City of Dallas v. Brooks
2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 7026
Tex. App.2011Background
- Brookses sued the City of Dallas and Officer Rangel, representing the Estate of Patricia Brooks, alleging Rangel's negligent driving caused Patricia Brooks’s death as a pedestrian struck by a police car.
- Rangel, on patrol, answered a Code 1 backup call for a combative, suicidal person and proceeded toward the scene.
- Rangel increased speed to 50 mph on Cullum, in a largely empty, industrial area with minimal pedestrian traffic.
- Rangel struck Brooks in the middle lane; Brooks died; Brookses sought damages based on alleged negligence and violations of emergency-vehicle procedures.
- The City moved for plea to the jurisdiction arguing Rangel was entitled to official immunity; the trial court denied the plea; on interlocutory appeal, the court reverses and dismisses for lack of jurisdiction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Rangel performed discretionary duties for official immunity. | Brookses contend General Orders removed discretion, making conduct ministerial. | City asserts Rangel’s action was discretionary given emergency response. | Rangel performed discretionary duties as to responding to the Code 1 call. |
| Whether Rangel acted within the scope of authority. | Brookses concede he acted within course and scope; argue lack of authority due to policy. | City shows Rangel was on duty and responding within duties. | Rangel acted within the scope of his authority. |
| Whether Rangel acted in good faith. | Brookses argue General Orders show lack of good faith by violating speed/ lights/sirens rules. | City argues evidence shows a reasonably prudent officer could believe actions were justified. | Court held Rangel acted in good faith as a matter of law. |
Key Cases Cited
- Chambers v. City of Lancaster, 883 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. 1994) (distinguishes discretionary vs ministerial acts for official immunity; high-speed/chase context)
- Harless v. Niles, 100 S.W.3d 390 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2002) (discretionary duties include emergency vehicle operation; executive judgment involved)
- Wadewitz v. Montgomery, 951 S.W.2d 464 (Tex. 1997) (balance of need vs. risk in good-faith analysis; negligent conduct alone does not defeat good faith)
- Univ. of Houston v. Clark, 38 S.W.3d 578 (Tex. 2000) (official immunity standard; good faith and scope analysis)
- Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325 (Tex. 2006) (sovereign/governmental immunity framework for municipalities)