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Bally Total Fitness Corp. v. Jackson
53 S.W.3d 352
Tex.
2001
Check Treatment

*1 BALLY TOTAL FITNESS CORPORA- Corpora- Health & Tennis

TION f/k/a America, by merger

tion of successor Clubs,

to Dallas Health Inc. Bal- d/b/a

ly’s, Petitioner, JACKSON, individually

Keith and on similarly

behalf of all others situat-

ed, Freddy Mack, Respondents.

No. 99-1002.

Supreme Court of Texas.

Argued Sept. 2000. April

Decided 2001.

Rehearing Sept. Overruled Crofts, H. Callaway,

Sharon E. Thomas Jr., Jefferson, Callaway & Ricardo Crofts Mendoza, Cedillo, Davis & Keith G. Cedillo Ferrill, Kaiser, E. A. Michael Cox & Antonio, Tribe, Smith, Laurence H. San MA, Cambridge, petitioner. Snell, Snell, Barry Claybourne David Antonio, Krause, San Bayne Snell & respondent. opinion

Justice O’NEILL delivered the Court, joined by of the Chief Justice PHILLIPS, ENOCH, Justice Justice BAKER, and Justice HANKINSON. an interloc party may A by statute. utory order unless authorized Ross, 698 S.W.2d Co. v. Cherokee Water curiam). (Tex.1985) Section (per 51.014(a)(3) Practice and of the Texas Civil *2 353 Code. See the Texas Consumer Credit appeal an party Remedies Code allows 5069-6.02(9)(a) (re art. or refuses interlocutory order that certifies Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. (current version at pealed) a class action. Tex. Fin.Code Tex. Prac. & Civ. 51.014(a)(3). 345.055(a)). claimed § Jackson also In De Los San- Rem.Code Deceptive Texas Bally liable under the Corp., 933 was tos v. Occidental Chemical (Tex.1996), Act for unconscionable 493, that Trade Practices 495 we held S.W.2d that an representing conduct and for сhanged order that a cer- an rights and obli conferred mandatory agreement opt-out tified class from & by law. See Bus. prohibited gations the class and its Tex. created conflict between 17.46(b)(12). 17.50(a)(3), §§ the fundamental nature of Comm.Code counsel altered 1995, opt-out trial court certified under the the appealable the class and was 42(b)(4) of the Texas class under statute. Bally appealed Procedure. Rules of Civil trial certified a In this case the court order, court of but the the certification subject not the of but that order is affirmed the trial court. See appeals defendant, Rather, Bally appeal. this Jackson, Am. v. Corp. Health & Tennis of Fitness, appeal Total seeks to three subse- ton (Tex.App.—San 928 S.W.2d An The first or- quent orders. w.o.j.). io writ dism’d summary judgment granted partial der Discovery disputes concerning certain cus- holding Bally charged had membership arose after the certifica- illegal time-price tomers an differential. tion, of notice.1 As delaying delivery Bally’s overruled two The other two orders result, sent when notice had been decertify the must motions to class. We summary judg- partial moved for Jackson effect of decide whether combined The trial court liability ment on the issue. meets the De Los Santos test these orders and ruled that granted Jackson’s motion interlocutory-appeal jurisdiction. for We the Texas Consumer Bally had violated hold that it does not. Whether or not the Bally DTPA. then and the Credit Code issuing trial court abused its discretion class, complaining decertify moved to Bally which we appeal, the orders seeks summary judgment should decide, partial that the do not those orders do not alter the to the class mem- рreceded not have notice nature of the as De Los fundamental two orders bers.2 The trial court issued Accordingly, we affirm requires. Santos denying the motions. appeals’ of for want of the court dismissal jurisdiction. Bally petition filed an and a ap- the court of of mandamus with

writ I denied, The writ of mandamus peals. ar- After oral appeal proceeded. action and the Keith Jackson filed this class appeals dismissed gument, cer- the court Bally claiming charged that it jurisdic- for want of interlocutory appeal amounts that exceeded tain customers 327. filed both tion. time-price permitted differential maximum Bally petitioned both the court of disputes while 2. were resolved and 1. After these Court, pending this the case was Court for a writ of mandamus and this delayed approved trial court a form notice but prevent the rendition granted delivery until June 2000. We its potential class mem- before notice was sent to pend- Bally’s stay delivery notice motion to bers, was unsuccessful. but Sup.Ct. J. ing in this Court. 43 Tex. resolution 329 n. 24, 2000). (May peti- and a ferred to another court. The new court petition writ of mandamus granted plaintiffs’ tion denied motion to reconsid- for review this Court. We mandamus, Sup.Ct. opt-oiit the writ of 43 Tex. J. er and certified the class as an 13, 2000), (April granted peti- but class. The Gonzalez and others out, opted plaintiffs pro- tion whether the and the Grant for review consider *3 juris- appeals correctly court of decided its ceeded to trial. Long diction. v. Humble Oil & See Refin- jury negli- found defendants to be (Tex.1964) Co., ing 380 S.W.2d negligent, and awarded gent grossly jurisdiction to (holding this Court has damages. proceeding actual Before to the appeals review whether the court of had trial, of the punitive damages phase

