Chrysler v. Guiney, 806 F.3d 104

Background

In March 1999 Dominick Pendino disappeared and was later determined to have been killed; physical and DNA evidence connected Gregory Chrysler (and co-defendant Lawrence Weygant) to the scene and to two vehicles.
At trial, co-defendant Weygant testified before the grand jury; the prosecution sought to introduce Weygant’s grand jury testimony and Ferretti’s testimony recounting Weygant’s admissions. Chrysler’s trial counsel expressly declined to object and Chrysler elected a joint trial with Weygant.
A jury convicted Chrysler of second-degree murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and a marijuana-related conspiracy. The convictions were affirmed on direct appeal.
Chrysler later sought postconviction relief claiming appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising a Crawford-based Confrontation Clause challenge to admission of Weygant’s grand jury testimony; the New York Appellate Division denied coram nobis relief on the merits.
Chrysler filed a § 2254 habeas petition arguing appellate ineffective assistance; the district court denied relief but granted a limited certificate of appealability. The Second Circuit affirmed, applying AEDPA deference to the state court’s Strickland analysis.

Issues

Issue	Chrysler's Argument	Respondent's Argument	Held
Whether appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a Crawford Confrontation Clause claim based on Weygant’s grand jury testimony	Chrysler: appellate counsel unreasonably omitted a meritorious Crawford claim that would have reversed his conviction	State: the claim was unpreserved at trial (trial counsel waived/consented), unlikely to be reviewed in the interest of justice, and, even if reviewed, any error was harmless given overwhelming other evidence	Held: No ineffective assistance — fairminded jurists could conclude the omitted claim would not have changed the outcome; state court’s denial was not an unreasonable application of Strickland under AEDPA
Whether admission of Weygant’s grand jury testimony violated the Confrontation Clause and required reversal	Chrysler: admission of testimonial grand-jury testimony without cross-examination violated Crawford and was not harmless	State: trial counsel expressly declined to object; the testimony was largely corroborative/duplicative and any error would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt	Held: Court assumed Confrontation Clause implicated but found no reasonable probability of a different result on appeal; any error would have been harmless and review discretionary given waiver
Whether AEDPA permits federal habeas relief where the state court summarily denied coram nobis on ineffective-assistance grounds	Chrysler: state adjudication should not bar federal relief because counsel’s omission was unreasonable	State: summary disposition invoked correct law (Jones/Barnes and Strickland); AEDPA deference applies and fairminded jurists could agree with the state court	Held: AEDPA applies; the Second Department’s summary denial was an adjudication on the merits and not an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law

Key Cases Cited

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (Confrontation Clause bars admission of testimonial statements absent prior opportunity for cross-examination)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong ineffective-assistance test: performance and prejudice)
Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983) (appellate counsel need not raise every nonfrivolous issue)
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (AEDPA deference; summary state-court dispositions are merits adjudications absent reason to think otherwise)
Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259 (2000) (appellate counsel may select issues to maximize success; guides Strickland in appellate context)
Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652 (2004) ("fairminded jurists could disagree" standard under AEDPA)
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (harmless-error standard: beyond a reasonable doubt)
Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987) (limiting instructions may cure Bruton-type problems)