers “plea to the jurisdiction” not to refer to a “particular procеdural vehicle,” but rather to the sübstance of the issue raised. Dep’t of Crim. Justice v. Simons,
The parties disagree about the applicability of our decision in City of Houston v. Estate of Jones,
In determining whether the City’s amended plea was merely a motion to reconsider, we looked to the arguments in the City’s two pleas. Jones,
While the City had asserted a new reason why it believed its immunity had not been waived, we determined that this new assertion was a change in “form without substance,” as the City “failed to address a contested issue or raise an issue” the City had not already asserted in its first plea. Jones,
Smedley asserts that the MDCs’ hybrid motion for summary judgment was nothing more than a motion for reconsideration, which cannot reset the appellate clock for an appeal. The MDCs assert that their motion for summary judgment was sufficiently different in form and substance and that they therefore should have had a full twenty-day period from the time the, motion was denied to file their interlocutory appeal.
Both parties discuss at length the different procedural vehicles used, in the abstract, without directly addressing whether the substance of the two relevant motions differed substantially. While the analysis depends more on content than form, the differences between those procedural vehicles inform our analysis. The MDCs contend that because the original motion was a pleadings challеnge and the later motion was an evidence-based motion for summary judgment, the later motion is distinct from the first and not a mere motion to reconsider. This argument is compelling. A pleadings challenge argues that the plaintiff has not alleged facts that, if proven true, constitute a valid claim over which there is jurisdiction. Miranda,
In City of Houston v. Harris,
[Tjhere is no real question of appellate jurisdiction in this case.... [T]he City has raised different issues with each appeal. The first appeal involved a challenge to the sufficiency of the pleadings, and the second appeal involves a challenge to the existence of jurisdictional facts, which requires an examination of evidence to determine, in summary judgment fashion, whether plaintiffs have evidence to support the claim pled....
Id. at 170. While Harris issued before Jones, the rationale for the court of appeals’ decision in Harris is consistent with Jones and is persuasive here. In Harris, the court of appeals looked to the two relevant motions and determined that they were sufficiently different to warrant a separate twenty-day period. Id.
Here, the MDCs argued in their original plea to the jurisdiction that Smedley had not alleged any facts that, if proven true,
The MDCs’ later motion for summary judgment, however, argued that in light of the discovered evidence, there was no evidence as to the claims under the Water Code or Takings Clause, and that- there was affirmative evidence that the MDCs did not own or control the Magnolia Stroll, preventing them from being able to provide injunctive relief. In support of 'their motion, the MDCs again offered the bylaws and articles of incorporation, along with the declaration of Paul Mendes, an alley identification- report surveying land near the Magnolia Stroll, City Ordinance No.- 113, Plaintiffs Additional Supplemental Response to City of Magnolia Interrogatory No,, 7 and Production Request No. 1Ó, and Plaintiffs First Amended Petition.
Based on the substance of the two motions, thе MDCs’.hybrid motion for summary judgment cannot be considered a mere motion for reconsideration of the initial plea to the jurisdiction.
Unlike in Jones, we conclude that the motions in this case are sufficiently different based on both their substance and procedural nature.- We hold that the MDCs’ hybrid motion for summary judgment was not a mere motion for reconsideration, but rather a distinct motion that merits an -independent twenty-day interlocutory appeal period. Accordingly, without hearing oral argument, Tex. R. App, P. 59.1, we reverse the court -of appeals’ judgment dismissing the MDCs’ appeal for lack of jurisdiction and remand the case to that court for further proceedings.
Notes
. Petitioners City of Magnolia 4A Economic Development Corporation and City of Magnolia 4B Community Development Corporation are MDCs operating under Chapters 501, 504, and 505 of the Texas Local Government Code and arе "governmental unit[s]” for liability and procedural purposes, See Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code §§ 504.107(b), 505.106(b).
, Defendants B&C Constructors, Inc. and CJR Lucky, Inc. were not parties on appeal. The City of Magnolia joined in the notice of appeal after the trial court granted in part and denied in part its motion to dismiss and plea to the jurisdiction. The court of аppeals went on to affirm in part and reverse and . remand in part as to the. City's appeal, 533 S.W,3d 1, 19,
. Importantly, we noté that procedural vehicles are not alone a dispositive end to the Jones analysis. The analysis must also involve an inquiry into the substance of the motions,