jurisdiction). $65,700,000 defendants ‍​‌​‌​​​​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌​‌​​‌​‌​‌​​​​​‌​‌‍offered to settle for

provided mandatory that a class was certi- II by the trial court. The approved fied statute, By party may appeal counsel, a previously had opposed who order that certifies or refuses mandatory accepted joined a certify a class action. Tex. Civ. PRAC. & convincing defendants in the court to mod- 51.014(a)(3). The three inter by changing it from an ify opt-out the class Rem.Code locutory orders at issue here do not ex mandatory class to a settlement class. pressly certify certify objection or refuse to a class. was done over the of those This Rather, grants partial summary a rejected one had class counsel’s plaintiffs who judgment and the other two refuse to de- representation by opting par- out and not the class. concedes this certify Bally ticipating the trial. De point, argues but Los Santos appeals The court of dismissed the ob that an

broadened the statute’s reach so juris jecting plaintiffs’ appeal for want of changes appeal any lies from diction, upon Mortuary Pierce relying the fundamental nature of the class. changing that an order proposition why reasons the trial court’s offers several merely size of a class modifies a certifica na orders altered the class’s fundamental qualify tion order and does not as an “or argu addressing Bally’s ture. Before certifying refusing certify a der ments, presented examine the facts we Mortuary Colleges,Inc. class.” See Pierce De Los Santos. (Tex. 878, 880-81 Bjerke, denied). Santos, But we App. In filed writ De Los Grant — Dallas interlocutory order at issue OxyChem inju- and others for held that the suit simply did more than plant’s a acci- De Los Santos by ries caused butadiene “[cjhanging of the class: a plaintiffs change release. Other the size dental chemical defendants, not opt-out mandatory class from does facing and the intervened suits, membership; it alters injury simply enlarge success- its personal hundreds of class.” 933 manda- the fundamental nature of the fully moved the court to reaching our decision vigorous ob- at 495. tory plaintiffs’ class over the S.W.2d concern about conflicts jections. appealed and others the we voiced Grant counsel, certification, the class and its group of over 500 arise between but settlement. regard with represented by attorney particularly Gonza- interlocutory ap though deny noted that join “[t]o in the even We lez did not situation, class counsel in this when initially oppоsed peal the certifica- they had restructuring agrees fundamental tion. While they opposed, to which were once the case was trans- the class pending, order were favor, although they would Id.; in their see also merits those concerns.” aggravates deci- bound an adverse not have been Corp. Bloyed, Motors Gen. (1988). (Tex.1996) app. (noting “special sion. See 28 U.S.C. 953-54 classes). Advisory Bally, Commit- According concerns” raised settlement 23(c)(3) drafters intended tee ruling in De Los Santos Our narrow to elimi- Procedure Federal Rules of Civil intent that Legislature’s with the comports “ by allowing judgment practice nate this ‘a strictly 51.014 be construed section have re- members who only to bind to the rule that exception general narrow opted out: “Under ceived notice and judgments ap- final and orders are ” (c)(3), one-way inter- propоsed subdivision County v. Fu pealable.’ Montgomery excluded; the action will vention is (Tex.App qua, 22 S.W.3d . —Beau *4 be a class or early determined to been denied) 2000, Dep’t Tex. pet. (quoting mont action, former case the nonclass City Valley, 8 Transp. v. Sunset favorable, or not will judgment, whether 1999, 727, (Tex.App. S.W.3d — Austin correspond- Id. The include the class....” Online, America Inc. v. pet.)); no rule, 42(c)(3), Rule ing Texas class-action Williams, 268, (Tex.App.— S.W.2d Rule language of Federal tracks pet.). no [14th Dist.] Houston 23(c)(3). P. From 42(c)(3). Tex.R. Civ. DeBord, rejected Stary example, for we 42(c)(3) this, also Bally infers that Rule argument corporate-shareholder that a one-way Bally intervention. con- prohibits claim, closely though derivative even re pre-notice par- that trial court’s tends action, a class fit within the stat sembling summary judgment effectively permits tial utory language. 967 353-54 one-way intervеntion and violates (Tex.1998) curiam). (per Similarly, 42(c)(3). allowing one- Bally claims that statute does not authorize an of an the Texas way intervention also violates class, merely enlarging order the size of a and the open courts clause Constitution’s 880-81, Mortuary, Pierce 841 S.W.2d at process due federal and state constitutions’ definition, modifying an order class’s Bally clauses. con- equal protection Harms, Gathering Systems, Koch Inc. v. impli- violations alleged cludes that these (Tex.App. Corpus 455-56 — underlay our De the concerns that cate denied). Christi writ Los Santos decision. Nevertheless, Bally argues that we is that De Bally’s arguments an The crux of should extend De Los Santos to cover whenever that it less like Los Santos authorizes makes create incentives opt will out. Ac orders ly that class members stay opt-out in an class. Bally, sum class mеmbers cording partial because outset, underly- question Bally’s we liability in the At the mary judgment resolved favor, partial the trial court’s potential ing premise class mem plaintiffs’ one-way in- summary implicates judgment have been virtu opt bers’ incentives to out class, eliminated; because it will cause thus the while nomi tervention ally class, in the class. members to remain nally opt-out actually a de facto that “absent Bally acknowledges itself mandatory argues class. also opt out could recover judgment class members who pre-notice partial summary than damages more one-way interven seventeen times impermissible invites due to the in the class.” This is staying to the “One-way tion. intervention” refers $100,000 to class cap applies penalties permitting class members practice Compare Tex. Fin.Code litigation. actiоn after the court has decided intervene § (allowing plaintiff change 349.001 an indi- ders do not the nature of the vidual action to recover twice the total nor affect they do class members’ relation- time-price differential contracted for as a ships with each other or with class counsel. regard penalty, without to the size of his conclude that De Los cannot be We Santos actual damages) with Tex. case, Fin.Code present extended to the which does ’ (limiting 349.403 members of a implicate any of De Los Santos con- damages plus propor- class to actual their cerns.

tionate share of the maximum class action that a emphatically The dissent states $100,000). penalty of The class notice that class can never be certified or maintained the trial approved court has notifies the any after favoring plain- merits decision accordingly: class members “Because Tex- resulting potential tiff because of the penalty as law limits the amount of which Yet it one-way intervention. fails to ex- action, you may in a be awarded plain how the trial court’s orders here greater recovery you be able to if receive alter the class’s fundamental nature as re- Thus, yourself exclude from the class.” That quired by De Los Santos. the order contrary Bally’s argument, it does not (which decide) might wrong do not we appear absent class members’ incen- *5 appealable, does not make it else all al- opt tive to out has been eliminated leged in class-action irregularities a suit pre-notice partial summary judgment. subject to immediately would be review. so, any But even if that were incentive analysis, any Under the dissent’s stay might to in the class that result from a motion for reconsideration of a denying affect only the trial court’s order would alleging class certification the class the size of the not its fundamental requirements did not meet the of Rule nature. And in De we Los Santos said subject would be to review. simply enlarging the class’s member- might or not orders that create Whether ship enough. is not at 495. potential one-way intervention are Importantly, De Los Santos was not about claims, Bally prohibited, question in, strategic opting which is what presented any prohibition is whether such complains forcing of here. It was about may remedied be already plaintiffs opted who had out into a jurisdictional under limited our statute’s mandatory settlement class. The does law grant. And whether or not the trial mandatory in a permit plaintiffs class created impermissibly court’s оrder here out, if they every even have incen- opt potential an incentive for class members Thus, tive lost plaintiffs to do so. in, clear, it opt changed which is far from ability opt their out and were forced nothing about the class itself. into a class and a settlement their will. Moreover, question the dissent’s we sweeping any pre-notice assertion that contrast,

By class members the Jackson favoring merits determination out as a result legal opting face no bar None of the requires decertification. summary judg- pre-notice partial of the upon establishes cases the dissent relies they are forced into a class ment. Nor contrary, rule. To the those per such a se against their will. And unlike the De Los that the federal courts have cases reveal members, class the class members Santos bright-line rule out- proclaim declined to here have not been forced into conflict background the context of the case’s counsel. The trial court’s or- side with class Newberg (D.C.Cir.1980). There, the court ob procedural posture.3 See on ed.) (3d of the law state present 7-54 “[T]he 7.15 at served: Actions Class necessarily preclude (“Whether does not on the summary dispositions certifi merits on the merits, judgment cation ruling, may prop be after 23(b)(3) in class action is unset reasons for allow may equitable er a Rule there tled.”). These decisions are consistent in some ing post-judgment added). The Pos discretion afforded district cases.” Id. (emphasis with the broad managing class certifying courts in did tow court concluded that the trial court Corp. In re Nissan Motor actions. See in de- refusing to not abuse its discretion (5th Litig., 552 F.2d Antitrust rendering summary certify a class after Cir.1977). favor, plаintiffs’ taking judgment procedural complicated into account Tse, In Schwarzschild v. example, Id. history of the case. 1383-84. rejected the Ninth the defendant’s Circuit following “equitable rea court cited the to order notice sent to class mem- request allowing post-judgment certifica sons” for bers almost six months after the defen- in that tion case: summary motion was judgment dant’s originally The class was certified before (9th Cir.1995). 293, 297 granted. 69 F.3d granted to the summary judgment specifically open ques- The court left (though II the mem- Postows on Count tion whether certification and notice correctly were not bers of the class proceed cases which the then); identified and notified until after Id. summary prevailed judgment. moved for at n. 4. In Oriental reserving question, Federal agreed stay had Postow OBA court after the Postows referred Ass’n, Savings & Loan discovery identity of the *6 System, jury Library plaintiffs the had obtained a favorable In Smith v. Shawnee liability finding whether class central issue before Seventh Circuit considered on the yet seeking members who had not received class no at 354-55. In even certification. Id. contrast, by summary judgment fa plaintiffs present tice were bound a case in the (7th voring relatively the defendant. 60 F.3d 317 Cir. sought certification and notice class 1995). they The court not. held were litigation, although discovery dis- early in the Although Id. at 322. the court stated that interlocutory appeals delayed putes and class litigation Morris, “the class action status of Philip As- In Inc. v. National notice. void,” supported Fund, that statement the court's Cir- Medical the Second bestos Workers conclusion that the class members were not expressly that it did not “foreclose cuit noted Elgin bound. The court cited Gert v. National possibility post-trial class certifica- of a Industries, (7th Cir.1985), F.2d an 773 154 Cir.2000). 132, (2d And tion.” 214 F.3d 135 upon. case the dissent relies But the other v. Na- in Electrical Construction Co. Premier Gert court did not hold that the class certifica Ass’n, tional Electrical Contractors the issue void; rather, district tion was it set aside the validity, a the class’s but whether was not granting summary judgment order in court's opted of class class member that had out one purported it rule the class sofar as prevailed a action in which members who had not received notice of the rely estoppel in another could on collateral class action. Id. at 160. (7th Cir.1987). lawsuit. 814 F.2d Corp., Finally, v. Carte Blanche in Liberty Corp. Katz does Loan Neither Peritz judicial that "the Third Circuit commented bright-line advo- establish the rule the dissent (7th Cir.1975). There, system may, postponing class action treat- 523 F.2d cates. proved, has been avoid ment until a violation expressly thе court declined to decide might 23(c) expense and it ... whatever time would bar "whether in all cases Rule preparation [class] in the of notice.” subsequent incurred to a decision (3d Cir.1974) Instead, (emphasis 496 F.2d 523 F.2d at 354 n. 4. merits.” added). because court set aside class certification added). .by Chapter (emphasis 65.” class members until a decision on ed dismiss; and the Oriental’s motion to Legislature The could have added similar potential notice to class members did 51.014(a)(3) language per to Section and not inform ‍​‌​‌​​​​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌​‌​​‌​‌​‌​​​​​‌​‌‍them as to the existence refusing from to de- appeals mitted orders favor, any judgment in their thus reduc- class, Rather, certify a but did not. substantially way the “one street” ing that an Legislature specified lies danger post-judgment certifications. only from an order that or re “certifies Postow, 627 F.2d at 1383. certify fuses to class.” Tex. Prac. Civ. & 51.014(a)(3). Moreover, in procedural background this case Rem.Code remarkably similar. The class here was has allowed an though one court certified, and that certification originally interlocutory appeal decertify of an order appealed upheld, partial was ing Bridge see Grant v. Austin granted was to the (Tex. Co., Constr. 368-69 Moreover, plaintiffs. approved the notice 1987, writ), App. no [14th Dist.] — Houston inform potential the trial court does not logical there is a distinction between any judgment class members of their grants decertify order that a motion to favor, reducing any potential danger thus and an order that denies such a motion. addition, one-way intervention. grants an order motion to While summary Bally had earlier moved for decertify actually original alters the certifi judgment seeking dismissal of the class’s decision, refusing cation an order to decer- Finally, suggests clаims. the record tify change quo. does not the status Cf. delay least contributed to the (7th Sheahan, Gary v. claim; notification, as Cir.1999) (holding denying that an order 2, 1998, Bally example, October subject not decertify motion to a class is produce data about ordered refusing interlocutory appeal as an electronically readable class members rules). under the federal a class form, more than months later seven Allowing interlocutory appeals whenever a yet complied. deciding If were had we change trial court refuses to its mind all appeal, the merits of this we would take successive decertify a class would invite account, of these considerations into pur the statute’s appeals and undermine *7 did, in deciding Postow court whether the judicial economy. See pose promoting trial were еrroneous. But court’s orders Packer, 833, 842 Walker orders on an to review those (Tex.1992) (noting disruptive nature of jurisdiction, must have which sim- basis we stating and that “the mandamus review legis- limited ply does not exist under our cannot afford immediate review system grant. lative order”); Mgmt. every discovery Waste cf. trial dissent also states that Holdings, Mowbray, Inc. v. decertify is the functional court’s refusal to (1st Cir.2000) (noting in the context of granting certifica- equivalent of a decision orders that from class certification Legislature But the has shown else- tion. time- “interlocutory appeals disruptive, are that it knew how where section 51.014 Thus, consuming, expensive”). encompass such orders. Section Bally’s mo overruling trial court’s orders 51.014(a)(4) from an order appeal allows an fit within the De decertify do not tions temporary in- “grants or refuses a interlocutory-appeаl Los test for Santos grants or overrules a motion to junction or jurisdiction. injunction provid- temporal dissolve a class. damentally altered the nature of the III to manda- “Changing opt-out a class fi- Bally may appeal still after Because its member- tory simply enlarge does not arguments its constitutional judgment, nal nature of it alters the fundamental ship; pre- are concerning one-way intervention Santos, Los the class.” De today before us is mature. The issue that the court of accordingly 495. We held jurisdiction over this appeals’ the court of jurisdiction over an interlocu- appeals had Legislature has interlocutory appeal. The modifica- tory from the trial court’s carefully articulated which though even a modification tion of the class We are bound appealed. be orders not, speaking, “an striсtly a class is Accordingly, we policy choice. ... certifies interlocutory order appeals’ the court of dismissal affirm within the a class” or refuses jurisdiction. want of 51.014(a)(3). Tex. Civ. meaning of section 51.014(a)(3). In this OWEN, Dissenting opinion Justice Prac. & Rem.Code case, the fundamental nature of the joined by Justice HECHT Justice the trial court issued a was altered when ABBOTT. liability notice to class decision on did not Justice JEFFERSON that rul- given. had been After members participate in the decision. longer a class could no be certified. ing, OWEN, joined by required. Justice Justice Decertification was ABBOTT, dissenting. HECHT Justice That regard. clear this The law is rule, fed- class in our class action like the After the this case had been because certified, rule, designed put an end to so- but before notice was eral given members, granted “one-way opt- the trial court called intervention” when an par- tial for the out class certified. See Tex.R. P. Civ. 42(c)(2); liability issues. The trial thus court 23(c)(2). Fed.R.Civ.P. As Supreme converted the has ex- class from one that did not United States Court permit “one-way so-called until class action plained, interventions” federal into class that did. This rule allowed members of a class to wait altered fundamental nature of the deciding class because and see the outcome before rule, under our class action liability join: when whether to given is resolved before notice is to class or brought by a suit was “[WJhen members, the class certification can no merely such a it was sustained, longer be and the class must be joinder invitation to invitation to be- —an decertified. An interlocutory appeal from come a traveler in litigation, fellow a denial of a motion decertify can be might might аccepted.” which taken under these circumstances. Accord- A recurrent source of abuse under the *8 ingly, I dissent. lay former Rule in that potential the in members of the claimed class could

Bally says, I agree, that there is no in developments some situations await principled for drawing basis a distinction judgment the trial or even final on the between the facts of this case and the facts merits in whether determine in De Los Santos v. Occidental Chemical would to their participation be favorable (Tex.1996). Corp., 933 S.W.2d 493 In De interests. Santos, Los the trial court modified the Utah, change it from opt-out Pipe an class to American & Constr. v.Co. a mandatory class. fun- We held that this U.S. 94 S.Ct. 38 L.Ed.2d 546 - (9th Cir.1995) omitted). (em (1974) (citations Tse, 293, 295 poten- This was ended “one-way original). tial for intervention” This is true even if a phasis rule: by the current federal class action the determination of merits is interlocu for so- tory plaintiff This situation —the and is favorable to the rather “one-way intervention” —aroused defendant, called as is the here. than the case ground upon considerable criticism summary has received When that to allow members of a it was unfair favor, judgment in its class certification or judg- from a favorable class to benefit notice to the class after a merits determi subjecting themselves to ment without prohibited. nation is The Seventh Circuit binding effect of an unfavorable one. interlocutory appeal. has so held designed, in The 1966 amendments were Liberty Corp., Loan 523 F.2d 349 Peritz perceived to mend this part, specifically (7th Cir.1975). recognized that “[t]he It defect in the former Rule and to assure the amended import is obvious that members of the class would be requires prior Rule 23 class certification trial on the merits and identified before merits.” Id. at a determination subsequent all orders would be bound what the Su court reiterated 353. That judgments. Pipe: in American had said preme Court (footnotes omitted). Id. at 94 S.Ct. 756 23(c)(1) in the plain it makes Section Now, notice must occur certification and that the order thereof second sentence is any decision on the merits is to be made determining class status be that all class members will reached so “before the decision and finalized bound, judgment is whether favorable 23(c)(2) similarly indi- merits.” Section or unfavorable: in a the class members cates the action Once it is determined 23(b)(3) notified action are a class action may be maintained as exclu- voluntary enough to allow early (b)(3), the court under subdivision early and also “judgment” prior sion to members of the mandated to direct appearancе for effective enough to allow practicable class “the notice under best 23(c)(3), by provid- by counsel. Section advising them that the circumstances” if bind all class judgment from the class shall they may be excluded that the ing they request, they members, so will be bound intended to specifically was judgment, whether favorable prob- one-way intervention confront exclusion, and they request if do not *9 Accordingly, in this case. notice of class receives that the with instruction is remanded this cause of the the merits the action well before the of of certification the order to vacate adjudicated.” Schwarzschild case are 361 (7th Inc., 154, dus., 159-60 Cir. individual 773 F.2d proceed with the class and 1985); plaintiffs. Corp., of the named Blanche 496 claims Katz v. Carte (3d Cir.1974) 747, (noting that the F.2d 762 Id. provides protec action rule federal class from this indistinguishable Peritz is one-way intervention after an against tion Peritz, the trial court convened case. In determination). interlocutory merits the sole issue jury special for a verdict on Inc. v. National Asbestos Philip Morris the defen- by a loan form used of whether Fund, 132, 135 Medical F.3d Workers made cer- clearly conspicuously dant (2d Cir.2000), pro a mandamus which was Id. at 351. After the tain disclosures. defendant, the trial jury against found the held that a ceeding, the Second Circuit ordered the court certified a class and to decide required trial court was whether of notice. The pay defendant to the costs proceeded try it certify a class before ap- then filed an defendant neces case on the merits. This was the The Circuit held that as- peal. Seventh explained, to fore sary, the Second Circuit costs of notice the defen- sessing interven “specter stall thе risk-free meaning final order the dant was a within by putative decision thousands of tion of 28 U.S.C. and that the trial Although Id. the Second Cir plaintiffs.” decision on the merits before class court’s “[wjhile not fore [it did] cuit stated that certification and notice was an order “[u]n- possibility post-trial the of a class close derlying and basic to” the assessment case,” it empha certification in another squarely ‍​‌​‌​​​​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌​‌​​‌​‌​‌​​​​​‌​‌‍costs. The Seventh Circuit then rare, sized that such situation would trial extensively why addressed imagine that “it is ‘difficultto cases stating merits ruling court had erred on the appropriate in which it is to defer liability issue common to all certification until after decision certifying before the class and plaintiffs ” Bieneman v. Chi (quoting merits.’ Id. sending notice. The circuit court held that (7th Cir.1988)). F.2d cago, 838 required decertification was under those circumstances. Id. at 354-55. The Court case, will know the In this that Peritz declined to argues “expressly deciding opt whether to outcome before 23(c) in all cases Rule decide “whether rule, out, like which the federal class action to a subsequent would bar certification rule, prohibits: our ” decision on the merits.’ 53 S.W.3d at decision on certification prompt n. But cites as examples Peritz par- fix the identities of would both occur situations which certification the absent prevent ties to the suit and adjudication are after an of the merits how waiting members from see cases in which a defendant has waived one- deciding what things turned out before Peritz, way protection. intervention person’s decision whether to do.... So F.2d at 354 n. 4. judgment to be bound —like anomaly. Peritz is not an It is line court’s decision whether virtually every court that with what has in advance of class—would come well See, e.g., considered the issue has said. on the merits. Under the decision Library Sys., Smith Shawnee a mem- scheme of the revised (7th Cir.1995) “class (holding cast his lot at the of the class must ber no notice certification was void because are parties the suit and all beginning of adjudication of the given” was ever ill, bound, the results. merits); good Elgin Nat’l In- see also Gert v. *10 proposi- stand for the Nat’l Elec. These decisions Elec. Co. v. Premier Constr. (7th Ass’n, protec- can waive the tion that a defendant 814 F.2d Contractors Cir.1987). against one-way interventions that the tion body action rule affords. The of the the sub- refuses to rule on The Court that “sev- opinion in Schwarzschild notes class action requirements of our stantive circuits have concluded that a defen- eral which is taken from the regard, rule in this right his to have notice sent to dant waives Compare Tex.R. Civ. P. federal rule. 42(c) 23(с)(2) Rule whenever he the class under 23(c). The Court will with Fed.R.Civ.P. summary judgment moves before on the merits say whether decision certified and noti- properly class has been destroys the notice to the class before (emphasis origi- 69 F.3d at 297 fied.” maintain a class ability of a trial court to nal). happened precisely And that is what nature fundamentally alters the and thus in Postow. The Postow ex- decision Instead, the Court asks of the class. that class action pressly recognizes questions, such as answers irrelevant having a de- protection rule affords ruling court’s on the whether the trial of the merits before certifica- termination mem- incentives for class merits creates that can protection tion and notice but this will increase the size opt bers to out or may waive the waived: defendant “[A] at 355. the class. 53 S.W.3d 23(c) and elect to protections Rule offers question is whether overarching notice the merits decided all after the trial there can be a class at when, here, as to the class is sent merits. If there can ruling court’s on the defendant moves for class, the fundamental na- longer no be a of the certification issue.” before resolution been unquestionably of the class has ture The Postow decision 627 F.2d ruling If trial court’s changed. for requiring that one reason explained destroyed ability its to maintain merits ruling on the merits certification before class, affected surely, ruling then that future suits a defendant from protect is to with each relationships “class members’ that of the but by potential members counsel,” which the other or with when the longer no viable this reason is permit- says were the concerns Court of the insists on a determination defendant in De Los San- interlocutоry appeal an ted or notice: merits before tos. Id. held expressly courts have Other attempts distinguish The Court may protections a defendant waive that have declared federal decisions 23(c) and elect to have offers action rule was intended the current class certifica the class merits decided before one-way interven- end and has ended notice is sent question tion and before open says that it is tion. The Court here, when, defendant the class notice “certification and question whether summary judgment before moves for plain- in which the cases proceed issue. the certification resolution judg- summary prevailed tiffs have Corp., 496 Katz v. Carte Blanche E.g., discussion ment.” Id. at 357. The Court’s (en (3d Cir.1974) banc), 747, 757-62 F.2d misleading. authorities is of the federal denied, 95 S.Ct. cert. 419 U.S. (1974); v. Na Torosian 42 L.Ed.2d 125 First, footnote in cites a the Court Washington, Bank Capital tional in turn cites v. Tse Schwarzschild (D.D.C.1976); Haas 167, 169-71 F.Supp. Loan Savings and Federal Postow OBA Bank, F.Supp. (D.C.Cir.1980). Pittsburgh Nat’l Ass’n,

363 (W.D.Pa.1974), summary judgment request on other did not rev’d 801 Cir.1975). (3d underlying class’s claims. merits of the grounds, 526 F.2d 1083 reasoning opin- the of those We find Next, entirely out quotes the Court Katz noted, The court ions instructive. Haas context, for the that it stands suggesting strongest argu- example, for the certification postponing proposition preclude construing ment for Eisen merits determination of the until after a class certification is that post-judgment at acceptable. Id. be efficient and would notice to pre-judgment certification and Katz, defendant, 357 n. 3. necessary protect the class are seeking certification, who was plaintiff by potential from future suits defendant the merits asked the trial court to rule on But that ratio- members of the class. hopеd The defendant before certification. disappears nale when the defendant thus avoid prevail on the merits and summary judgment himself moves consisting of its customers having certification. before a decision on class The Katz court was certified and notified. situation, In such a “the defendants the defendant point careful to out that in their judgment assume the risk that a right had the would otherwise have protect favor will not them from subse- liability on notice to the class before insist quent suits other determined: was members, the slender reed of in- Finally, turning to defendant’s them and stare decisis stands between terest, that we it must be understood prospective litigants.” onrush of only with the defendant who dealing are Haas, supra, F.Supp. 381 at 805. against one-way protection declines the (footnote Postow, F.2d at omit- 627 1382 intervention after a violation has been ted). 23(b)(3) designed rule proved which holding consistent This unremarkable If to afford. a class action defendant Peritz, with Peritz and Katz. See class determination upon early insists Katz, 4; Bally at 354 n. at F.2d 762. rule, notice, is, he under the entitled in rights has not waived its this case. The But he makes a nonfrivo- to it. where it Court mischaracterizes the record when that his business will be lous claim says “Bally had earlier moved for notice, by the disrupted harmed or summary judgment seeking dismissal of willing to run the risk that deter- the class’s claims.” 53 S.W.3d at 358. loses, liability, if he will be mination of Bally did not move for in favor of the with given effect Bally the merits of the class’s claims. of such determina- notice the event requested summary judgment on Jack- tion, seriously district court must son’s individual claims based on the affir- consider that alternative. one-satisfaction, arguing mative defense of 496 F.2d at 762. against Bally, Jackson prior suit implication that Katz would received full satisfaction of all The Court’s already had court to establish a defen permit in this suit. a trial sought amounts he to recover request of a pecu- liability dant’s Because of this affirmative defense and then decide seeking Jackson was liar to Jackson because con directly a class is time of Bal- only name-plaintiff at the whether motion, Supreme the United States ly’s Bally argued trary also that the suit & Jac holding class action. Eisen Carlisle could not be maintained as a Court’s Postow, 417 U.S. 94 S.Ct. quelin, But unlike the defendant in (1974). Eisen, Supreme L.Ed.2d 732 Court one. See 417 U.S. at prohibited admonished that trial court is S.Ct. conducting any inquiry into the mer Beeson, Intratex *12 Gas Co. in deciding

its whether to a class: (Tex.2000). 404 attempts The Court refute the rule nothing find in either lan-

We that a merits determination should not oc- guage history gives or of Rule that cur before class certification notice any authority prelimi- court to conduct a noting in some of the cases cited nary inquiry into in the merits a suit above, proceeded the trial court with certi- may order to determine whether it fication and notification after the Indeed, maintained as a class action. defen- granted summary judg- dant had been procedure such a contravenes the Rule therefore, argues, ment. The Court by allowing representative plaintiff to those cases are in inapposite deciding of a secure benefits class action proceed whether certification can after a requirements without first satisfying grants summary judgment trial court in it. He is thereby allowed to obtain a ‍​‌​‌​​​​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌​‌​​‌​‌​‌​​​​​‌​‌‍plaintiff. agree favor of the I that cases determination on the merits of the granted summary which a defendant is claims advanced on behalf of the class judgment before certification dif- present any without that a assurance class action ferent concerns than when a has may procedure be maintained. This granted summary judgment. been For ex- directly contrary to the command of a trial ample, court must consider the due (c)(1) subdivision the court deter- process rights class members mine whether a suit denominated a class in deciding proceed whether to with class may action be maintained as such “as certification and notification after a defen- practicable soon as after the commence- ” dant summary judg- receives a favorable [the] ment of action.... Gert, ruling. ment 773 F.2d at 159-60. Eisen, 178-79, 417 U.S. at 94 S.Ct. 2140. But these different concerns do not detract that, recognition from these courts’ clear expressly This Court has followed Ei defendant, absent waiver a trial sen, determining that evaluation of the prohibited adjudicating court is prior inappropri merits to certification is plaintiffs request merits at the until after ate: certification and notification. Deciding the merits of the suit rule, The federal class action which the to determine the scope the class its aspects Texas rule follows material as a not maintainability class action is here, authoritatively has been construed to appropriate. See Eisen Carlisle & that a cannot be maintained if a mean 156, 177, Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 94 S.Ct. giv- trial court rules on the merits (1974); L.Ed.2d 732 Sirota This Court ing notice the class. Devices, Inc., Solitron the federal courts agree with what (2d Cir.1982); Irving Trust Co. v. Na- said, plausibly deny it cannot but Corp., Leisure 95 F.R.D. tionwide they have said it. (S.D.N.Y.1982). By evaluating the mer- stage, pre- its at the certification the trial The Court’s remarks about federal interloсutory court a representative plain- concerning would allow cedent proceeding asking tiff to secure the benefits of that it to insist on reveal continues wrong questions. with a class-action suit without first sat- The case before us rules isfying requirements does not turn on whether the federal maintaining are unmistakable in this request for relief permit would an or statutes regard. Texas appeal. question The whether That appeal.

law permits give refuses to effect Because the Court the trial depends in turn whether intent and to adhere to our legislative changed the ruling fundamentally court’s I dissent. precedent, own The trial court in this nature of the class. of the class when changed case the nature viability ruling on the merits ended the

its of section purpose

of the class.

51.014(a)(3) Practice and of Texas Civil Code, interlocutory

Remedies which allows of certain class-certification rul

appeals

ings, costly process is to ensure that the of action, its attendant potential with LIBANO, COMPANIA FINANCIARA defendant, harm a does

for irremediable Fong Najarro, Armando and S.A. proceed when there is no basis for Petitioners, 51.014(a)(3) certifying a class. Section provides person may appeal “[a] Mary that: ... certi H. William SIMMONS Hensley, individually

fies or refuses to a class in a suit Simmons trustee, brought Respondents. under Rule 42 of the Texas Rules and as Procedure.” Civil & Tex. Civ. Prac. No. 00-0465. 51.014(a)(3). Legislature § Rem.Code construing provi has directed that in this of Texas. Supreme Court sion, may object sought consider the it we 21, 2001. June consequences partic to attain and the of a ular construction. Tex. Gov’t Code 20, 2001. Rehearing Sept. Overruled 311.023; Corp. see also Ken Petroleum Questor Drilling Corp., (Tex.2000). The Court has refused to acknowledge give object to the effect attain, Legislature sought

which is to allow In

rulings on whether class is certified. case,

this the trial court’s refusal to decer-

tify longer after the certification could no equivalent

be sustained is the functional indistinguishable from а decision

granting certification. closing, it should ‍​‌​‌​​​​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌​‌​​‌​‌​‌​​​​​‌​‌‍be noted that says Bally appealing

Court the order summary judgment. granted partial at 359. That is not the case. trial court’s appealing decertify

refusal to the class after it had Bally’s briefing and

ruled on the merits. Notes lem, Advisory Committee as request who does not that a member point out. appearance enter an exclusion Peritz, 354. Decertification F.2d at the case. required: (footnotes 547-48, omit- Id. at 94 S.Ct. here did Inasmuch ted). certification, in fact affir- not seek adhered to the courts have federal the merits resolution on sought matively the merits that a decision on requirement objec- face of in the prior or else to the class occur after notice must defendants, them- they by the tions or maintained. class cannot be certified any class effectively precluded selves 23(c)(2) to ensure purpose “The

Case Details

Case Name: Bally Total Fitness Corp. v. Jackson
Court Name: Texas Supreme Court
Date Published: Sep 27, 2001
Citation: 53 S.W.3d 352
Docket Number: 99-1002
Court Abbreviation: Tex.
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